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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF NEVADA**

DAVID PEREZ-ALVAREZ,	)	
	)	
Petitioner,	)	2:12-cv-02088-JCM-GWF
	)	
vs.	)	<b>ORDER</b>
	)	
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, <i>et al.</i> ,	)	
	)	
Respondents.	)	
	/	

Petitioner, who is represented by counsel, has filed a habeas corpus petition, including a motion to stay of deportation. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2). On January 29, 2013, respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition as moot. (ECF No. 17). Petitioner filed a response to the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 20). On April 15, 2013, respondents filed a motion for an extension of time to file a reply, seeking a 2-day enlargement of time. (ECF No. 26). Two days later, on April 17, 2013, respondents filed a second motion to dismiss the petition. (ECF No. 27). Petitioner has not filed an opposition to respondents' second motion to dismiss the petition. Pursuant to Local Rule 7-2(d), the failure of a party to file points and authorities in response to any motion shall constitute consent to the granting of the motion. As such, respondents' second motion to dismiss could be granted solely on the basis of petitioner's failure to file a response to the motion. Local Rule 7-2(d).

1           The REAL ID Act of 2005, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252, significantly narrowed the scope of  
2 judicial review for removal orders in immigration cases. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), a  
3 petition filed with the appropriate court of appeals “shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial  
4 review of an order of removal entered or issued under any provision under this Act.” District courts  
5 do not have jurisdiction, habeas or otherwise, to review any removal order for any alien. *See*  
6 *Nadarajah v. Gonzales*, 443 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006) (interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1252). In this  
7 case, petitioner challenges the immigration judge’s reinstated final order of removal, which was  
8 issued after the date of enactment of the REAL ID Act. The petition is therefore dismissed for lack  
9 of subject matter jurisdiction.

10           In order to proceed with any appeal, petitioner must receive a certificate of appealability. 28  
11 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Fed. R. App. P. 22; 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. R. 22-1; *Allen v. Ornoski*, 435 F.3d 946, 950-951  
12 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006); *see also United States v. Mikels*, 236 F.3d 550, 551-52 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001). District  
13 courts are required to rule on the certificate of appealability in the order disposing of a proceeding  
14 adversely to the petitioner or movant, rather than waiting for a notice of appeal and request for  
15 certificate of appealability to be filed. Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 and 2255  
16 Cases. Generally, a petitioner must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional  
17 right” to warrant a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); *Slack v. McDaniel*, 529 U.S.  
18 473, 483-84 (2000). “The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district  
19 court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” *Id.* (quoting *Slack*, 529 U.S. at  
20 484). In order to meet this threshold inquiry, the petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that the  
21 issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues differently; or that  
22 the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. *Id.* In this case, no  
23 reasonable jurist would find this court’s decision debatable or wrong. The court therefore denies  
24 petitioner a certificate of appealability.

