1450, 1478 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (internal citations omitted); see also Nevada Fair Housing Ctr., Inc. v. Clark County, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1187 (D. Nev. 2008).

Defendant's motion seeks to strike the reference to itself as a "fiduciar[y]" in paragraph 44 of the Complaint. Defendant acknowledges that the Nevada Supreme Court has expressly approved a jury instruction that "[t]he duty owed by an insurance company to an insured is fiduciary in nature." Reply at 3 (quoting *Powers v. United Serv. Auto. Assoc. & USAA Cas. Ins. Co.*, 114 Nev. 690, 701 (1998)). But Defendant argues that this duty is only "akin" to that of a fiduciary and not equivalent to it. *See id.* In short, Defendant asserts that "Plaintiffs have alleged a fiduciary duty rather than a special contractual duty akin to a fiduciary duty." *See id.* at 5.

Defendant fails to cite to any case law of any kind addressing Rule 12(f), let alone case law supporting its assertion that striking is appropriate in this matter. *See* Mot. at 5-6; Reply at 4-5. Nor is Defendant's reasoning persuasive. Because the Complaint refers to Defendant as a "fiduciar[y]" rather than "akin to a fiduciary," Defendant worries that Plaintiffs "attempt[] to impose a higher duty" on Defendant. *See* Mot. at 6. Suffice it to say, the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiffs' use of the word "fiduciary" in their complaint rather than the phrase "akin to a fiduciary" will result in the imposition of a higher duty on Defendant.

The Court is simply not persuaded that a Rule 12(f) motion is the proper vehicle for determining the contours of Defendant's duty. Nor is it clear to the Court that a dispute between the parties of the contours of the duty owed even exists.

Accordingly, the motion is hereby **DENIED**.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 18, 2013

NANCY J. KOPPE

United States Magistrate Judge