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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA

William Merritt,
Petitioner

v.

D. Neven, et al.,
Respondents

Case No.: 2:13-cv-02347-JAD-PAL

**Order Granting Respondents'
Motion to Reopen Case and
Motion to Dismiss**

[ECF Nos. 49, 50]

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Pro se petitioner William Merritt has not taken any action to prosecute this case after the Nevada Supreme Court denied his appeal.¹ Because the petitioner failed to comply with my instructions to file a motion to reopen within forty-five days of issuance of the remittitur by the Nevada Supreme Court, I grant the respondents' motions to reopen² and dismiss this case.³

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I. Background

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In March 2016, I administratively closed this action while the petitioner exhausted his unexhausted claims in state court.⁴ I also instructed him to file a motion to reopen within 45 days of issuance of the remittitur by the Nevada Supreme Court.⁵ The state court denied the petitioner's state habeas petition and the Nevada Supreme Court denied his appeal.⁶ Remittitur issued in January 2020.

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¹ ECF No. 50-4.

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² ECF No. 49.

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³ ECF No. 50.

⁴ ECF No. 42.

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⁵ *Id.*

⁶ ECF Nos. 50-1, 50-4.

1 **II. Discussion**

2 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “in the exercise of
3 that power, they may impose sanctions, including where appropriate ... dismissal of a case.”⁷ A
4 court may dismiss an action, with prejudice, based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action,
5 failure to obey a court order, or failure to comply with local rules.⁸ In determining whether to
6 dismiss an action for lack of prosecution, failure to obey a court order, or failure to comply with
7 local rules, I must consider several factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of
8 litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants;
9 (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less
10 drastic alternatives.⁹

11 I find that the first two factors weigh in favor of dismissal. Since a presumption of injury
12 arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action, the third factor, risk of
13 prejudice to respondents, also weighs in favor of dismissal.¹⁰ The fourth factor, public policy
14 favoring disposition of cases on their merits, is greatly outweighed by the factors in favor of
15 dismissal. More than three years have elapsed since the issuance of remittitur and the petitioner
16 has not filed a motion to reopen. Petitioner did not respond to the motion to dismiss, and has
17 failed to otherwise prosecute this action. Under such circumstances, there is no lesser alternative
18 than dismissal of this action with prejudice.

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21 ⁷ *Thompson v. Housing Auth.*, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986).

22 ⁸ *See, e.g., Pagtulunan v. Galaza*, 291 P.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002) (dismissal of habeas corpus
petition with prejudice for failure to prosecute action and failure to comply with a court order).

23 ⁹ *Id.* at 642.

¹⁰ *See Anderson v. Air West*, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976).

