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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA

* * *

TIMOTHY LEROY WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff(s),

v.

STATE OF NEVADA, et al.,

Defendant(s).

Case No. 2:14-CV-1605 JCM (PAL)

ORDER

Presently before the court is defendant State of Nevada’s motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 15). Plaintiff Timothy L. Williams filed a response. (ECF No. 17). Defendant filed reply. (ECF No. 18).

I. Background

Plaintiff, who is a prisoner in the custody of the Nevada department of corrections (“NDOC”), has submitted an amended civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 10). Plaintiff alleges the following: On May 19, 2014, plaintiff was working in the SDCC culinary unit. (ECF No. 8 at 10). As part of his assigned duties, he set up the serving line, which was a one-person job. (Id.). While working that day, plaintiff experienced a sharp pain in his right groin while lifting a water dispenser from the floor to the counter. (Id.). Plaintiff continued working, but the pain resumed four hours later. (Id.).

Plaintiff reported the pain to prison staff and asked to have medical notified. (Id.). Plaintiff then requested medical on his own. (Id.). On May 28, 2014, plaintiff saw Dr. Sanchez, who diagnosed plaintiff with a hernia. (Id. at 10-11). Plaintiff submitted a classification for “medical light duty,” was given a support brace, and was sent back to work with the medical instruction paperwork. (Id. at 11). On May 30, 2014, a prison official informed plaintiff that due to his medical

James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge

1 light duty classification, he could no longer work in the culinary. (Id.). Later, plaintiff was
2 informed that the only employment opportunity available in that classification was “unit porter.”
3 (Id.).

4 Plaintiff filed an informal grievance regarding the prison work-induced hernia and
5 requesting workplace accommodations. (ECF No. 17 “Exhibit A-1”). The informal grievance was
6 denied June 4, 2014, because plaintiff did not state a remedy. (Id.). After remedying the procedural
7 issue, plaintiff correctly filed a new informal grievance and received a response on June 20, 2014.
8 (Id. at “Exhibit A-2”). Before filing a first-level grievance, plaintiff filed suit in this court on
9 September 19, 2014. (ECF No. 1-1). Plaintiff then filed a first-level grievance and received a
10 response on September 25, 2014. (Id. at “Exhibit A-3”). The same day, plaintiff filed a second-
11 level grievance. (Id. at “Exhibit A-7”). Plaintiff’s grievance was officially denied March 9, 2015.
12 Id.

13 **II. Legal Standard**

14 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary adjudication when the
15 pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
16 affidavits, if any, show that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant
17 is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A principal purpose of summary
18 judgment is “to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477
19 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986).

20 In determining summary judgment, a court applies a burden-shifting analysis. “When the
21 party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must come forward
22 with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at
23 trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine
24 issue of fact on each issue material to its case.” *C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests.,*
25 *Inc.*, 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

26 In contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or defense,
27 the moving party can meet its burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential
28 element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed

1 to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party's case on which that
2 party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See *Celotex Corp.*, 477 U.S. at 323–24. If the moving
3 party fails to meet its initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need not
4 consider the nonmoving party's evidence. See *Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.*, 398 U.S. 144, 159–60
5 (1970).

6 If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party
7 to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See *Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith*
8 *Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing
9 party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the
10 claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions
11 of the truth at trial.” *T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n*, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th
12 Cir. 1987).

13 In other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid summary judgment by relying solely on
14 conclusory allegations that are unsupported by factual data. See *Taylor v. List*, 880 F.2d 1040,
15 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposition must go beyond the assertions and allegations of the
16 pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that shows a genuine issue
17 for trial. See *Celotex Corp.*, 477 U.S. at 324.

18 At summary judgment, a court’s function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the
19 truth, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,*
20 *Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The evidence of the nonmovant is “to be believed, and all justifiable
21 inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” *Id.* at 255. But if the evidence of the nonmoving party is
22 merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See *id.* at
23 249–50.

24 **III. Discussion**

25 Defendant’s motion for summary judgment makes two arguments: (1) plaintiff has failed
26 to exhaust administrative remedies and (2) plaintiff has waived his claim for ADA accommodation
27 by estoppel. Plaintiff responds that he exhausted administrative remedies when his second-level
28 grievance was denied. He further alleges that the amended complaint restarts the pleading process,

1 precluding the “failure to exhaust administrative remedies” affirmative defense. Plaintiff also
2 contests defendant’s argument that his remedy has changed throughout the proceedings.

3 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires that inmates fully exhaust grievance
4 opportunities through the prison’s administrative process before filing an action. 42 U.S.C. §
5 1997e(a). The administrative remedies a prisoner must exhaust are defined by the prison grievance
6 process itself, not the PLRA. Jones, 549 U.S. at 218 (2007).

7 Nevada’s formal inmate grievance process has three levels. NEV. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS
8 ADMIN. REG.: INMATE GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE, ADR 740. Each level requires that the inmate
9 clearly detail the claim and remedy sought. Id.

10 The process requires an inmate to first file an informal grievance after failing to resolve the
11 issue outside of the prison process. Id. at 740.04. The inspector general’s office has ninety days to
12 respond. Id. Second, an inmate must file a first-level grievance. Id. at 740.05. The warden must
13 respond within forty-five days. Id. at 740.06.

14 Third, an inmate must file a second-level grievance. Id. at 740.07. The warden must respond
15 to a second-level grievance within sixty days. Id. A prisoner has exhausted his administrative
16 remedies only after he has completed the three-level grievance process.

17 Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense under the PLRA.
18 Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Exhaustion must occur prior to filing suit, not during the
19 suit’s pendency. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 199-1201 (9th Cir. 2002). Additionally, NRS
20 41.0322 requires prison inmates exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing suit, which,
21 pursuant to NRS 209. 243, must be filed within six months of the date of the alleged injury.

22 Defendant demonstrates that it is entitled to summary judgement as a matter of law because
23 plaintiff failed to exhaust the formal prison grievance process. Defendant presents evidence that
24 shows the plaintiff filed suit in federal court on September 19, 2014, several days before he
25 received a response to his first-level grievance or even filed a second-level grievance. (ECF No.
26 15-5).

27 Plaintiff’s evidence is consistent with this timeline. Plaintiff attaches formal grievances and
28 responses, which show that he filed suit before exhausting his administrative remedies. (ECF No.

1 17-7). There is thus no genuine issue of material fact with respect to plaintiff’s failure to exhaust
2 administrative remedies before filing suit.

3 Showing administrative relief existed does not support summary judgment, however, if
4 relief was unattainable. *Id.* When a plaintiff asserts this argument, the burden then shifts to the
5 plaintiff to show the relief he sought was made generally unavailable to him by “showing that the
6 local remedies were ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, inadequate, or obviously futile.”
7 *Hilao v. Estate of Marcos*, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir.1996). Plaintiff fails to convey that here.

8 Plaintiff argues that administrative relief was unattainable, but fails to demonstrate it.
9 While plaintiff argues his initial attempts to resolve the grievance were difficult to complete, he
10 does not show the remedies were unattainable. In fact, defendant presents evidence that it gave
11 plaintiff advice on how to cure deficiencies in the grievance. (ECF No. 17-2). This shows
12 administrative remedies were attainable, had plaintiff followed the procedure. Plaintiff has not met
13 the sufficiently shown the remedies were unattainable. Thus, summary judgment is appropriate.

14 Plaintiff also argues that the amended complaint was filed after the response to the second-
15 level grievance. However, while an amended complaint does supersede the initial pleading, it does
16 not change the date on which the action was commenced. *Sandpiper Management, LLC v. JP*
17 *Morgan Chase & Co.*, 2010 WL 4055567 (S.D. CA. 2010) (rejecting a defendant’s argument that
18 an amended complaint determined the commencement date). Further, § 1997e(a) does not require
19 exhaustion of administrative remedies before a complaint is filed, but instead before an action is
20 commenced. “[N]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions ... until such
21 administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” *McKinney v. Carey*, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200
22 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, the date the amended complaint was filed is irrelevant to whether plaintiff
23 commenced the action before exhausting administrative remedies.

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1 **IV. Conclusion**

2 Defendant has demonstrated that plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative remedies
3 required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Summary judgment in defendant's favor is therefore
4 appropriate.¹

5 Accordingly,

6 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that defendant state of
7 Nevada's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 15) be, and the same hereby, is GRANTED.

8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant State of Nevada shall submit an appropriate
9 proposed judgment within seven days of this order.

10 DATED June 15, 2016.

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12 _____
13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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28 ¹ Having granted summary judgment based on defendant's exhaustion argument, the court will not consider defendant's waiver by estoppel argument.