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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA**

AGS, LLC, <i>et al.</i> ,)	Case No. 2:14-cv-02018-JAD-CWH
Plaintiffs,)	
vs.)	<u>ORDER</u>
GALAXY GAMING, INC.,)	
Defendant.)	

Before this Court is Defendant and Counterclaimant Galaxy Gaming Inc’s (“Defendant”) motion to seal (doc. # 88), Plaintiffs and Counterclaimants AGS, LLC and Red Card Gaming Inc.’s (“Plaintiffs”) response (doc. # 92), and Defendant’s reply (doc. # 93).

BACKGROUND

This action arises from a dispute over the terms of the non-competition and asset purchase agreements that were entered into by Defendant and Plaintiff Red Card Gaming Inc. (“Red Card”). Plaintiff AGS, LLC is involved in this action, as it has been assigned Red Card’s rights and obligations under both the non-competition and asset purchase agreements.

DISCUSSION

1. Legal Standard

The Ninth Circuit has comprehensively examined the common law right of public access to judicial files and records. See Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2006). In Kamakana, the court recognized that different interests are at stake in preserving the secrecy

1 of materials produced during discovery, and materials produced or presented in relation to dispositive
2 motions. Id. at 1180-81. According to the court, two standards apply to account for these interests
3 when evaluating requests to seal such materials.

4 A party seeking to seal “private materials unearthed during discovery,” or to maintain the
5 sealing of such materials when attached to non-dispositive motions, need only demonstrate “good
6 cause” to justify sealing. Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010). “For good
7 cause to exist, the party seeking protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm will
8 result if no protective order is granted.” Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d
9 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002). In essence, “the public can gain access to litigation documents and
10 information produced during discovery unless the party opposing disclosure shows ‘good cause’ why
11 a protective order is necessary.” Id. at 1210. Thus, the “burden is on the party requesting a protective
12 order to demonstrate that: (1) the material in question is a trade secret or other confidential
13 information within the scope of Rule 26(c); and (2) disclosure would cause an identifiable, significant
14 harm.” Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation
15 omitted). “If a court finds particularized harm will result from disclosure of information to the public,
16 then it balances the public and private interests to decide whether a protective order is necessary.” Id.
17 at 1211 (citing Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995)).

18 By contrast, a party seeking to seal a judicial record attached to a dispositive motion, or
19 material that is presented at trial must articulate “compelling reasons” in favor of sealing. Kamakana,
20 447 F.3d at 1178. Indeed, the “mere fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant’s
21 embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court
22 to seal its records.” Id. (citation omitted). To justify sealing such documents, therefore, a party must
23 present articulable facts identifying the interests favoring continued secrecy and show that these
24 specific interests overcome the presumption of public access by outweighing the public’s interest in
25 understanding the judicial process. Id. at 1181. Generally, requests for sealing are justified in cases
26 in which the production of records would gratify private spite, encourage public scandal, circulate
27 libelous statements, or release trade secrets. Id. at 1179.

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