1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA	
2		Case No.: 2:15-cv-01581-GMN-(CWH)
3	SANFORD BUCKLES, on behalf	
4	of himself and others similarly situated,	CERTIFICATION ORDER TO
5		THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT
6	Plaintiff,	
7	V.	
8	GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC	
9	and WALTER INVESTMENT	
10	MANAGEMENT	
11	CORPORATION,	
11	Defendants.	
13	Before the Court is Defendant D	itech Financial LLC's (formerly known as
14	Green Tree Servicing LLC) ("Ditech")	motion to dismiss the amended complaint
15	in this putative class action (ECF No. 1	4). Plaintiff Sanford Buckles ("Plaintiff")
16	filed a response (ECF No. 20), and Dite	ech filed a reply (ECF No. 24). For the
17	reasons discussed below, the Court has	decided that the motion to dismiss raises a
18		which may be determinative of the cause" as
19	to which it appears to the Court that "th	-
20		
21	decisions of the Nevada Supreme Cour	
22		statutory law to the Nevada Supreme Court
	I. NATURE OF THE CASE	

Plaintiff has filed a putative class action against mortgage servicer Ditech, claiming it violated Nevada Revised Statutes 200.620 by recording telephone conversations involving him and other class members without each class member's consent. ECF No. 13 (amended complaint). Plaintiff has defined the class to

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include "All persons in Nevada whose inbound and outbound telephone conversations were monitored, recorded, and/or eavesdropped upon without their consent by [Ditech] within three years prior to the filing of the original Complaint in this action." *Id.* ¶ 39.

Ditech moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing (1) that Nevada Revised Statutes 200.620 does not govern telephone calls recorded by persons outside Nevada on equipment located outside of Nevada, and (2) that the United States Constitution precludes extraterritorial application of Nevada Revised Statutes 200.620 to telephone recordings made outside of Nevada. This Court has determined that Ditech's motion turns on a dispositive question of Nevada's statutory law best decided by the Nevada Supreme Court, since "there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the Supreme Court of this state." See NEV. R. APP. P. 5(a).

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# **STATUTES AT ISSUE**

Nevada Revised Statutes 200.620(1) provides, in relevant part: Except as otherwise provided in NRS 179.410 to 179.515, inclusive, 209.419 and 704.195, it is unlawful for any person to intercept or attempt to intercept any wire communication unless:

(a) The interception or attempted interception is made with the prior consent of one of the parties to the communication; and (b) An emergency situation exists and it is impractical to obtain a court order as required by NRS 179.410 to 179.515, inclusive, before the interception, in which event the interception is subject to the requirements of subsection 3. If the application for ratification is denied, any use or disclosure of the information so intercepted is unlawful, and the person who

1	made the interception shall notify the sender and the receiver of
2	the communication that:
3	(1) The communication was intercepted; and
4	(2) Upon application to the court, ratification of the
5	interception was denied.
6	The Nevada Revised Statutes include the following definitions:
7	1. "Person" includes public officials and law enforcement officers of
8	the State and of a county or municipality or other political subdivision
9	of the State.
10	2. "Wire communication" means the transmission of writing, signs,
11	signals, pictures and sounds of all kinds by wire, cable, or other
12	similar connection between the points of origin and reception of such
13	transmission, including all facilities and services incidental to such
14	transmission, which facilities and services include, among other
15	things, the receipt, forwarding and delivering of communications.
16	3. "Radio communication" means the transmission of writing, signs,
17	signals, pictures, and sounds of all kinds by radio or other wireless
18	methods, including all facilities and services incidental to such
19	transmission, which facilities and services include, among other
20	things, the receipt, forwarding and delivering of communications. The
21	term does not include the transmission of writing, signs, signals,
22	pictures and sounds broadcast by amateurs or public or municipal
23	agencies of the State of Nevada, or by others for the use of the general
24	public.
25	Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.610.
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1	"Intercept" means the aural acquisition of the contents of any wire,	
2	electronic or oral communication through the use of any electronic,	
3	mechanical or other device or of any sending or receiving equipment.	
4	Nev. Rev. Stat. 179.430.	
5	The Nevada Revised Statutes contain the following penalties:	
6	A person who willfully and knowingly violates NRS 200.620 to	
7	200.650 inclusive:	
8	(a) Shall be punished for a category D felony as provided in	
9	NRS 193.130.	
10	(b) Is liable to a person whose wire or oral communication is	
11	intercepted without his or her consent for:	
12	(1) Actual damages or liquidated damages of \$100 per	
13	day of violation but not less than \$1,000, whichever is	
14	greater;	
15	(2) Punitive damages; and	
16	(3) His or her costs reasonably incurred in the action,	
17	including a reasonable attorney's fee,	
18	all of which may be recovered by civil action.	
19	Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.690(1).	
20	III. <u>STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS</u>	
21	Ditech is a Delaware limited liability company which was headquartered in	
22	Minnesota at the time the complaint was filed, and which has since moved its	
23	headquarters to Florida. Ditech has customer call centers equipped to record	
24	telephone calls. Those call centers are located in Arizona and Minnesota. The	
25	company does not have any telephone recording equipment in Nevada. Ditech is a	
26	home mortgage servicer that regularly services mortgages of Nevada properties.	

Plaintiff resides in Nevada in a home whose mortgage is serviced by Ditech. Plaintiff alleges that from 2013 through 2014, Ditech engaged in telephone conversations with Plaintiff regarding the Plaintiff's mortgage and recorded such telephone conversations without Plaintiff's consent.

## IV. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

The Nevada Supreme Court has interpreted Nevada Revised Statutes 200.620 to "prohibit the taping of telephone conversations with the consent of only one party." *Lane v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 969 P.2d 938, 940 (Nev. 1998). Ditech has moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, arguing Nevada Revised Statutes 200.620 does not apply to telephone calls recorded outside of Nevada. Specifically, Ditech argues that NRS 200.620 applies only to recordings that take place with recording equipment in the State of Nevada.

Ditech relies primarily on *McLellan v. State*, 182 P.3d 106 (Nev. 2008). In that case, the Nevada Supreme Court held that a telephone recording made in California was admissible against a Nevada defendant who was party to the call because the recording was not made in Nevada and thus 200.620 did not apply. *Id.* at 109–10. Ditech also relies on authority from the Washington Supreme Court, followed in *McLellan*, holding that the law of the State where the recording is made determines whether interception of the telephone call is lawful. *See State v. Fowler*, 139 P.3d 342, 347 (Wash. 2006) (en banc); *Kadoranian v. Bellingham Police Dept.*, 829 P.2d 1061, 1065 (Wash. 1992) (en banc).

Plaintiff argues that 200.620 applies to telephone calls recorded outside of
the State if a person in Nevada is party to the call and does not consent. Plaintiff
argues that *McLellan* is distinguishable because it turned on an evidentiary rule
(Nevada Revised Statutes 48.077), not 200.620. Plaintiff relies primarily on a
California Supreme Court decision, *Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney*, 137 P.3d

914 (Cal. 2006). *Kearney* held that California's two-party consent statute applied to recordings made outside California because to hold otherwise would disadvantage California residents. Id. at 917, 937.

V. DISCUSSION

If Nevada revised Statutes 200.620 does not apply to recordings made outside of Nevada by Ditech, Ditech's motion to dismiss is due to be granted. If the statute applies to telephone recordings made outside of Nevada by Ditech, however, this Court must decide Ditech's constitutional challenge to the statute under the Due Process Clause and the Dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The necessity of reaching these serious constitutional questions depends upon resolution of prior, potentially dispositive, questions of Nevada statutory law. This Court believes there is "no controlling precedent" from the Nevada Supreme Court on these precise "questions of law" and therefore has decided to certify the questions to that court. See NEV. R. APP. P. 5(a).

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#### PARTIES' PROPOSED CERTIFIED QUESTIONS OF STATE LAW VI.

The Parties have met and conferred on the issue but could not agree as to the language of the question(s) of law to be certified to the Nevada Supreme Court. They therefore respectively propose the following:

Plaintiff's proposed question: Does Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.620 apply to 22 telephone recordings made by a party outside Nevada, who regularly records telephone conversations with Nevada residents, of telephone conversations with a 23 person in Nevada without that person's consent? 24

25 **Defendant's proposed question**: Does Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.620 apply to telephone recordings made by a party outside Nevada who uses equipment outside 26 Nevada to record telephone conversations with a person in Nevada without that

person's consent? If so, does that decision apply retroactively or prospectively only?

#### Parties' explanation for competing positions:

First, Plaintiff maintains that the question presented should include the fact that Defendant "regularly records telephone conversations with Nevada residents," a fact that was considered in *Kearney*. Defendant maintains that the question presented should not include this because the allegation is not relevant. Defendant believes the question should include the fact that the equipment used to record is also located outside Nevada. Plaintiff proposes not to include that concept.

Second, Defendant believes that implicit in the question to be certified is whether any decision to apply the statute to recording that takes place on equipment outside Nevada should apply retroactively or prospectively only. Defendant submits that this issue is subsumed within the question to be certified but should be made explicit, is raised by Plaintiff's reliance on *Kearney<sup>1</sup>*, and is now appropriate to raise since the Nevada Supreme Court is the court with the power to make application of the statute prospective only. Plaintiff disagrees that this is appropriate since this issue has never been raised in the Parties' briefing and, furthermore, it is outside of the scope of this Court's Order for the Parties to submit this joint brief.

Accordingly, the parties have submitted competing proposals on the question(s) to be certified.

<sup>1</sup> The California Supreme Court applied its decision in *Kearney* prospectively, however, due to prior uncertainty in the law. *Id.* at 937–39.

### VII. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

**IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that Defendant Ditech's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 14) is **DENIED without prejudice**, with permission to renew the motion within 30 days of the resolution of the Court's certified question to the Nevada Supreme Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following questions of law are CERTIFIED to the Nevada Supreme Court pursuant to Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure 5:

Plaintiff's position: Does Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.620 apply to telephonerecordings made by a party outside Nevada, who regularly records telephoneconversations with Nevada residents, of telephone conversations with a person inNevada without that person's consent?

**Defendant's position**: Does Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.620 apply to telephone recordings by a party outside Nevada who uses equipment outside Nevada to record telephone conversations with a person in Nevada without that person's consent? If so, does that decision apply retroactively, or prospectively only? *See* NEV. R. APP. P. 5(c)(1). The nature of the controversy and a statement of the facts are discussed above. *See* NEV. R. APP. P. 5(c)(2)–(3). Because Defendant Ditech is the movant, Ditech is designated the Appellant and Plaintiff Buckles is designated the Respondent. *See* NEV. R. APP. P. 5(c)(4). The names and addresses of counsel are as follows:

#### **Counsel for Plaintiff**

Michael Kind
Kazerouni Law Group, APC
7854 W. Sahara Avenue
Las Vegas, NV 89117
800-400-6808
mkind@kazlg.com

1	David H. Krieger
2	Haines & Krieger, LLC
3	8985 S. Eastern Avenue Suite 350
4	Henderson, NV 89123
5	(702) 880-5554 Fax: (702) 383-5518
6	dkrieger@hainesandkrieger.com
7	Counsel for Defendant
8	
9	Michael R. Brooks Nevada Bar No. 7287
10	Gregg A. Hubley
11	Nevada Bar No. 7386 BROOKS HUBLEY LLP
12	1645 Village Center Circle, Suite 200
	Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Telephone: (702) 851, 1101
13	Telephone: (702) 851-1191 Facsimile: (702) 851-1198
14	mbrooks@brookshubley.com
15	ghubley@brookshubley.com
16	Elizabeth Hamrick
17	Nevada Bar No. 9414 Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP
18	200 Clinton Avenue West, Suite 900
19	Huntsville, AL 35801 Telephone: (256) 517-5100
20	Facsimile: (256) 517-5200
21	ehamrick@babc.com
22	See NEV. R. APP. P. 5(c)(5). Further elaboration upon the certified question is
23	included in this Order.
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	<b>IT IS FURTHER ORDERED</b> that the Clerk of the Court shall forward a
	copy of this Order to the Clerk of the Nevada Supreme Court under the official
;	seal of the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. See NEV. R.
-	App. P. 5(d).
;	<b>DATED</b> this $25$ day of May, 2016.
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;	Gloria M. Navarro, Chief Judge United States District Court
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