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| 4 | UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT | |
| 5 | DISTRICT OF NEVADA | |
| 6 | * * * | |
| 7 | LEROY COLLINS, | Case No. 2:15-CV-1696 JCM (CWH) |
| 8 | Plaintiff(s), | ORDER |
| 9 | v. | |
| 10 | PATRICK HENDRIX, et al., | |
| 11 | Defendant(s). | |
| 12 | | |
| 13 | Presently before the court is plaintiff Leroy Collins' motion for default judgment. (ECF | |
| 14 | No. 56). Defendants Romero Aranas, Greg Cox, Patrick Hendrix, and Dwight Nevens filed a | |
| 15 | response (ECF No. 57), to which plaintiff replied (ECF No. 59). | |
| 16 | Also before the court is plaintiff's motion to strike defendants' response to plaintiff's | |
| 17 | motion to strike. (ECF No. 60). | |
| 18 | Obtaining a default judgment is a two-step process. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 | |
| 19 | (9th Cir. 1986). First, "[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought | |
| 20 | has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the | |
| 21 | clerk must enter the party's default." Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure | |
| 22 | 55(b)(2) provides that "a court may enter a default judgment after the party seeking default applies | |
| 23 | to the clerk of the court as required by subsection (a) of this rule." | |
| 24 | The choice whether to enter a default judgment lies within the discretion of the court. | |
| 25 | Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.3d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In the determination of whether to grant | |
| 26 | a default judgment, the court should consider the seven factors set forth in Eitel: (1) the possibility | |
| 27 | of prejudice to plaintiff if default judgment is not entered; (2) the merits of the claims; (3) the | |
| 28 | sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the amount of mo | oney at stake; (5) the possibility of a dispute |
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| 1 | concerning material facts; (6) whether default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the policy | |
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| 2 | favoring a decision on the merits. 782 F.2d at 1471–72. In applying the Eitel factors, "the factual | |
| 3 | allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true." | |
| 4 | Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d). | |
| 5 | In the instant motion, plaintiff seeks a default judgment in plaintiff's favor against | |
| 6 | defendant Patrick Hendrix ("Hendrix"). (ECF No. 56). Plaintiff alleges that Hendrix has failed to | |
| 7 | appear in the matter, thus warranting an order of default judgment. Id. | |
| 8 | However, as noted in defendants' response (ECF No. 57), Hendrix filed his answer on | |
| 9 | February 8, 2017 (ECF No. 28). Rule 55(a) explicitly states that a default judgment may be entered | |
| 10 | "[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or | |
| 11 | otherwise defend." As Hendrix has appeared in this matter, there is no basis for the court to enter | |
| 12 | default judgment against him. Accordingly, the court will deny plaintiff's motion for default | |
| 13 | judgment. | |
| 14 | As the court will deny plaintiff's motion for default judgment, the court will deny plaintiff's | |
| 15 | motion to strike defendants' response as moot. | |
| 16 | Accordingly, | |
| 17 | IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that plaintiff's motion for | |
| 18 | default judgment (ECF No. 56) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. | |
| 19 | IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to strike defendants' response (ECF | |
| 20 | No. 60) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED as moot. | |
| 21 | DATED July 20, 2018. | |
| 22 | Xerris C. Mahan | |
| 23 | UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE | |
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