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2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
3	DISTRICT OF NEVADA		
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5	Cheryl Fealy,	2:15-cv-2124-JAD-CWH	
6	Plaintiff	Order Denying Plaintiff's Motions	
7	V.	[ECF Nos. 18, 19, 24]	
8 9	Department of the Treasury and Internal Revenue Service, et. al.,		
9	Defendants		
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11	The Internal Revenue Service garnished plaintif	f Cheryl Fealy's social security checks	
12	because she didn't pay her taxes. Feely brought this action to stop the garnishment on the basis that—because she is not a federal employee—she is immune from having to pay taxes. In a prior		
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14	order, I dismissed Fealy's complaint with prejudice because she both failed to exhaust her		
15	administrative remedies and, even if she had not, her allegations did not give rise to a plausible		
17	claim. <sup>1</sup> Since that order, Fealy continues to zealously advocate on her own behalf—filing three		
17	motions asking that I set aside my prior decision.		
18	A motion to reconsider must set forth "some valid reason why the court should reconsider its		
20	prior decision" by presenting "facts or law of a strongly convincing nature." <sup>2</sup> Reconsideration is		
	appropriate if the court "is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or		
21	the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law." <sup>3</sup>		
22	"A motion for reconsideration is not an avenue to re-litigate the same issues and arguments upon		
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26	<sup>1</sup> I find this motion suitable for disposition without oral argument. Nev. L.R. 78-1.		
27	<sup>2</sup> Frasure v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1183 (D. Nev. 2003).		
28	<sup>3</sup> Sch. Dist. No. 1J v. Acands, Inc., 5 F.3d 1244, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).		
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1 which the court has already ruled."<sup>4</sup>

2	I am sympathetic to the challenges that Fealy faces in representing herself, but her latest	
3	motions rehash the same arguments that she made before. <sup>5</sup> She contends that she exhausted her	
4	administrative remedies because she made "efforts to resolve the issue" with the IRS. <sup>6</sup> To be	
5	clear: I do not doubt that she made some effort to resolve this case with the IRS. But as I explained	
6	before, that is not legally enough. To exhaust an agency's administrative remedies, a party must not	
7	merely make some effort to resolve the issue-she must follow that agency's procedures in doing	
8	so. <sup>7</sup> The IRS's procedures are laid out in 26 C.F.R. § 301.7433. Fealy has never alleged facts	
9	showing that she properly complied with these requirements and thus properly exhausted her	
10	remedies with the agency. <sup>8</sup> Navigating an agency's administrative process can be daunting, but that	
11	does not excuse Fealy's failure to comply with the IRS's requirements.	
12	But even if Fealy had exhausted her remedies, I still must dismiss her case (and thus deny her	
13	newest round of motions). Above all, Fealy's claims are predicated on the theory that only	
14	employees of "Government regulated Compan[ies]" can be taxed.9 But she provides no cases or	
15	statutes supporting her theory, and that is because there are none. Indeed, courts have sanctioned	
16	plaintiffs with heavy monetary fines for maintaining frivolous arguments that they are immune from	
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18	<sup>4</sup> Brown v. Kinross Gold, U.S.A., 378 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1288 (D. Nev. 2005).	
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20	as a "tax protester." But I ruled against Fealy because her claims have no basis in the law, and for no	
21	other reason.	
22	<sup>6</sup> ECF No. 18 at 7.	
23	<sup>7</sup> Conforte v. United States, 979 F.2d 1375, 1377 (9th Cir. 1992).	
24	<sup>8</sup> Fealy alleges that she requested a hearing and filed a document request with the IRS, but neither of	
25	those acts stand in for the agency's procedural process.	
26	<sup>9</sup> ECF No. 18 at 8. Most of the facts Fealy recites in her motion are nowhere to be found in her complaint. The facts Fealy does provide are of little help. She repeatedly says that the government	
27	cannot impose "excise taxes" on her, but there is no evidence that the IRS ever imposed excise	
28	(sales) taxes on her. Fealy says that she was misled into thinking that she had to fill out a W-4 form but she fails to explain how this fact would impact her claims.	
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1	taxes. <sup>10</sup>	
2	Conclusion	
3	Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Fealy's	
4	motions for reconsideration, to set aside, and for preliminary injunction [ECF Nos. 18, 19, 24]	
5	are DENIED.	
6	Fealy is cautioned that any motions asking for further relief in this case will be summarily	
7	denied.	
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9	Dated this 18 <sup>th</sup> day of January, 2017	
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11	Jennifer A. Dorsey	
12	United States District Judge	
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20	<sup>10</sup> See Taliaferro v. Freeman, 595 F. App'x 961, 962 (11th Cir. 2014) (rejecting as frivolous the	
27	argument that only federal employees must pay taxes). Fealy's constitutional claims are equally frivolous because, among other things, she provides no legal support for them, and her complaint contains no facts making them plausible.	
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