



1           **I. ANALYSIS**

2           Under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA), “[a]ny  
3           dispute between an employer and the plan sponsor concerning a determination made under  
4           sections 1381 through 1399 of [ERISA] shall be resolved through arbitration.” 29 U.S.C.  
5           § 1401(a)(1). This mandatory arbitration is “not a jurisdictional prerequisite to federal court  
6           review” but rather “constitutes an exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement.” *Bd. of Trs.*  
7           *of Constr. Laborers’ Pension Tr. for S. Cal. v. M. M. Sundt Constr. Co.*, 37 F.3d 1419, 1420 (9th  
8           Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Exceptions to the exhaustion requirement are rare, and “apply only in  
9           extraordinary circumstances, such as, when the arbitral process would be futile or would cause  
10          the plaintiff irreparable injury.” *Id.* at 1421. “[Q]uestions of statutory interpretation are not  
11          excepted from arbitration under MPPAA.” *Teamsters Pension Tr.–Bd. of Trs. of the W.*  
12          *Conference v. Allyn Transp. Co.*, 832 F.2d 502, 504 (9th Cir. 1987).

13          The mandatory arbitration provision “applies where an employer contests the existence or  
14          the amount of an alleged liability.” *Carpenters Pension Tr. Fund for N. Cal. v. Moxley*, 734 F.3d  
15          864, 870 (9th Cir. 2013). In other words, where the issue is the establishment of withdrawal  
16          liability, arbitration is required. *Allyn Transp. Co.*, 832 F.2d at 506.

17          In my previous order denying the Plan’s motion to dismiss, I held that the arbitration  
18          provision had not yet been triggered because there had been no withdrawal or assessment of  
19          withdrawal liability. ECF No. 21 at 2–3. In fact, the Plan determined that JB had withdrawn in  
20          September 2016 and assessed withdrawal liability of \$913,315. ECF No. 27-7 at 11.

21          JB argues that I must follow the law of the case, namely my finding in the previous order  
22          that arbitration was not triggered. Under the law of the case doctrine, “a court is generally  
23          precluded from reconsidering an issue previously decided by the same court . . . in the identical  
24          case.” *Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Seals Corp. of Am.*, 902 F.2d 703, 715 (9th Cir. 1990).  
25          “Application of the doctrine is discretionary,” but it should not be applied “in only three  
26          instances: (1) the first decision was clearly erroneous and would result in manifest injustice; (2)  
27          an intervening change in the law has occurred; or (3) the evidence . . . [is] substantially different.”  
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1 *Id.* JB contends none of these circumstances occurred here, but the evidence in front of me is  
2 substantially different than it was on the motion to dismiss. There is now evidence of a  
3 withdrawal and individualized determination as contemplated by § 1401. JB's argument that the  
4 Plan should have raised this evidence before my ruling on the motion to dismiss is inapposite, as  
5 the Plan's argument at that stage was that such a withdrawal trigger was unnecessary. Therefore,  
6 I find that I am not precluded from reconsidering whether JB must arbitrate its claim.

7 Although styled as a challenge to an amendment affecting all contributing employers, this  
8 dispute is at its core about the existence of JB's withdrawal liability. JB contends that an  
9 amendment in the Plan's Trust Agreement—limiting the exception to withdrawal liability for  
10 certain entertainment industry employers found in § 1383(c) of the MPPAA—is invalid.  
11 Depending on the determination of the amendment's validity, JB may be liable for withdrawal  
12 payments. The establishment or existence of withdrawal liability is a question that must be  
13 brought in arbitration before judicial review is sought. *See Moxley*, 734 F.3d at 870; *Allyn Transp.*  
14 *Co.*, 832 F.2d at 506. JB has not shown that arbitration would be futile or that it would be  
15 irreparably harmed by arbitration. Therefore, this dispute is subject to the MPPAA's mandatory  
16 arbitration provision, and JB has failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.

17 **II. CONCLUSION**

18 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant Nevada Resort Association-IATSE  
19 Retirement Local 720 Pension Plan's motion for summary judgment (**ECF No. 27**) is  
20 **GRANTED.**

21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff JB Viva Vegas, L.P.'s motion for summary  
22 judgment (**ECF No. 28**) is **DENIED.** The parties must proceed to arbitration regarding  
23 withdrawal liability. The clerk of court is ordered to close this case.

24 DATED this 29th day of May, 2018.

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27 ANDREW P. GORDON  
28 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE