1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
2	DISTRICT OF NEVADA	
3	* * *	
4	BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. and	Case No. 2:16-CV-02853-APG-CWH
5	FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION,	ODDED TEMPODADU V STAVINC
6	Plaintiffs,	ORDER TEMPORARILY STAYING CASE
7	V.	
8 9	DURANGO TRAILS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., <i>et al.</i> ,	
9 10	Defendants.	
10		of a non-judicial foreclosure sale conducted
11	This is one of many disputes over the effect of a non-judicial foreclosure sale conducted by the homeowners association ("HOA") after the prior owner failed to pay HOA assessments.	
12	On August 12, 2016, a divided Ninth Circuit panel in <i>Bourne Valley Court Trust v. Wells Fargo</i>	
14	Bank held that Nevada Revised Statutes Chapter 116's HOA nonjudicial foreclosure scheme, as it	
15	existed before the statutory scheme was amended in 2015 "facially violated mortgage lenders'	
16	constitutional due process rights." No. 15-15233, 2016 WL 4254983, at *5 (9th Cir. Aug. 12,	
17	2016); but see id. at *6-11 (Wallace, J. dissenting).	I disagree with the majority opinion for the
18	reasons I have set out previously. See Las Vegas De	ev. Grp., LLC v. Yfantis, F. Supp. 3d,
19	No. 2:15-cv-01127-APG-CWH, 2016 WL 1248693	8, at *3-6 (D. Nev. Mar. 24, 2016). <sup>1</sup> In
20	particular, the Bourne Valley majority opinion does	s not address the fact that the Supreme Court of
21	Nevada has already construed this Nevada state sta	tute to require notice to the mortgage lenders.
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24	both the statute's interpretation and on whether there is	0
25	Investments Pool, 2:14-cv-02080-RFB-GWF, 2016 WL (Boulware, J.); Capital One v. Las Vegas Dev. Group, N	
26	at 5 (D. Nev. June 30, 2016) (Dorsey, J.); <i>Bank of Amer</i> MMD-WGC, 2016 WL 1298114, at *3 (D. Nev. Mar. 3	. v. Rainbow Bend HOA, No. 3:15-cv-00291-
27	No. 3:15 or 00401 LPH WGC 2016 WI 2065105 of \$2 (D. Nov. July 22, 2016) (Hicks S. I.); but see	
28	3, 2015) (Jones, S.J.) (holding that the statutory scheme	

1	See SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, NA., 334 P.3d 408, 417-18 (Nev. 2014) (en banc).
2	Even the dissenting justices in SFR agreed this was the proper interpretation of Nevada's
3	statutory scheme. See id. at 422. Federal courts are not free to reinterpret a state statute once it
4	has been interpreted by that state's highest court. See Cal. Teachers Ass'n v. State Bd. of Educ.,
5	271 F.3d 1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[I]t is solely within the province of the state courts to
6	authoritatively construe state legislation."). Nor does the majority's analysis employ Nevada's
7	rules of statutory construction under which the state's laws are presumptively constitutional and
8	must be given any reasonable construction to avoid declaring the statute unconstitutional. See
9	State v. Castaneda, 245 P.3d 550, 552 (Nev. 2010) (en banc). Nevertheless, Bourne Valley at the
10	moment is controlling authority for federal district courts in the Ninth Circuit that, if it stands,
11	will significantly impact the hundreds of HOA foreclosure cases pending in this District.
12	The appellant in Bourne Valley has recently indicated it will pursue a writ of certiorari
13	from the United States Supreme Court. To avoid receiving briefs about the Bourne Valley
14	opinion's effect before the Ninth Circuit issues the mandate, I agree with the analysis set forth by
15	Judge Dorsey in U.S. Bank v. Ascente Homeowners Association, 2:15-cv-00302-JAD-VCF, ECF
16	No. 44 (Aug. 17, 2016), and I sua sponte stay all proceedings in this case pending the Ninth
17	Circuit's issuance of the mandate in Bourne Valley.
18	A district court has the inherent power to stay cases to control its docket and promote the
19	efficient use of judicial resources. Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936);
20	Dependable Highway Exp., Inc. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007).
21	When determining whether to stay a case pending the resolution of another case, I must consider
22	(1) the possible damage that may result from a stay, (2) any "hardship or inequity" that a party
23	may suffer if required to go forward, (3) "and the orderly course of justice measured in terms of
24	the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law" that a stay will engender.
25	Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005). I find that a Landis stay is
26	appropriate here.
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The crux of the parties' dispute is whether the HOA foreclosure sale extinguished the 1 2 deed of trust. If the HOA sale was void because Chapter 116 is facially unconstitutional, then the 3 parties' dispute is, in large part, resolved or at least simplified. The Bourne Valley opinion, 4 whatever its outcome, thus could be dispositive of this case, or at least of significant issues in the 5 case. In this district, as the jurisprudence and the parties' arguments in this area evolve, the parties file new motions or move to supplement the pending briefs, burdening our already-busy 6 7 docket. Bourne Valley no doubt will inspire more motions and supplements. I have many cases 8 involving HOA foreclosures and many dispositive motions pending. Most of those cases, and 9 many of the pending motions, raise the due process and state action issues addressed by the 10 Bourne Valley majority. Staying this case pending the mandate in Bourne Valley will permit the 11 parties to present arguments and evidence in the context of complete and resolved precedent, and 12 it will allow me to evaluate the claims in light of this legal authority. Consequently, a stay 13 pending the mandate would simplify the proceedings and promote the efficient use of the parties' 14 and the court's resources.

Resolving the claims or issues in this case before the Ninth Circuit issues the mandate in *Bourne Valley* could impose a hardship on both parties. A stay will prevent unnecessary or
premature briefing on *Bourne Valley*'s impact on this case.

18 The only potential damage that may result from a stay is that the parties will have to wait 19 longer for resolution of this case and any motions that they intend to file in the future. But a 20 delay would also result from new briefing that may be necessitated if the Supreme Court grants 21 certiorari. So a stay pending the *Bourne Valley* mandate will not necessarily lengthen the life of 22 this case. Any possible damage that a stay may cause is minimal. The stay pending the mandate 23 may be short and is tied to the Ninth Circuit's issuance of its mandate in Bourne Valley, so it is 24 not indefinite. Once the mandate is issued, either party may move to lift the stay. 25 ////

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1	IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this case is administratively <b>STAYED</b> until the	
2	Ninth Circuit issues the mandate in Bourne Valley Court Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, case number	
3	15-15233 (2:13-cv-649-PMP-NJK). Once the mandate issues, any party may move to lift the	
4	stay. Regardless of this stay, the plaintiffs shall timely serve process upon the defendants	
5	and file proof of service.	
6	DATED this 12 <sup>th</sup> day of December, 2016.	
7	Q	
8	ANDREW P. GORDON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE	
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