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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF NEVADA

\* \* \*

SHAUN GOODRICH,  
  
Plaintiff(s),  
  
v.  
  
GRG ENTERPRISES, LLC, et al.,  
  
Defendant(s).

Case No. 2:20-CV-671 JCM (NJK)

ORDER

Presently before the court is defendant GRG Enterprises, LLC d/b/a Mackenzie River (“GRG”) motion to dismiss cross-claims. (ECF No. 31). Defendants Callville Bay Resort & Marina and Forever Resorts LLC (“the Callville defendants”) filed a response, (ECF No. 32), to which GRG replied. (ECF No. 33).

**I. Background**

The instant case arises from plaintiff Shaun Goodrich’s (“Goodrich”) injuries that took place at the businesses of GRG and the Callville defendants, approximately three months apart. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff asserts separate claims against GRG and the Callville defendants for negligence.

On March 11, 2018, plaintiff was a customer at MacKenzie River Pizza, Grill & Pub which is operated by GRG. (ECF No. 31). The chair he was seated in became “loose, slipped, tipped, rocked or wobbled.” (Id.). Plaintiff fell and was taken to the hospital by ambulance. (Id).

Several months later, on May 28, 2018, plaintiff was walking on a dock, maintained and owned by the Callville defendants, when he tripped over a loose power cord in a poorly lit area. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff fell off the dock, hitting his head on a wood log. (Id.). Plaintiff suffered a head wound and aspirated a large amount of water. (Id). Because of this incident, plaintiff spent three days in two different hospitals and, on December 16, 2019, he underwent cervical anterior decompression and fusion surgery. (Id.).

1 In March 2020, plaintiff initiated this suit in Nevada state court. (ECF No.1). Plaintiff  
2 brought claims of negligence against GRG and the Callville defendants. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges  
3 physical harm, pain, loss of mobility, economic losses, and adverse employment effects  
4 stemming from both incidents. (Id.).

5 On April 10, 2020, the Callville defendants removed to this court. (ECF No. 1). The  
6 Callville defendants answered plaintiff's amended complaint and filed two cross-claims against  
7 GRG: (1) Contribution and (2) Equitable Indemnity (ECF No. 14.). GRG answered the cross-  
8 claims on April 22, 2020. (ECF No. 15).

9 On June 9, 2020, defendant GRG filed its instant motion to dismiss both cross-claims.  
10 (ECF No. 31).

## 11 **II. Legal Standard**

12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) allows a party to move for judgment on the  
13 pleadings “[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial.” Rule  
14 12(c) is “functionally identical to Rule 12(b)(6) and . . . the same standard of review applies to  
15 motions brought under either rule.” *Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys.*, 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 n.4  
16 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Therefore, “[a] judgment on the  
17 pleadings is properly granted when, taking all the allegations in the pleadings as true, the moving  
18 party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” *Milne ex rel. Coyne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc.*,  
19 430 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted). To proceed, a  
20 complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that  
21 is plausible on its face” may not be dismissed under Rules 12(b)(6) or 12(c). *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*,  
22 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citation and quotation omitted).

23 A court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be  
24 granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A properly pled complaint must provide “[a] short and plain  
25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); *Bell*  
26 *Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While Rule 8 does not require detailed  
27 factual allegations, it demands “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of  
28 the elements of a cause of action.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation  
omitted).

“Factual allegations must be enough to rise above the speculative level.” *Twombly*, 550  
U.S. at 555. Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

1 matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation  
2 omitted).

3 In Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step approach district courts are to apply  
4 when considering motions to dismiss. First, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual  
5 allegations in the complaint; however, legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of  
6 truth. *Id.* at 678–79. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by  
7 conclusory statements, do not suffice. *Id.* at 678.

8 Second, the court must consider whether the factual allegations in the complaint allege a  
9 plausible claim for relief. *Id.* at 679. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff’s complaint  
10 alleges facts that allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for  
11 the alleged misconduct. *Id.* at 678.

12 The Ninth Circuit addressed post-Iqbal pleading standards in *Starr v. Baca*, 652 F.3d  
13 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). The *Starr* court stated, in relevant part:

14 First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a  
15 complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a  
16 cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of  
17 underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing  
18 party to defend itself effectively. Second, the factual allegations  
19 that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to  
20 relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be  
21 subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation.

22 *Id.*

### 23 **III. Discussion**

24 GRG moves to dismiss both cross-claims by the Callville defendants: (1) contribution  
25 and (2) equitable indemnity. (ECF No. 31). With the well-pled factual allegations of the  
26 pleadings accepted as true, the court dismisses only the cross-claim of equitable indemnity.

27 As a preliminary matter, the Callville defendants argue that GRG’s motion to dismiss is  
28 untimely. (ECF No. 32). On April 22, 2020, GRG answered the Callville defendants’ cross-  
claims. (ECF No. 15). On June 9, 2020, GRG filed its instant motion to dismiss. (ECF. No. 31).  
A defendant must file its 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss before its first responsive pleading. See  
*Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church*, 375 F.3d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 2004). Although the Callville  
defendants are correct, this court will construe GRG’s instant motion to dismiss as a motion for  
judgment on the pleadings. See *id.*

1           A. Contribution

2           In Nevada, to prevail on a claim for right to contribution, there must be “two or more  
3 persons [that] become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property  
4 of for the same wrongful death . . . even though judgment has not been recovered against all or  
5 any of them.” Nev. Rev. Stat. 17.225. Additionally, the right to contribution exists only for the  
6 tortfeasor who paid a larger amount than their equitable share. *Id.* Lastly, a tortfeasor is not  
7 permitted to recover contribution from any other tortfeasor, if it is in excess of what was  
8 reasonable. *Id.*

9           GRG argues that the Callville defendants’ contribution claim fails as a matter of law  
10 because GRG and the Callville defendants are “clearly successive tortfeasors and not joint  
11 tortfeasors.” (ECF No. 31). GRG argues that plaintiff Goodrich alleged “two separate causes of  
12 action, which stem from two different and distinct incidents.” (*Id.*). “Successive tortfeasors” is  
13 defined as two people or entities that produce acts “differing in time and place of commission as  
14 well in nature, [causing] produced two separate injuries [that] give rise to two distinct causes of  
15 action” *Hansen v. Collet*, 380 P.2d 301, 305 (Nev. 1963). “When tortfeasors are successive,  
16 rather than joint tortfeasors, there can be no claim for contribution as a matter of law.” *Republic*  
17 *Silver State Disposal v. Cash*, 2018 Nev. Dist. LEXIS 1314 (Nev. 2018).

18           Defendant GRG makes the argument that the Callville defendants are successive  
19 tortfeasors, because these two incidents occurred on different days, at different times, and in  
20 different locations. (*Id.*). However, this court accepts the factual allegations in the amended  
21 complaint as true. See *Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp.*, 559 F.3d 1028, 1029-30 (9th Cir.  
22 2009).

23           Here, the Callville defendants assert that the claim of contribution cannot be dismissed  
24 because, taken as true, the plaintiffs’ complaint uses the phrase “jointly and severally” multiple  
25 times throughout; therefore, it shows that defendants are joint tortfeasors and not successive.  
26 (ECF No. 31). However, this statement by the Callville defendants is conclusory. (ECF No. 33).  
27 “While legal conclusions can provide the framework for a complaint, they must be supported by  
28 factual allegations.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). This court will not consider this  
argument as the reasoning for the claim of contribution to proceed.

          This claim may proceed because both incidents created an indivisible injury. (ECF No.  
32). If the actions of the joint tortfeasors were separate and independent, but the actions “produce

1 an indivisible injury” they are entitled to pursue a claim of contribution. *Discount Tire v. Fisher*  
2 *Sand & Gravel*, 400 P.3d at 244. Even though GRG argues that the incidents were “two separate  
3 causes of action, which stem from two different and distinct incidents” taking the plaintiffs’  
4 allegations as true, there is no definitive evidence showing who is at fault for plaintiffs’ injuries.  
5 *Id.* The Callville defendants argue that in both incidents the plaintiff hit his head and further  
6 discovery is needed in order “to determine the causation of the alleged collective damages and  
7 cervical spine fusion surgery;” this further shows that one defendant cannot be definitively liable  
8 for the plaintiffs’ injury. (*Id.*).

9 A. Equitable Indemnity

10 Equitable indemnity “allows a defendant to seek recovery from other potential  
11 tortfeasors.” *Pack v. LaTourette*, 277 P.3d 1246, 1249 (Nev. 2012). The claim is “generally  
12 available to remedy the situation in which the defendant, who has committed no independent  
13 wrong, is held liable for the loss of a plaintiff caused by another party.” *Id.* at 1248-49. If a party  
14 is actively negligent and has committed an independent wrong, “that party has no right to  
15 indemnity from other tortfeasors.” *Id.* at 1249. Furthermore, in order to establish indemnity, there  
16 must be some nexus proven between the indemnitee and indemnitor. *Rodriguez v. Primadonna*  
17 *Co., LLC*, 216 P.3d 793, 802.

18 Here, plaintiffs’ complaint states the injuries he obtained from both incidents, thus  
19 serving as the nexus between the two parties. (ECF No. 31). However, plaintiff alleges the  
20 Callville defendants, in a separate cause of action, are liable for maintaining the dock in a  
21 negligent manner. (*Id.*). Thus, taking the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint as true, the Callville  
22 defendants were actively negligent and committed an independent wrong. (*Id.*). Therefore, the  
23 Callville defendants have no right to indemnity. *Pack*, 277 Nev. at 1249.

24 This court grants GRG’s motion to dismiss the claim of equitable indemnity. This court  
25 denies the Callville defendants’ request for leave to amend due to futility.

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
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**IV. Conclusion**

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that defendants' motion to dismiss the cross claims (ECF No. 31) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

DATED October 14, 2020.

  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE