

1 II. SCREENING

2 Courts must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks redress
3 from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.
4 § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims
5 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek
6 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),
7 (2). In addition to the screening requirements under § 1915A, a federal court must dismiss a
8 claim if it “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); accord
9 Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). Review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) does not require that the
10 claimant be a prisoner.²

11 Dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2) incorporates the standard for
12 failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). *Watison v. Carter*, 668
13 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive § 1915 review, a complaint must “contain sufficient
14 factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See
15 *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court liberally construes pro se complaints and
16 may only dismiss them “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
17 support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” *Nordstrom v. Ryan*, 762 F.3d 903, 908
18 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678).

19 In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, all allegations of
20 material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. *Wylor*
21 *Summit P’ship v. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc.*, 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
22 Although the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff
23 must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S.

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25 ² Based on several appellate requests for a sentence reduction, on May 8, 2020, Judge Mahan granted
26 Collins a sentence of credit for time served. 2:29-cr-216-JCM-RJJ, ECF No. 170. Given Judge Mahan’s
27 order, Collins may no longer be incarcerated. Thus, the screening may not fall under 28 U.S.C.
28 § 1915A(a). Still, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), which is not limited to prisoners, requires the sua sponte
dismissal of an IFP plaintiff’s case if it “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
See *Calhoun v. Stahl*, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).

1 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. *Id.*
2 Unless it is clear the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured through amendment, a pro se
3 plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with notice regarding the complaint’s
4 deficiencies. *Cato v. United States*, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).

5 Here, Collin seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Bivens, and “the common law” based
6 on violations of his constitutional rights in both state court and federal court criminal proceedings.
7 First, as part of Claim One, he takes issue with a Nevada state conviction (Case No. C-109813),
8 as he claims that “[he] never caught a case in October of 1993” and that he was coerced to enter
9 into that plea. ECF No.1-1 at 2. He explains that this conviction was later used to enhance a
10 sentence (to a life sentence) in federal case No. 2:95-cr-216-LDG-RJJ, which is the basis for
11 Claim Two.³

12 If a Section 1983 case seeking damages alleges constitutional violations that would
13 necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence, the prisoner must establish that the
14 underlying sentence or conviction has been invalidated on appeal, by habeas petition, or through a
15 similar proceeding. See *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477, 483-87 (1994). Under *Heck*, a party
16 who was convicted of a crime is barred from bringing a suit under Section 1983 if a judgment in
17 favor of that party would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction or sentence. See
18 *Whitaker v. Garcetti*, 486 F.3d 572, 581 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing *Heck*, 512 U.S. at 114).

19 Collins’ complaint directly attacks the validity of his state criminal conviction and the
20 sentence in his federal case. That is, he alleges that he was coerced into pleading guilty in state
21 court and then alleges that his federal sentence was improperly enhanced based on that state
22 conviction. But, critically, Collins does not allege that either his state conviction or federal
23 sentence were reversed or otherwise invalidated.⁴ Given that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim
24 necessarily implies the invalidity of Collins’ state conviction and federal sentence, Plaintiff must
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26 ³ The court notes that based on several appellate requests for a sentence reduction, on May 8, 2020 Judge
27 Mahan granted Plaintiff time served. As such, Plaintiff is no longer subject to that life-sentence. 2:29-cr-
216-JCM-RJJ, ECF No. 170.

28 ⁴ It is important to note that Judge Mahan did not invalidate the prior sentence—he simply re-sentenced
him based on new legislation authorizing such reductions. 2:29-cr-216-JCM-RJJ, ECF No. 170.

1 plead that his state conviction or federal sentence have been invalidated or reversed to bring these
2 claims. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint without prejudice and with
3 leave to amend. If Plaintiff can truthfully plead that his state conviction or federal sentence have
4 been invalidated, he may amend his complaint.

5 It is worth noting that Plaintiff fares no better under a Bivens claim. The Ninth Circuit has
6 stated that "[a]ctions under § 1983 and those under Bivens are identical save for the replacement
7 of a state actor under § 1983 by a federal actor under Bivens." *Van Strum v. Lawn*, 940 F.2d 406,
8 409 (9th Cir.1991). In addition, the Ninth Circuit has held that the rationale of Heck applies to
9 Bivens actions. *Martin v. Sias*, 88 F.3d774 (9th Cir. 1996).

10 Lastly, the Supreme Court likened Section 1983 claims to common law tort actions for
11 malicious prosecution when deciding Heck. Thus, the Supreme Court necessarily considered
12 common law claims and still required the plaintiff to allege and prove the termination of the prior
13 criminal proceeding in his favor as an element of his claim. Heck, 512 U.S. at 484-86.

14 Given that Plaintiff cannot proceed unless he can truthfully allege that his state conviction
15 or federal sentence have been invalidated, the court does not address other remaining issues in the
16 complaint involving the capacity in which he sues each defendant, whether defendants were
17 acting under color of state law, or whether any immunity applies.

18 **III. CONCLUSION**

19 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Collins' application to proceed in forma pauperis
20 (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED. Collins will not be required to pay the filing fee in this action.
21 Collin is permitted to maintain this action to conclusion without the necessity of prepayment of
22 any additional fees or costs or the giving of a security for fees or costs. This order granting leave
23 to proceed in forma pauperis does not extend to the issuance of subpoenas at government
24 expense.

25 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk of court must detach and file Collins'
26 complaint (ECF No. 1-2) as a separate entry on the docket.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Collins' complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave to amend. If Plaintiff chooses to amend his complaint, he must do so by November 13, 2020.

DATED: October 14, 2020



BRENDA WEKSLER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE