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4	UNITED STATES I	DISTRICT COURT	
5	DISTRICT OF NEVADA		
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7	JUSTIN LYNN VICTORY,	Case No. 2:23-cv-02086-CDS-NJK	
8	Plaintiff(s),		
9	v.	ORDER	
10	HENDERSON NA P.D., et al.,		
11	Defendant(s).		
12	2 On April 24, 2024, the Court screened Plaintiff's complaint and dismissed the Henderson		
13	3 Police Department with leave to amend. Docket No. 19. Plaintiff has filed a second amended		
14	4 complaint. Docket No. 31. ¹ The Court now screens Plaintiff's second amended complaint with		
15	5 respect to municipal liability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).		
16	6 Federal courts are given the authority to dismiss a case if the action is legally "frivolous or		
17	7 malicious," fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from		
18	8 a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). When a court dismisses a		
19	9 complaint under § 1915, the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with directions		
20	0 as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that the deficiencies		
21	could not be cured by amendment. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).		
22	2 Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal of a complaint		
23	3 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is		
24	4 essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 723		
25	(9th Cir. 2000). A properly pled complaint must provide a short and plain statement of the claim		
26	5 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v.		
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28	¹ Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in the interim, Docket No. 22, which has now been superseded by the second amended complaint.		

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, 1 2 it demands "more than labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 3 286 (1986)). The court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations contained in the 4 5 complaint, but the same requirement does not apply to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 6 Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory allegations, do 7 not suffice. Id. at 678. Secondly, where the claims in the complaint have not crossed the line from 8 conceivable to plausible, the complaint should be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 9 Allegations of a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that liberal 10 construction of *pro se* pleadings is required after *Twombly* and *Iqbal*). 11

Plaintiff's complaint seeks to bring a claim against the Henderson Police Department under 12 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Docket No. 1-1 at 1. Local governments, such as municipalities, cannot be 13 held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of City of 14 15 N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Local governments can instead be sued only for "a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's 16 officers" or for a "governmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not received formal 1718 approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels." Id. at 690-91. A plaintiff may also establish Monell liability by proving that an official with final policy-making authority ratified 19 a subordinate's unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it. Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 20 6 F.4th 961, 974 (9th Cir. 2021). 21

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1	Plaintiff's case centers on allegations that Henderson police officers used excessive force.		
2	See, e.g., Docket No. 1-1 at 3. ² With respect to municipal liability, the second amended complaint		
3	appears to rely on a ratification theory in that the police department found after an investigation		
4	that the police officers "did not commit any act of misconduct as alleged." See Docket No. 31 at		
5	4. The Court does not find this allegation sufficient to state a claim for municipal liability. "In		
6	order for there to be ratification, there must be 'something more' than a single failure to discipline		
7	or the fact that a policymaker concluded that the defendant officer's actions were in keeping with		
8	the applicable policies and procedures." Garcia v. City of Imperial, 2010 WL 3911457, at *2 (S.D.		
9	Cal. Oct. 4, 2010). As explained in a leading case within the Ninth Circuit:		
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11	has shot someone is evidence of a "whitewash" policy or some other policy of "sham" investigations. The law does not say that,		
12	whenever an investigative group accepts an officer's version over a victim's differing version, this acceptance establishes a policy for		
13	which a municipality may be held liable under § 1983. If that were the law, counties might as well never conduct internal investigations		
14	and might as well always admit liability. But that is not the law. The law clearly requires "something more."		
15	Kanae v. Hodson, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1191 (D. Haw. 2003); see also, e.g., Cole v. Doe 1 thru		
16	2 Officers of City of Emeryville Police Dept., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1099-1101 (N.D. Cal. 2005)		
17	(concluding that ratification cannot be established through "deliberate indifference towards a		
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20	² Plaintiff was given leave to amend to attempt to cure deficiencies as to his municipal claim against the city of Henderson regarding his allegations that police officers used excessive		
	force. <i>See</i> Docket No. 19 at 3. Plaintiff's second amended complaint appears to include a claim related to the adequacy of medical treatment that he received from the hospital. <i>See</i> Docket No.		
22	² 31 at 10-11. Plaintiff did not seek leave to amend to add a new type of claim to the case, so the ² Court declines to address these allegations herein. <i>Cf. Lebsock v. General Motors</i> , 2023 WL		
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24	Civ. P. 20; <i>see also</i> Docket No. 27 (adopting report and recommendation that certain other claims be dismissed as improperly brought within this case).		

The second amended complaint also now names as defendants the Henderson Police Chief and Officer of Internal Affairs. *See, e.g.*, Docket No. 31 at 2. To the extent these officers are sued in their official capacities, the claims fail for the reasons stated herein with respect to municipal liability. *See, e.g.*, *Hale v. Shinn*, 2023 WL 2759026, at *13 (D. Ariz. Apr. 3, 2023). To the extent these officers are sued in their individual capacities, Plaintiff failed to seek leave to add them as

new parties, so the Court declines to address such allegations herein. *Cf. Lebsock*, 2023 WL 1796455, at *4.

single after-the-fact investigation"); *Almeida v. City of Long Beach*, 2020 WL 551598, at *2 (C.D.
 Cal. Feb. 4, 2020); *Muller v. Cruz*, 2015 WL 9455565, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2015).

In this case, the second amended complaint attempts to establish ratification based on the fact that the police department's subsequent investigation concluded that the officers did not engage in misconduct. *See* Docket No. 31 at 4. The existence of that investigation and conclusion does not establish ratification. Moreover, although the second amended complaint includes unelaborated assertions that the investigation was "inadequate," *id.* at 2, and not "proper[]," *id.* at 5, such "labels and conclusions" fail to allege that the investigation conducted suffices as a ratification of any alleged wrongdoing by the police officers, *see Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678.

In short, the second amended complaint fails to sufficiently state a claim for municipal
liability arising out of the excessive force alleged. Plaintiff has already been given an opportunity
to amend the complaint to state such a claim, which militates against allowing another opportunity. *See City of Los Angeles v. San Pedro Boat Works*, 635 F.3d 440, 454 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting *Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobile Oil Co.*, 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989)). Moreover, it is not
clear that Plaintiff can cure this deficiency through further amendment. Nonetheless, the Court
will provide Plaintiff one, final opportunity to amend if he believes he can cure this deficiency.

17 Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the second amended complaint is **DISMISSED** 18 with leave to amend except with respect to the excessive force claims against the John Doe Henderson police officers (see Docket No. 17). Plaintiff will have until October 7, 2024, to file a 19 Third Amended Complaint, if the noted deficiencies can be corrected.³ If Plaintiff chooses to 20 further amend the complaint, Plaintiff is informed that the Court cannot refer to a prior pleading 21 in order to make the amended complaint complete. This is because, as a general rule, an amended 22 23 complaint supersedes the prior complaints. Local Rule 15-1(a) requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. Once a plaintiff files an amended 24 25 complaint, the prior pleadings no longer serve any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended 26

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³ Absent leave being granted otherwise, <u>the third amended complaint may not add new</u> 28 <u>claims or new defendants</u>.

1	complaint each claim and the involvement of each Defendant must be sufficiently alleged. Failure	
2	to file comply with this order may result in dismissal of the subject claims.	
3	IT IS SO ORDERED.	
4	Dated: August 29, 2024	
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6	Nancy J. Koppe United States Magistrate Judge	
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