

James C. Mahan U.S. District Judge Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact that would support the allegations and
judgment is appropriate as a matter of law. *See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56©. Scott alleges three causes of action: (1) First Amendment retaliation; (2) Eighth
Amendment retaliation; and (3) supervisor liability. Doc. #6. Here, summary judgment is
appropriate as to all defendants for Scott's second and third causes of action, and for all defendants
except c/o Bryant for Scott's first cause of action.

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## **Claim 1 - First Amendment Retaliation**

In a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) that a correctional officer
took adverse action against an inmate; (2) that did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional
goal; (3) because of an inmate's protected conduct; and (4) that the adverse action chilled the
inmate's First Amendment rights. *See Rhodes v. Robinson*, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2004).
The plaintiff has the burden of "pleading and proving the absence of legitimate correctional goals
for the conduct he complains of." *Pratt v. Rowland*, 65 F.3d 802, 802 (9th Cir. 1995).

Here, Scott has raised issues of material fact as to whether c/o Bryant disciplined him
unfairly. Defendants argue that c/o Bryant disciplined Scott only after multiple false grievances and
that such discipline is necessary to prevent inmates from wasting prison resources and staff time.
However, there are material issues of fact as to whether the underlying grievances were false or not.
Scott alleges that c/o Bryant refused to investigate the grievances and disciplined Scott for
complaining of a fellow correctional officer. Summary judgment is not appropriate in light of these
disputed facts.

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## Claim 2 - Eighth Amendment Retaliation

The Eighth Amendment forbids confinement in unsanitary cells conditions which can lead
to disease. *See Rhodes v. Chapman*, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); *Diagre v. Maggio*, 719 F.2d 1310,
1312 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1983). Eighth Amendment retaliation claims encompass a subjective, as well as,

1 objective component. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). Subjectively, a prison official must 2 "know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health and safety." Anderson v. County of Kern, 3 45 F.3d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir. 1995).

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Here, Scott has failed to show that any of the defendants subjectively knew that their actions 5 were putting Scott's health at risk. C/o Bryant does not have the power to transfer Scott to another 6 cell, particularly an unsanitary one, and so could not have known the conditions that Scott was 7 allegedly living in. Additionally, c/o Jacoby had no knowledge of Scott's call for medical attention 8 because the medical call button was "glitched" and was not working properly. Scott has not provided 9 any evidence that would support his allegations that defendants subjectively knew that their actions 10 violated Scott's constitutional rights. As such, the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter 11 of law as to Scott's Eighth Amendment retaliation claim.

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## **Claim 3 - Supervisor Liability**

14 In a §1983 action, vicarious liability may not be imposed on an official for the acts of an 15 individual under that official's supervision solely on the basis of that supervision. Fayle v. Stapley, 16 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979). In order to support a claim for supervisor liability, a plaintiff must 17 show that the supervisor either: (1) personally participated in the constitutional violation; (2) knew 18 of the violations and failed to act on this knowledge; (3) promulgated or enacted a policy that caused 19 the constitutional violations; or (4) is liable under state law. See Id.; Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d. 642, 20 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

21 Here, Scott has completely failed to support his allegations of supervisor liability. Nevada state law does not automatically impose supervisory liability. Scott has not provided any evidence 22 23 of a policy by the NDOC or the individual supervisors to deprive him of his constitutional rights. 24 Further, Scott has not provided any evidence that any of the defendant supervisors engaged in or 25 condoned any of the individual defendant correctional officer's conduct. Accordingly, the defendant 26 supervisors are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the supervisor liability claim. Therefore,

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1	IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendants' motion for summary
2	judgment (Doc. #75) is <b>GRANTED in part and DENIED in part</b> . The motion is granted as to all
3	defendants and causes of action except defendant c/o Ronald Bryant regarding Scott's First
4	Amendment retaliation claim. All other defendants and causes of action are dismissed.
5	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the hearing currently scheduled for Wednesday, April 29,
6	2009 at 11:00 a.m. is <b>VACATED</b> .
7	DATED this 27 <sup>th</sup> day of April, 2009.
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9	Jenne C. Mahan
10	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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James C. Mahan U.S. District Judge	- 4 -