period of limitation, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The only effect that the timeliness of Petitioner's state habeas corpus petition has is whether the time spent on that petition statutorily tolls the federal period of limitation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

However, statutory tolling is a moot point in Petitioner's case. His judgment of conviction became final on January 14, 2001, the period of limitation expired on January 14, 2002, and Petitioner did not file his state habeas corpus petition until October 12, 2006. Even if his state habeas corpus petition were somehow eligible for statutory tolling, the federal period of limitation still expired more than four years before he filed that state petition. See Order (#7), p. 3.

Petitioner's actual-innocence argument is unpersuasive. In the Petition (#8), he stated his belief that the victim would recant her statements at an evidentiary hearing. The Court gave him the opportunity to present something less vague than that. In his Response (#11), Petitioner alleges again that he has the evidence, but that the Court would need to issue subpoenas to secure it. A vague allegation like that does not meet the requirements of <u>Schlup v. Delo</u>, 513 U.S. 298 (1995).

Attached to the first Application to Proceed <u>in Forma Pauperis</u> (#1) is a Motion for Appointment of Counsel. This motion is moot because the Court is dismissing the action.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court file the Motion for Appointment of Counsel, which is attached to the first Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (#1).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Appointment of Counsel is $\boldsymbol{DENIED}.$

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is **DISMISSED** with prejudice as untimely. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

DATED this 29th day of January, 2009.

LARRY R. HICKS

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE