Williams v. Liveror	et al	Dod 4	
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6	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
7	DISTRICT OF NEVADA		
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9	RONALD C. WILLIAMS, #87832		
10	Plaintiff,	3:10-cv-00422-LRH-VPC	
11		3.10-CV-00422-LRH-VPC	
12	VS.	ORDER	
13	RICHARD LIVERONI, et al.,  Defendants.		
14	Defendants.		
15	This is a prisoner civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff's application		
16	to proceed in forma pauperis is granted (docket #1). Based on the information regarding plaintiff's		
17	financial status in the application to proceed in forma pauperis, plaintiff is required to pay an initial		
18	installment of the filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915.		
19	The grant of <i>in forma pauperis</i> status adjusts the amount of the filing fee that plaintiff must		
20	prepay plaintiff will be required to prepay an initial installment of \$5.52, instead of having to prepay		
21	the full \$350 filing fee for this action. The entire \$350 filing fee will, however, remain due from		
22	plaintiff, and the institution where plaintiff is incarcerated will collect money toward the payment of the		
23	full filing fee when petitioner's institutional account has a sufficient balance, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.		
24	§1915. The entire \$350 filing fee will remain due and payable, and will be collected from plaintiff's		
25	institutional account regardless of the outcome of this action. The court now reviews the complaint.		
26	I. Screening Standard		
27	Federal courts must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks		
28	redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. §		

1915A(a). Pursuant to the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), federal courts must dismiss a prisoner's claims, "if the allegation of poverty is untrue," or if the action "is frivolous or malicious," "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. *Nietzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. *Id.* at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. *See Jackson v. Arizona*, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989).

Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the court applies the same standard under Section 1915(e)(2) when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or amended complaint. Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. *See Chappel v. Laboratory Corp. of America*, 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). A complaint must contain more than a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;" it must contain factual allegations sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). "The pleading must contain something more...than...a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action." *Id.* In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, *Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees*, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. *Jenkins v. McKeithen*, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

Allegations in a *pro se* complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. *See Hughes v. Rowe*, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (*per curiam*); *see also Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't*, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). All or part of a complaint filed by a prisoner may be dismissed *sua sponte*, however, if the prisoner's claims lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable (*e.g.* claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations

(e.g. fantastic or delusional scenarios). See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28; see also McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).

To sustain an action under section 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right." *Hydrick v. Hunter*, 466 F.3d 676, 689 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006).

## II. Instant Complaint

Plaintiff, who is incarcerated at Ely State Prison ("ESP"), has sued Nevada Department of Corrections ("NDOC") Director Howard Skolnik, along with three members of the High Desert State Prison ("HDSP") staff: Lt. Richard Liveroni, caseworker Larry Wuest, and Assistant Warden of Programs ("AWP") Cole Morrow. Plaintiff alleges violations of his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights as well as his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection.

Plaintiff alleges the following with respect to a disciplinary hearing that Lt. Liveroni conducted at HDSP on charges that plaintiff assaulted another inmate at ESP. Lt. Liveroni denied plaintiff his requested witness and refused to obtain a videotape from ESP that would have exonerated plaintiff. Plaintiff was found guilty of all charges, sentenced to 180 days lockdown confinement in the "hole" and charged restitution without a restitution hearing. Lt. Liveroni, whom plaintiff claims has a history of "over-flexing his authority on inmates," then entered a sentence of one year in the hole–instead of 180 days–into the prison computer system. Plaintiff grieved this issue and states that caseworker Wuest said that the warden orders him to deny all grievances. Plaintiff asserts that AWP Morrow and Wuest were aware of the violations of plaintiff's constitutional rights related to these disciplinary sanctions and refused to "correct the issues."

First, while plaintiff names NDOC Director Howard Skolnik as a defendant, "[1]iability under [§] 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant. A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional violations of . . . subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. There is no respondeat superior liability under [§] 1983." *Taylor v. List*, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1989) (citations omitted); *see also Hydrick v. Hunter*, 500 F.3d 978, 988 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2007); *Ortez v. Washington County, State of Or.*,

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88 F.3d 804, 809 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding proper to dismiss where no allegations of knowledge of or participation in alleged violation). Plaintiff merely alleges that Director Skolnik is responsible for the grievance procedures and for training his subordinates. Plaintiff does not describe any specific actions by Director Skolnik, nor does he allege that Director Skolnik had knowledge of or participated in any alleged civil rights violation. Defendant Skolnik is dismissed from this action.

Turning to the substance of plaintiff's claims, plaintiff alleges that the disciplinary hearing and sanctions imposed violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. "Prisoners . . . may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law . . . . [T] he fact that prisoners retain rights under the Due Process Clause in no way implies that these rights are not subject to restrictions imposed by the nature of the regime to which they have been lawfully committed . . . ." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). When a prisoner faces disciplinary charges, prison officials must provide the prisoner with (1) a written statement at least twenty-four hours before the disciplinary hearing that includes the charges, a description of the evidence against the prisoner, and an explanation for the disciplinary action taken; (2) an opportunity to present documentary evidence and call witnesses, unless calling witnesses would interfere with institutional security; and (3) legal assistance where the charges are complex or the inmate is illiterate. See id. at 563-70; see also Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 2003); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1997); Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1419-20 (9th Cir. 1994), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); McFarland v. Cassady, 779 F.2d 1426, 1428 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. 472. With his allegations regarding the disciplinary hearing and restitution charged, plaintiff states claims under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments and "embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency." *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).

[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met. First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, 'sufficiently serious[;]' a prison official's act or omission must result in the denial of 'the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities'.... The second requirement follows from the principle that 'only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment.' To

violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, a prison official must have a 'sufficiently culpable state of mind.'

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). With his allegations that Lt. Liveroni arbitrarily doubled the length of time that plaintiff was sanctioned to confinement in the hole, he states an Eighth Amendment claim.

Plaintiff claims, without elaboration, that his Fifth Amendment rights have been violated. The procedural guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause apply only when a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest is at stake. *See Ingraham v. Wright*, 430 U.S. 651, 672-73 (1977); *Bd. of Regents v. Roth*, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). "The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the equal protection component thereof apply only to actions of the federal government-not to those of state or local governments." *Lee v. City of Los Angeles*, 250 F.3d 668, 687 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing *Schweiker v. Wilson*, 450 U.S. 221, 227 (1981)). Plaintiff does not allege that any of the defendants are federal actors. Accordingly, plaintiff's Fifth Amendment claim is dismissed.

Plaintiff also claims that his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights have been violated. "Prisoners are protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invidious discrimination based on race." *Wolff v. McDonnell*, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Prisoners are also protected by the Equal Protection Clause from intentional discrimination on the basis of their religion. *See Freeman v. Arpaio*, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997). To establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the prisoner must present evidence of discriminatory intent. *See Washington v. Davis*, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976). Plaintiff has not alleged that defendants intentionally discriminated against him based on race or religion, nor has he alleged any disparate treatment whatsoever. Therefore, plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim is dismissed.

## III. Conclusion

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's application to proceed *in forma pauperis* (docket #1) is **GRANTED.** Plaintiff **Ronald C. Williams, Inmate No. 87832**, will be permitted to maintain this action to conclusion without prepayment of the full filing fee. However, plaintiff must pay an initial installment of the filing fee in the amount of \$5.52. Plaintiff will not be required to pay fees or costs, other than the filing fee, or give security therefor. This Order granting *in forma pauperis* status

shall not extend to the issuance and service of subpoenas at government expense.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that, even if this action is dismissed, or is otherwise unsuccessful, the full filing fee shall still be due, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915, as amended by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1996.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915, as amended by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1996, the Nevada Department of Corrections shall pay the Clerk of the United States District Court, District of Nevada, the \$5.52 initial installment of the filing fee, if sufficient funds exist in plaintiff's inmate account. Thereafter, the Nevada Department of Corrections shall pay the Clerk of the United States District Court, District of Nevada, 20% of the preceding month's deposits to plaintiff's account (in months that the account exceeds \$10.00), until the full \$350 filing fee has been paid for this action. The Clerk shall send a copy of this order to Albert G. Peralta, Chief of Inmate Services, Nevada Department of Prisons, P.O. Box 7011, Carson City, NV 89702.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that the Clerk shall **FILE** the complaint (docket #1-1).

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that plaintiff's claims against Howard Skolnik are dismissed.

Defendant Skolnik is **DISMISSED** from this action.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's Fifth Amendment claims are DISMISSED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims are **DISMISSED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process claims may proceed.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims **may proceed**.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** as follows:

- 1. The Clerk shall electronically serve a copy of this order, including the attached Notice of Intent to Proceed with Mediation form, along with a copy of plaintiff's complaint, on the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Nevada, to the attention of Pamela Sharp.
- 2. The Attorney General's Office shall advise the Court within **twenty-one** (21) **days** of the date of entry of this order whether it can accept service of process for the named defendants. As to any of the named defendants for which the Attorney General's Office cannot accept service, the Office shall

file, under seal, the last known address(es) of those defendant(s).

- 3. If service cannot be accepted for any of the named defendant(s), plaintiff shall file a motion identifying the unserved defendant(s), requesting issuance of a summons, and specifying a full name and address for said defendant(s). Plaintiff is reminded that, pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, service must be accomplished within one hundred twenty (120) days of the date the complaint was filed.
- 4. If the Attorney General accepts service of process for any named defendant(s), such defendant(s) shall file and serve an answer or other response to the complaint within **thirty (30) days** following the date of the early inmate mediation. If the court declines to mediate this case, an answer or other response shall be due within **thirty (30) days** following the order declining mediation.
- 5. The parties **SHALL DETACH, COMPLETE, AND FILE** the attached Notice of Intent to Proceed with Mediation form on or before **thirty (30) days** from the date of entry of this order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that henceforth, plaintiff shall serve upon defendants, or, if an appearance has been made by counsel, upon their attorney(s), a copy of every pleading, motion, or other document submitted for consideration by the court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper submitted for filing a certificate stating the date that a true and correct copy of the document was mailed to the defendants or counsel for defendants. If counsel has entered a notice of appearance, the plaintiff shall direct service to the individual attorney named in the notice of appearance, at the address stated

therein. The court may disregard any paper received by a district judge or a magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk, and any paper which fails to include a certificate showing proper service.

DATED this 8th day of October, 2010.

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LARRY R. HICKS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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	UNIT	ED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA
		, ) Case No
	Plaintiff,	) )
v.		) NOTICE OF INTENT TO PROCEED WITH MEDIATION
	Defendants.	
	Determants.	<u> </u>
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