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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF NEVADA**

ALFONSO JACKSON,  
#64708

Plaintiff,

vs.

SARGENT JOHN DOE, *et al.*,

Defendants.

3:10-cv-00771-LRH-RAM

**SCREENING ORDER**

This is a prisoner civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On April 27, 2011, the court issued a Screening Order directing that plaintiff's claims may proceed (docket #8). On May 31, 2011, plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint (docket #11), along with a second amended complaint (docket #12) (plaintiff incorrectly titled this as his first amended complaint). The court now reviews plaintiff's second amended complaint (docket #12).

**I. Screening Standard**

Pursuant to the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), federal courts must dismiss a prisoner's claims, "if the allegation of poverty is untrue," or if the action "is frivolous or malicious," "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an

1 arguable basis either in law or in fact. *Nietzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The court may,  
2 therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or  
3 where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. *Id.* at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a  
4 constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. *See Jackson*  
5 *v. Arizona*, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1989).

6 Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is  
7 provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the court applies the same standard under  
8 Section 1915(e)(2) when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or amended complaint. Review under  
9 Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. *See Chappel v. Laboratory Corp. of America*,  
10 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). A complaint must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the  
11 elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief  
12 above the speculative level.” *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965  
13 (2007). “The pleading must contain something more...than...a statement of facts that merely creates a  
14 suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” *Id.* In reviewing a complaint under this standard,  
15 the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, *Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex*  
16 *Hospital Trustees*, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to  
17 plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. *Jenkins v. McKeithen*, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).  
18 Allegations in a *pro se* complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by  
19 lawyers. *See Hughes v. Rowe*, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (*per*  
20 *curiam*); *see also Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t*, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). All or part of  
21 a complaint filed by a prisoner may be dismissed *sua sponte*, however, if the prisoner’s claims lack an  
22 arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable  
23 (*e.g.* claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a legal interest  
24 which clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations (*e.g.* fantastic or  
25 delusional scenarios). *See Nietzke*, 490 U.S. at 327-28; *see also McKeever v. Block*, 932 F.2d 795, 798  
26 (9th Cir. 1991).

1 To sustain an action under section 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) that the conduct  
2 complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct  
3 deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right.” *Hydrick v. Hunter*, 466 F.3d 676,  
4 689 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006).

## 5 **II. Instant Complaint**

6 In his second amended complaint, plaintiff, who is incarcerated at Ely State Prison  
7 (“ESP”), has sued officers Sgt. Charles Kirchen, Glinda Stroik, James Minnix, Jason Marshall, Joshua  
8 Conner, Justin Chenault, Ruben Lajda, and Tom Stubbs. Plaintiff alleges the following: on or about  
9 December 10, 2009, plaintiff was in the infirmary “for mental health reasons” when defendants came  
10 to his cell. A female officer had a video camera, and a sergeant instructed plaintiff to back away from  
11 the door. Plaintiff complied and also complied when the sergeant ordered him to get on the ground  
12 facedown. Defendants began stomping plaintiff on the head and yelling for him to put his hands behind  
13 his back. They continued to stomp him on the head for about three minutes, splitting his left eyebrow  
14 and cracking a front tooth. Plaintiff was then cuffed and shackled and taken to another room where he  
15 was strapped down to a bed with blood all over his face for hours. Later, apparently on December 11,  
16 he was taken to the doctor who stitched his eyebrow. Plaintiff suffers nightmares from the attack and  
17 it also made his jaw pain and headaches from TMJ worse. Plaintiff claims that defendants used  
18 excessive force against him in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.

19 The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments and  
20 “embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency.” *Estelle*  
21 *v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). “[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive  
22 physical force in violation of the [Eighth Amendment], the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was  
23 applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause  
24 harm.” *Hudson v. McMillian*, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992); *see also Whitley v. Albers*, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21  
25 (1986); *Watts v. McKinney*, 394 F.3d 710, 711 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2005); *Martinez v. Stanford*, 323 F.3d 1178, 1184  
26 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2003); *Marquez v. Gutierrez*, 322 F.3d 689, 691-92 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2003); *Clement v. Gomez*, 298 F.3d

1 898, 903 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002); *Jeffers v. Gomez*, 267 F.3d 895, 900 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (*per curiam*); *Schwenk v.*  
2 *Hartford*, 204 F.3d 1187, 1196 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); *Robins v. Meecham*, 60 F.3d 1436, 1441 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995);  
3 *Berg v. Kincheloe*, 794 F.2d 457, 460 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1986). When determining whether the force is excessive,  
4 the court should look to the “extent of injury . . . , the need for application of force, the relationship  
5 between that need and the amount of force used, the threat ‘reasonably perceived by the responsible  
6 officials,’ and ‘any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.’” *Hudson*, 503 U.S. at 7  
7 (quoting *Whitley*, 475 U.S. at 321); *see also Martinez*, 323 F.3d at 1184. Although the Supreme Court  
8 has never required a showing that an emergency situation existed, “the absence of an emergency may  
9 be probative of whether the force was indeed inflicted maliciously or sadistically.” *Jordan*, 986 F.2d  
10 at 1528 n.7; *see also Jeffers*, 267 F.3d at 913 (deliberate indifference standard applies where there is no  
11 “ongoing prison security measure”); *Johnson v. Lewis*, 217 F.3d 726, 734 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000). Moreover,  
12 there is no need for a showing of serious injury as a result of the force, but the lack of such injury is  
13 relevant to the inquiry. *See Hudson*, 503 U.S. at 7-9; *Martinez*, 323 F.3d at 1184; *Schwenk*, 204 F.3d  
14 at 1196. Plaintiff states an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against defendants.

### 15 **III. Conclusion**

16 **IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED** that plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended  
17 complaint (docket #11) is **GRANTED**.

18 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that plaintiff’s claims set forth in his second amended  
19 complaint (docket #12) **MAY PROCEED**.

20 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** as follows:

21 1. The Attorney General’s Office shall advise the Court within **twenty-one (21) days** of the date  
22 of entry of this order whether it can accept service of process for the named defendants. As to any of  
23 the named defendants for which the Attorney General’s Office cannot accept service, the Office shall  
24 file, *under seal*, the last known address(es) of those defendant(s). If the Attorney General accepts service  
25 of process for any named defendant(s), such defendant(s) shall file and serve an answer or other response  
26 to the complaint within **thirty (30) days** of the date of the notice of acceptance of service.

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2. If service cannot be accepted for any of the named defendant(s), plaintiff shall file a motion identifying the unserved defendant(s), requesting issuance of a summons, and specifying a full name and address for said defendant(s). Plaintiff is reminded that, pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, service must be accomplished within one hundred twenty (120) days of the date the complaint was filed. **This Order supersedes the court's May 31, 2011 Order (docket #13).**

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that henceforth, plaintiff shall serve upon defendants, or, if an appearance has been made by counsel, upon their attorney(s), a copy of every pleading, motion, or other document submitted for consideration by the court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper submitted for filing a certificate stating the date that a true and correct copy of the document was mailed to the defendants or counsel for defendants. If counsel has entered a notice of appearance, the plaintiff shall direct service to the individual attorney named in the notice of appearance, at the address stated therein. The court may disregard any paper received by a district judge or a magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk, and any paper which fails to include a certificate showing proper service.

DATED: June 13, 2011.

  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE