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Subsequently, on May 12, 2011, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants alleging nine causes of action: (1) debt collection violations; (2) Nevada Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, NRS 598.0923; (3) Nevada Unfair Lending Practices Act, NRS 598D.100; (4) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (5) NRS 107.080; (6) quiet title; (7) fraud; (8) slander of title; and (9) abuse of process. Doc. #1, Exhibit C. In response, defendants filed a motion to dismiss (Doc. #5) which was granted by the court (Doc. #16). Thereafter, plaintiffs filed the present motion for reconsideration. Doc. #17.

II. Discussion

A. Motion for Reconsideration

Plaintiffs bring their motion for reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). A motion under Rule 59(e) is an "extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources." Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). Rule 59(e) provides that a district court may reconsider a prior order where the court is presented with newly discovered evidence, an intervening change of controlling law, manifest injustice, or where the prior order was clearly erroneous. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e); see also United States v. Cuddy, 147 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1998); School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County v. AcandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).

In their motion, plaintiffs contend that there has been an intervening change in controlling law such that the court's prior order is in error. See Doc. #21. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that the recent Ninth Circuit decision in Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, 656 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. September 7, 2011), establishes that a party must be a holder of both the mortgage note and deed of trust to initiate non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. *Id*.

The court has reviewed the documents and pleadings on file in this matter and finds that reconsideration of the court's order is not warranted. Plaintiffs' reliance on Cervantes is misplaced. First, that decision is based solely on the application of Arizona law which differs greatly from

| 1 | Nevada law in terms of non-judicial foreclosures. At the time of the instant foreclosure, Nevada |
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| 2 | law did not require the production of the original note before one of the statutorily enumerated |
| 3 | parties initiates a non-judicial foreclosure. Weingarter v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, 702 F. Supp. |
| 4 | 2d 1276, 1280 (D. Nev. 2010). Second, the <i>Cervantes</i> court re-established the legality of statutorily |
| 5 | enumerated parties initiating non-judicial foreclosure proceedings against a defaulting party. See |
| 6 | Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1044. Therefore, the court finds that plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is |
| 7 | without merit and shall deny the motion accordingly. |
| 8 | B. Motion to Dismiss |
| 9 | As to defendant LSI's motion to dismiss, the court finds the motion moot because LSI has |
| 10 | already been dismissed from this action pursuant to parties' April 12, 2012 stipulation dismissing |
| 11 | LSI as a defendant. See Doc. #40. Accordingly, the court shall deny the motion to dismiss. |
| 12 | |
| 13 | IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration (Doc. #17) is |
| 14 | DENIED. |
| 15 | IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's motion to dismiss (Doc. #21) is DENIED as |
| 16 | moot. |
| 17 | IT IS SO ORDERED. |
| 18 | DATED this 17th day of May, 2012. |
| 19 | Outoucc |
| 20 | LARRY R. HICKS |
| 21 | UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE |
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