

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF NEVADA

THE PIATELLI COMPANY, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

ALAN CHAMBERS and LAURA  
CHAMBERS,

Defendants.

3:12-cv-225-RCJ-WGC  
AMENDED ORDER

This Case involves a dispute between members of an LLC regarding an attempt to sell a gold mine. Defendants have moved for partial summary judgment (ECF No. 32). For the reasons stated herein, the motion is denied.

**I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

In late 2006 and early 2007, Defendant Alan Chambers (“Chambers”) sought to have Mario Piatelli, Jack Frost, Robert Dierking, and J.D. Hunt (the “Investors” or “Plaintiffs”) invest in his 800-acre gold mine (the “Mine”) located near Hawthorne, Nevada. (Piatelli Decl., ECF No. 7, at 24).<sup>1</sup> On March 8, 2007 Chambers and the Investors executed a joint agreement (the “Joint Agreement”). (Id.; Joint Agreement, ECF No. 7, at 40). Pursuant to the Joint Agreement, Chambers conveyed the Mine to the recently formed Lucky Boy Mining and Development, LLC (“Lucky Boy”) in exchange for an 80% ownership interest in Lucky Boy and, among other benefits, \$30,000 from the Investors. (Piatelli Decl., ECF No. 7, at 26). An operating agreement

<sup>1</sup> The Court takes Judicial Notice of the declarations filed in support of Plaintiffs’ April 26, 2012 motion for injunction ( ECF No. 7).

1 (the “Operating Agreement”) executed the same day provided that Lucky Boy would be  
2 managed and controlled by a management committee consisting of all five of its members.<sup>2</sup>  
3 (Operating Agreement, ECF No. 7, at 45–46). A majority vote of the members was to control all  
4 aspects of managing the company, (Id. at 51), and Piatelli was appointed as president by a  
5 majority of the members. (Piatelli Decl., ECF No. 7, at 25). The members agreed that Lucky  
6 Boy’s purpose was to prove the profitability of the Mine and market it for a price ranging from  
7 \$3,000,000 to \$5,000,000. (Id. at 24; Joint Agreement, ECF No. 7, at 41).  
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9 In 2006, prior to the execution of the Joint Agreement, Chambers apparently executed a  
10 commission agreement (the “Commission Agreement”) with the Piatelli Company, wherein he  
11 agreed to pay a ten-percent commission to Piatelli, provided that Piatelli produced a ready,  
12 willing, and able buyer. During his deposition, Chambers repeatedly denied the existence of the  
13 Commission Agreement until the fully executed document was presented to him, at which point  
14 he admitted signing it. (Chambers Dep., ECF No. 33, at 42–45).  
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16 Shortly after Lucky Boy’s formation Piatelli and Frost began an aggressive program to  
17 find a large investor or buyer. (Piatelli Decl., ECF No. 7, at 25). During a five-year period from  
18 March 2007 to March 2012, Piatelli and Frost created advertising materials and marketed the  
19 property to dozens of prospective purchasers around world. (Id. at 28). Although the pair  
20 received multiple offers, most of the prospective purchasers were not qualified buyers, but were  
21 instead interested in packaging a deal to sell stock. (Id.).  
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23 During this period, Chambers apparently operated the Mine without any permits and  
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25 <sup>2</sup> The Court notes that Chambers denies ever signing the Operating Agreement, (Chambers Dep.,  
26 ECF No. 32-3, at 58–59), and that the Investors contest this denial, (Hunt Decl., ECF No. 7, at  
27 138).  
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1 without providing an accounting to the Investors, failed to respond to requests for information  
2 from the Investors, locked the Mine and refused to provide a key to the Investors, denied the  
3 Investors the ability to inspect the Mine, and even attempted to sell the Mine without the  
4 approval of the Investors. (Frost Decl., ECF No. 7, at 135–36).

5 Early in 2007, Lucky Boy retained the services of geologist Chris Shaw (“Shaw”), who  
6 investigated certain portions of the mining property, obtained samples, and prepared geological  
7 reports. While investigating the property, Shaw was able to enter a large open shaft (the “Shaft”)  
8 and take samples and photographs of a visibly large vein of gold, which revealed significant  
9 information about the value of the mine. (Shaw Decl., ECF No. 7, at 146–152).

10 In late 2010, Dr. Victor Asai—a representative of The Yasheng Group (“Yasheng”)—  
11 contacted Piatelli and Frost to discuss the Mine. (Asai Decl., ECF No. 7, at 153). After initial  
12 discussions about the Mine, the chairman and president of Yasheng agreed to visit the Mine on  
13 November 18, 2011. (Piatelli Decl., ECF No. 7, at 25). Dierking contacted Chambers and asked  
14 him open the Mine for the visit. He further explained that Yasheng was interested in purchasing  
15 the Mine. (Dierking Decl., ECF No. 7, at 143). Chambers reacted negatively to this information  
16 and stated he did not want to sell the property. (Id.).

17 During Yasheng’s November, 2011 visit to the Mine, Dierking observed that Chambers  
18 had begun to fill the Shaft containing the visible vein of gold. (Id.). Contrary Dierking’s onsite  
19 observation, Chambers testified, in his deposition, that he had totally closed the Shaft six months  
20 prior to the November, 2011 visit.<sup>3</sup> (Chambers Dep., ECF No. 33, at 37–38).

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<sup>3</sup> Prior to the November, 2011 visit, Piatelli was negotiating with a different prospective buyer. On October 26, 2011, Piatelli described the proposed transaction in an email to Chambers. Later that day, Chambers and his wife, Defendant Laura Chambers responded with an email stating

1 In February 2012, Yasheng and Lucky Boy entered into an Option to Lease agreement  
2 and a Lease and Purchase Option agreement. (Option to Lease, ECF No. 7, at 114; Lease and  
3 Purchase Option Agreement, ECF No. 7, at 121). The Option to Lease agreement provided a  
4 ninety-day period for Yasheng to conduct an in-depth investigation of the Mine, and if  
5 satisfactory, Yasheng could elect to lease the Mine under the Lease and Purchase Option  
6 agreement by paying \$500,000. If Yasheng leased the Mine, it could then, at any time during the  
7 eighteen-month lease period, exercise its option to purchase by paying the balance of  
8 \$4,000,000. (Id.). The Option to Lease did not permit Yasheng to extract ore. (Id.).

10 On March 6, 2012, Dr. Asai called Chambers to arrange for him to open the Mine for  
11 Yasheng's executives and professionals. (Asai Decl., ECF No. 7, at 155). During that  
12 conversation, Chambers represented that he owned 80% of the Mine itself (not of Lucky Boy)  
13 and that he would not open the Mine unless he saw a contract. (Id.). The Parties agreed to a  
14 meeting on March 8, 2012, in Hawthorn, Nevada, between the president and chairman of the  
15 Yasheng board, four of Yasheng's geologists, Dr. Asai, Lucky Boy's geologist, and two  
16 professional companies from which Yasheng sought proposals for the due diligence work  
17 (Summit Engineering and Broadbent Environmental). (Id. at 156).

20 During the meeting, the group desired to see the visible vein of gold in the Shaft, (Id. at  
21 157), but Chambers told the group that they could not get to the Shaft because it was "all snowed  
22 in." (Id.). Nonetheless, the group proceeded to the Shaft and found it filled-in with dirt. (Id.).

24 When Dr. Asai asked where the Shaft was located, Chambers responded "you are on top of it."

25 that Piatelli should no longer contact them, that they had their own deals, and that they did not  
26 need the partners anymore. At his deposition, Chambers denied knowledge of the responsive  
27 email, (Chambers Dep., ECF No. 33, at 49–50), but Laura Chambers has testified that Chambers  
dictated it to her, ( L. Chambers Dep., ECF No. 33, at 77–79).

1 (Id.). The group had apparently driven over it without Chambers warning them of the potential  
2 danger. (Id.). Chambers claimed that he filled the Shaft because of the risk of earthquakes, (Id.),  
3 but prior to his actions, the Shaft had been open for sixty to seventy years without any  
4 earthquake-related harm. (Shaw Decl., ECF No. 7, at 147–48). Because of Chambers actions, the  
5 group was unable to view the prominent vein of gold it desired to inspect.  
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7 After the visit to the Mine, the group met at the nearby El Capitan hotel, where Shaw  
8 gave a presentation about the Mine. (Dierking Decl., ECF No. 7, at 144). During this meeting,  
9 both Chambers and his wife were very disruptive, claiming that they owned 80% of the Mine,  
10 knew nothing of any contract between Lucky Boy and Yasheng, that the Mine did not have the  
11 proper permits, that Piatelli had forged the deed to the Mine, and that criminal charges and a  
12 lawsuit were being filed against him. (Id.; Asai Decl., ECF No. 7, at 158). Chambers and his wife  
13 were apparently so disruptive during the visit and subsequent meeting that the chairman and  
14 CEO of Summit Engineering informed Dr. Asai that Summit was unwilling to perform the due  
15 diligence work while Chambers was present, because he believed that Chambers would not  
16 behave safely, responsibly, or legally at the Mine. (Gallagher Decl., ECF No.7, at 162–63).  
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19 In fact, Chambers and his wife created such doubt in the minds of the Yasheng executives  
20 that Dr. Asai decided to drive to Los Angeles to meet with Piatelli and determine Chambers’  
21 authority. (Asai Decl., ECF No. 7, at 159). Before Dr. Asai departed, Chambers and his wife  
22 approached him and told him that Chambers had another mine for sale, which he would offer to  
23 sell to Yasheng. (Id.). In response, Dr. Asai explained that there would be no further discussions  
24 until Lucky Boy resolved its internal conflict. (Id.).  
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26 In Los Angeles, Piatelli provided Dr. Asai with copies of the deed and the Lucky Boy  
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1 Operating Agreement, which authorized a majority of the management committee to make  
2 decisions. (Id.). When Dr. Asai returned to Hawthorn, Laura Chambers again approached him,  
3 stating that she and Chambers wanted to buy out their partners and do the mining project with  
4 Yasheng, but that they would not pull any permits because they did not want the state to know  
5 what they were doing. (Id. at 160). Dr. Asai told her to stop talking and explained that Yasheng  
6 required all proper permits. (Id. at 160). Since that time, Chambers has repeatedly attempted to  
7 negotiate with Yasheng's president by telephone. (Piatelli Decl., ECF No. 7, at 33).

9 In early April, 2012 Piatelli sent a copy of the Yasheng transaction documents to all  
10 members, including Chambers. The documents were executed by members Frost, Dierking, and  
11 Hunt on or about April 7, 2012. Chambers refused to sign the documents, but he admits that he  
12 received them. (Chambers Dep., ECF No. 33, at 45–48).

14 On July 26, 2012, Lucky Boy held a duly noticed members' meeting, via conference call,  
15 to ratify certain actions taken by Lucky Boy, including the execution of the Yasheng Agreement,  
16 and allow for needed discussion between the members. All of Lucky Boy's members participated  
17 in the conference call, including Chambers and his counsel, Attorney Brohawn. Chambers,  
18 however, expressed an objection to the meeting and claimed that he was participating under  
19 protest. Near the end of the meeting, after discussion on various agenda items, Piatelli called for  
20 a vote to ratify the Yasheng Agreement and approve the other items on the agenda. Four of the  
21 members voted "Aye," and Chambers voted "No." Chambers then restated his objections to the  
22 meeting. (Tr. July 26, 2012 Members Meeting, ECF No. 33-1, 80–97).

1 On April 23, 2012, the Investors<sup>4</sup> filed a complaint in this Court against Alan and Laura  
2 Chambers (collectively “Defendants”), alleging (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the implied  
3 covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; (4) interference with  
4 contractual relations; (5) interference with prospective economic advantage; and (6) defamation.  
5 (ECF No. 1). On April 26, 2012, the Investors filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, which  
6 this Court granted in an order dated May 11, 2012. (ECF No. 21). Specifically, the Court  
7 enjoined Defendants from, among other things, taking any actions that might interfere with any  
8 contract between Lucky Boy and Yasheng. (Id. at 8).

10 On April 10, 2013, Defendants filed the pending motion for partial summary judgment,  
11 contending that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all claims other than (1)  
12 Piatelli’s claim for defamation, and (2) the claims for a proportionate share of unreimbursed  
13 regular operating expenses. (ECF No. 32). The Court now considers, and ultimately denies,  
14 Defendants’ motion.

## 16 **II. LEGAL STANDARDS**

17 In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court construes the evidence in the  
18 light most favorable to the nonmoving party. *Bagdadi v. Nazar*, 84 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir.  
19 1996). Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, a court will grant summary judgment “if the movant shows  
20 that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a  
21 matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Material facts are “facts that might affect the outcome of the  
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24 <sup>4</sup> The Piatelli Company, Inc., Hunt Brothers Producing Company, Inc., and Jack Gibson Frost,  
25 Inc. are also named as plaintiffs in this action. These are all corporations that are owned and  
26 operated by the individual Investors, through which the Investors either made the investment or  
27 to which they later transferred their interest in the LLC. (Piatelli Decl., ECF No. 7, at 24; Hunt  
28 Decl., ECF No. 7, at 138; Frost Decl., ECF No. 7, at 33).

1 suit under the governing law.” *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct.  
2 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a  
3 reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. *Id.*

4         The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying the portions of the pleadings and  
5 evidence that the party believes to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.  
6 *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A  
7 party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by “citing  
8 to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically  
9 stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of  
10 the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” or “showing that the  
11 materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse  
12 party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B).  
13 Once the moving party has properly supported the motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving  
14 party to come forward with specific facts showing that a genuine issue for trial exists. *Matsushita*  
15 *Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538  
16 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be  
17 insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.”  
18 *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. The nonmoving party cannot defeat a motion for  
19 summary judgment “by relying solely on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data.”  
20 *Taylor v. List*, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). “Where the record taken as a whole could  
21 not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for  
22 trial.” *Matsushita*, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356.  
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1 **III. ANALYSIS**

2 Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on all  
3 of the claims arising out of the Joint Agreement and the Lucky Boy Operating Agreement. The  
4 Court disagrees. Defendants’ motion can be reduced to two arguments, neither of which are  
5 persuasive: (1) The Investors’ contract with Yasheng was unauthorized under the Operating  
6 Agreement and therefore constituted a breach of contract, which excused any breach of contract  
7 committed by Defendants; and (2) Because the Investors have failed to designate experts in this  
8 case, they are unable to prove damages as a matter of law. (See ECF No. 32, at 7–11).  
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10 **a. Breach of Contract**

11 Turning first to the breach of contract argument,<sup>5</sup> Defendant contends that the Investors  
12 entered into the Yasheng Agreement without the approval of a majority vote of Lucky Boy’s  
13 members, in violation of paragraph 6.2 of the Operating Agreement,<sup>6</sup> and that the Investors  
14 concealed the Yasheng transaction documents from them. These actions, Defendants claim,  
15 constituted a breach of contract sufficient to excuse Defendants from liability under the LLC  
16 Agreements. However, the undisputed evidence reveals that the Yasheng Agreement was  
17 approved by a majority vote, which satisfied paragraph 6.2’s requirements, and that even if the  
18 vote was procedurally defective, it was duly ratified on July 26, 2012. Moreover, Chambers’ own  
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22 <sup>5</sup> Although Defendants dispute Plaintiff’s allegation that Chambers signed the Operating  
23 Agreement, they contend that Plaintiff’s “breached their own Operating Agreement as a matter  
24 of law,” and that this somehow excuses Defendants’ alleged conduct. (Mot. Summ. J., ECF No.  
25 32, at 7).

26 <sup>6</sup> Paragraph 6.2 provides, in relevant part, “no Member will have authority to cause the Company  
27 to engage in the following transactions without first obtaining the approval of a Majority vote of  
28 the Members . . . the sale, exchange or other disposition of all, or substantially all of the  
Company’s assets.” (Operating Agreement, ECF No. 7, at 52).

1 testimony plainly demonstrates that the Investors did not conceal the Yasheng transaction from  
2 him, and Defendants’ attempt to persuade this Court otherwise borders on misleading.

3 As an initial matter, because Defendants do not dispute the fact that four of the five  
4 members executed the transaction documents, (See Chambers Dep., ECF No. 33, at 45–48), they  
5 apparently assume that this did not constitute the majority “vote” required under paragraph 6.2.  
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7 This assumption is incorrect. Paragraph 6.3 provides,

8 No annual or regular meetings of the Members are required to be held. However,  
9 if such meetings are held, such meetings will be noticed, held and conducted  
10 pursuant to the Act. In any instance in which the approval of the Members is  
11 required under this Agreement, such approval may be obtained in any manner  
12 permitted by the Act, except that proxies shall not be allowed. Unless otherwise  
13 provided in this Agreement, approval of the Members will mean the approval of a  
14 Majority vote of the Members.

15 (Operating Agreement, ECF No. 7, at 55) (emphasis added). Paragraph 2.1 provides that the term  
16 “Act” refers to the Beverly Killea Limited Liability Act, Cal. Corp. Code § 17000, et seq., which  
17 governs California limited liability companies. (Id. at 46). Section 17001 of the Act expressly  
18 provides that the term “‘vote’ includes authorization by written consent.” Nevada’s analogous  
19 statute likewise defines “vote” to include actions constituting “written consent.” Nev. Rev. Stat. §  
20 78.010(a). Therefore, whether the Court applies the Beverly Killea Act, as the Operating  
21 Agreement directs, or NRS 78.010, it must conclude that the majority “vote” or “approval”  
22 required under paragraph 6.2 can be accomplished by written consent. As noted above, it is  
23 undisputed that in April of 2012, four of the five members of Lucky Boy, a clear majority,<sup>7</sup>  
24 signed the Yasheng Agreement. These signatures unquestionably constituted written consent.

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26 <sup>7</sup> While Defendants repeatedly make a point of the fact that Chambers has an 80% ownership  
27 interest in the LLC, the Court notes that he does not have an 80% membership, i.e., voting,  
28 interest. Chambers, like each of the other members, has a 20% membership interest.

1 Therefore, the Court finds, as a matter of law, that the Yasheng Agreement was approved by a  
2 majority vote of the members.

3 Moreover, even if the written “vote” was somehow defective under the Operating  
4 Agreement, it was cured by the July 26, 2012 ratification. Under both Nevada and California  
5 law, “contract ratification is the adoption of a previously formed contract, notwithstanding a  
6 quality that rendered it relatively void.” *Merrill v. DeMott*, 951 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Nev. 1997)  
7 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); *Kraft v. Wilson*, 37 P. 790, 792 (Cal. 1894)  
8 (“Ratification is the adoption of a previously formed contract, notwithstanding a vice which  
9 rendered it relatively void; and, by the very nature of the act of ratification, confirmation, or  
10 affirmance, the party confirming becomes a party to the contract.”). Moreover, “[r]atification  
11 relates back and is equivalent to prior authority to make the contract.” *Clark Realty Co. v.*  
12 *Douglas*, 212 P. 466, 467 (1923). Defendants do not dispute that a majority of Lucky Boy’s  
13 members voted to ratify the Yasheng Agreement. (See Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 32, at 4).  
14 Therefore, they cannot seriously maintain that it was unauthorized, and thus violated the  
15 Operating Agreement, at the time of execution. Indeed, both by reason of the majority’s written  
16 consent and the majority’s ratification, Defendants’ breach of contract claim is meritless.  
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20 Defendants also attempt to excuse their alleged conduct by claiming that “Plaintiff  
21 Piatelli affirmatively concealed the existence of the signed Yasheng contract.” (Mot. Summ. J.,  
22 ECF No. 32, at 6). The Court not only rejects this argument, it finds that it mischaracterizes the  
23 undisputed facts and is somewhat misleading. Defendants base this argument on an email from  
24 Plaintiff Piatelli to geologist Shaw dated February 9, 2012, which states in relevant part,  
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26 This is a Confidential Memo to You at this time. A) The Chairman (Big Boss) of  
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1 the Yasheng Corporation has signed our Sale Agreement as of TODAY. B) Please  
2 DO NOT, repeat DO NOT say anything to ALAN at this time. We do not want  
Alan or his GREEDY WIFE causing any trouble and screw up the deal.

3 (Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 32, at 6–11 (quoting Email, ECF No. 32-6)). Defendants make no  
4 effort to discuss this email in the relevant context. Instead, they quote it without explanation,  
5 apparently hoping that the Court will read it in vacuum and find that it excuses the alleged  
6 behavior. The Court is not impressed. This email does not reflect conduct that would excuse the  
7 alleged behavior; it reflects a reasonable fear of the alleged behavior.  
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9 As a starting point, the Court notes that Defendants admit that in November, 2011 they  
10 sent an email to Piatelli unambiguously directing him to cease contacting them about potential  
11 deals to sell the Mine. ( L. Chambers Dep., ECF No. 33, at 79). Furthermore, and contrary to the  
12 obviously intended implication, Piatelli’s email does not evidence an intent to keep Chambers  
13 from voting on the deal, but instead attempts to prevent him from sabotaging it. Poignantly, it  
14 requests that Shaw not reveal the information to Chambers “at this time.” (ECF No. 32-6). More  
15 importantly, Chambers admits that (1) in November, 2011 he was aware that a majority of the  
16 members supported the potential deal with Yasheng, (Chambers Dep., ECF No. 33, at 50–51);  
17 (2) he knew about the Option to Lease before the March 8, 2012 meeting between  
18 representatives of Lucky Boy and Yasheng, (Id.); (3) in April, 2012, he had an opportunity to  
19 sign the transaction documents, and thereby vote on the transaction, (Id. at 45–48); and (4) he  
20 participated in a meeting during which the deal was ratified by a majority vote, (See Mot. Summ.  
21 J., ECF No. 32, at 4). Therefore, Defendants’ reliance Piatelli’s email for the implied  
22 proposition that Chambers was deliberately kept from expressing his views on the deal, and that  
23 this somehow affected the majority’s decision to execute it, is not only unpersuasive, it is a  
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1 mischaracterization of the email itself and the facts of this case.

2 Finally, even assuming, arguendo, that the Yasheng contract is not valid, its execution  
3 most certainly would not excuse the behavior alleged in the causes of action presently at issue.  
4 Defendants' sole argument on this point is that is "[i]t is a principle of fundamental justice that if  
5 a promisor is himself the cause of the failure of performance, either of an obligation due him or  
6 of a condition upon which his own liability depends, he cannot take advantage of the  
7 failure."(See *id* at 7 (quoting *Cladianos v. Friedhoff*, 240 P.2d 208, 210 (1952))). While the  
8 Court agrees with this rule generally, it is entirely inapplicable to this case. Indeed, there is  
9 nothing in the record from which the Court could conclude that the Investors caused the culpable  
10 behavior alleged.<sup>8</sup> Even if the investors were without authority to execute the Yasheng  
11 agreement, which is plainly not the case, paragraph 6.2 simply does not create an enforceable  
12 duty as to the Defendants personally or impose a condition upon which their liability depends.  
13 Instead, it simply defines the situations in which members are without authority to bind the LLC  
14 (i.e., situations in which a disputed agreement is voidable). Therefore, Defendants cannot be  
15 heard to argue that an alleged violation of paragraph 6.2 excuses the conduct at issue in this case.  
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19 **b. Damages**

20 Defendants next argue that because the Investors have not designated an expert witness,  
21 they cannot put on any evidence of damages related to the Operating Agreement. This argument  
22 is poorly researched and poorly reasoned.

23 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, lay opinion is admissible when it is "(a) rationally  
24 based on the witness's perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness's testimony or  
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26 <sup>8</sup> In fact, as explained above, the record actually supports the conclusion that it was Defendants  
27 conduct that caused the Investors to engage in the behavior of which Defendants now complain.

1 to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized  
2 knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”

3 While the Court acknowledges that proving some of the damages claimed in this case  
4 could require expert testimony, Defendants have failed to make a meaningful attempt identify  
5 those damages or demonstrate why they would require specialized knowledge. Moreover, it is  
6 possible, even likely, that expert testimony will not be required at all. If, for example, the  
7 Investors prove that Defendants’ conduct merely delayed the sale of the Mine, the damages will  
8 presumably be based on the calculated interest, and such calculations do not require special  
9 expertise. Thus, at this point, it is simply not clear that the Investors will be required to put on  
10 expert testimony.  
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12 Furthermore, even if expert testimony is required, and the deadline for Rule 26(a)(2)  
13 disclosures has passed, the Court is not bound to exclude it. Indeed, Rule 37(c)(1), gives the  
14 Court broad discretion in this area:  
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16 (1) Failure to Disclose or Supplement. If a party fails to provide information or  
17 identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use  
18 that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a  
19 trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless. In addition to or  
20 instead of this sanction, the court, on motion and after giving an opportunity to be  
21 heard:

22 (A) may order payment of the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees,  
23 caused by the failure;

24 (B) may inform the jury of the party’s failure; and

25 (C) may impose other appropriate sanctions . . . .

26 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37.

27 Stated simply, Defendants have assumed what they intended to conclude: (1) that expert  
28 testimony is unquestionably required in this case, and (2) that the Court must exclude it as a

1 matter of law. These assumptions, however, confuse well settled procedural and evidentiary  
2 rules. In the event that expert testimony is required in this case, the Court may still allow it.  
3 Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the motion for partial  
4 summary judgment is denied.  
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
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7 **CONCLUSION**

8 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment (ECF  
9 NO. 32) is DENIED.

10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the hearing scheduled for January 21, 2014 is  
11 VACATED.

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13 IT IS SO ORDERED

14 Dated: January 7, 2014

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18 ROBERT C. JONES  
19 United States District Judge  
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