



1 fire, causing severe injuries. The state district court sentenced Newell to 72–180 months  
2 for Count Two and 24–60 months for Count Three, to run concurrently. (ECF No. 22-5 at  
3 20.) Count Four was dismissed as redundant. (*Id.*) Judgment of conviction was filed on  
4 August 29, 2014. (ECF No. 22-6.)

5 In his federal habeas petition, Newell raises one issue—he argues that the Nevada  
6 courts’ retroactive application of limitations on the justifiable use of deadly force violated  
7 his constitutional due process rights against ex post facto violation. (ECF No. 6, ECF No.  
8 32 at 4.) This Court denied Respondents’ motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 32.) Respondents  
9 answered the petition. (ECF No. 42.) Newell filed his reply/motion for evidentiary hearing  
10 (ECF Nos. 55, 56.)

## 11 **II. Legal Standards**

12 An evidentiary hearing is authorized under Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing  
13 Section 2254 Cases for the development of a colorable claim when the state court has not  
14 reliably found the relevant facts and the claim, if proved, would entitle the petitioner to  
15 relief. *Schriro v. Landrigan*, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007). If the record belies the petitioner’s  
16 factual allegations, or precludes habeas relief, an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary. *Id.*  
17 The Ninth Circuit has also found that on issues that can be resolved from the record, an  
18 evidentiary hearing is not necessary. *Totten v. Merkle*, 137 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir.  
19 1988).<sup>3</sup>

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23 <sup>3</sup>To determine whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, the Court may consider six  
24 factors: (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2)  
25 the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the  
26 fact-finding process employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and  
27 fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the  
28 material facts were not adequately developed at the state court hearing; and (6) for any  
reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and  
fair hearing. *Townsend v. Sain*, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), *overruled on other grounds by*  
*Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes*, 504 U.S. 1 (1992), *superseded in part by statute*, 28 U.S.C. §  
2254(e)(2); *see Earp v. Ornoski*, 431 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005).

1 **III. Analysis**

2 Respondents point out as an initial matter that Newell’s request for an evidentiary  
3 hearing as included in his reply is inappropriate. (ECF No. 58 at 3.) A reply is not the  
4 proper posture to raise claims for the first time, and the Court may utilize its discretion and  
5 decline to consider any such claims. *Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes*, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th  
6 Cir. 1994).

7 In any event, Newell’s motion fails. Newell has not demonstrated that a hearing is  
8 necessary to determine the merit of his claim that retroactive application of new limitations  
9 on the use of deadly force violated ex post facto principles and deprived him of a defense  
10 that would otherwise have been available to him when he committed his crime. Newell  
11 fails to explain how an evidentiary hearing would further establish any factual basis for his  
12 for his claim. He contends that Respondents’ answering brief is “in dispute with [his] factual  
13 allegations,” but he fails to recite a single factual difference between the petition and the  
14 answer. (ECF No. 56 at 6.) The difference lies in the interpretation of the law as applied  
15 to the facts in Newell’s case. No factual dispute exists. The record is sufficient to review  
16 the state courts’ interpretation of the law and determine if the interpretation was both  
17 “contrary to clearly established law” and “objectively unreasonable.” *Williams v. Taylor*,  
18 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000); *Harrington v. Richter*, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011).

19 Newell has had a full opportunity to provide all evidence regarding the events which  
20 led up to the state courts’ alleged ex post facto application of law. Accordingly, the motion  
21 for evidentiary hearing (ECF No. 56) is denied.

22 **IV. Conclusion**

23 It is therefore ordered that Petitioner’s motion for evidentiary hearing (ECF No. 56)  
24 is denied.

25 It is further ordered that Petitioner’s motion to have the matter placed on the  
26 calendar (ECF No. 59) and motion to submit case for a decision (ECF No. 60) are both  
27 denied. The petition now stands brief and will be adjudicated in the ordinary course.

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It is further ordered that Respondents' motion to extend time to respond to the motion for evidentiary hearing (ECF No. 57) is granted *nunc pro tunc*.

DATED THIS 16<sup>th</sup> day of MARCH 2020.



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MIRANDA M. DU  
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE