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8		DISTRICT COURT
9	DISTRICT	OF NEVADA
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11	EDWARD TREMPER,) 3:16-cv-00707-HDM-VPC
12	Plaintiff,)) ORDER
13	VS.)
14	CYNTHIA ANN VINING and JOHN VINING,))
15	Defendants.)
16))
17		_ ′
18	Before the court is the defe	endants' motion to dismiss
19	plaintiff's first amended complai	nt (ECF No. 20). Defendants mov

19 plaintiff's first amended complaint (ECF No. 20). Defendants move 20 for dismissal on the grounds that the complaint does not satisfy 21 the pleading standards under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 22 12(b)(6) and 9(b). Plaintiff has opposed (ECF No. 22), and 23 defendants have replied (ECF No. 27).

Plaintiff Edward Tremper ("plaintiff") filed his first amended complaint on January 18, 2017, asserting seven causes of action against his daughter, Cynthia Ann Vining, and one cause of action against Cynthia's husband, John Vining. Plaintiff alleges that Cynthia improperly transferred \$454,000.00 from an account owned by

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1 plaintiff to which Cynthia had been added for estate planning, 2 convenience and emergency purposes, only. Plaintiff asserts that 3 he and Cynthia orally agreed that absent authorization from 4 plaintiff, Cynthia was not to withdraw any funds from the account 5 until plaintiff's death. Generally, the defendants argue that because Cynthia was a co-owner of the account, she had the legal 6 7 right to withdraw the funds and that the parol evidence rule bars 8 any claim of a contrary oral agreement because the account 9 agreement entered into between plaintiff, Cynthia, and the bank is 10 a written agreement between plaintiff and Cynthia. Defendants 11 argue that they therefore cannot be liable under any of plaintiff's 12 causes of action. Defendants also argue that plaintiff's complaint 13 fails to plead sufficient facts to state plausible claims for 14 relief and that plaintiff's fraud claim fails to satisfy the 15 heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b).

16 In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the 17 court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint 18 as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from such allegations. LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1150 n.2 (9th Cir. 19 20 2000). The allegations of the complaint also must be construed in 21 the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). However, legal 22 23 conclusions are not entitled to the presumption of truth. Ashcroft 24 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

25 "Under the notice pleading standard of the Federal Rules,
26 plaintiffs are only required to give a 'short and plain statement'
27 of their claims in the complaint." Paulsen v. CNF, Inc., 559 F.3d
28 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Diaz v. Int'l Longshore &

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1 Warehouse Union, Local 13, 474 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007)). 2 While this rule "does not require 'detailed factual allegations,'" 3 it "must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim 4 to relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 5 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 6 7 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 8 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. A 9 pleading is insufficient if it offers only labels and conclusions, 10 a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, or 11 "naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Id. 12 (internal punctuation omitted).

13 Under Rule 9(b), "a party must state with particularity the 14 circumstances constituting fraud Malice, intent, knowledge, 15 and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally." 16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). To comply with the rule, the complaint must 17 state with particularity the circumstances constituting the fraud, including an account of the "time, place, and specific content of 18 19 the false representations as well as the identities of the parties 20 to the misrepresentation." Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 21 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004). "[A]llegations of fraud must be 'specific enough to give defendants notice of the particular 22 23 misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud charged so that 24 they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have 25 done anything wrong." Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal punctuation omitted). 26

27 The court concludes that the plaintiff's first amended 28 complaint states claims for relief that are plausible on their

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face, thus satisfying the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, and alleges sufficient facts to satisfy the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b). Accordingly, the defendants' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 20) is DENIED without prejudice to renew at the close of discovery as a motion for summary judgment. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: This 27th day of February, 2017. Howard DMEKiller UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE