UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 2 *** 3 4 JONAH GOLD. Case No. 3:21-cv-00480-JVS-CBL 5 Plaintiff, 6 v. ORDER REGARDING MOTION 7 FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING BRIAN SANDOVAL, et al., ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW 8 CAUSE 9 Defendants. 10 Plaintiff Jonah Gold ("Gold") filed an Emergency Motion for a Temporary 11 Restraining Order and an Order to Show Cause why a preliminary injunction 12 should not issue. Mot., ECF No. 10. Gold provided Defendants Brian Sandoval 13 ("Sandoval"), Melody Rose ("Rose"), Lisa Sherych ("Sherych"), and Steve 14 Sisolak ("Sisolak") (collectively, "Defendants") with notice of the motion and an 15 opportunity to file an opposition. Fulton Decl., ECF No. 10-2. The Defendants did 16 not file a response. 17 18 For the following reasons, the Court **DENIES** the request for a temporary 19 restraining order and declines to issue an order to show cause why a preliminary 20 injunction should not issue. 21 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 24 This case concerns the constitutionality of the University of Nevada-Reno's 25 COVID-19 vaccine policy. On August 20, 2021, the University of Nevada-Reno 26 ("University") enacted the Student COVID-19 vaccine requirement ("Policy") 27 which requires all students to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 before 28

1	enrolling for the Spring 2022 semester. ¹ Gold, who is currently enrolled as an
2	undergraduate at the University, alleges that he has previously contracted COVID-
3	19 and recovered. Compl., ECF No. 1, \P 12. Gold alleges that he is currently
4	unable to enroll in in-person classes for the spring semester because of the Policy.
5	Id. Gold seeks an injunction preventing the University from enforcing the Policy
6	against him because he alleges that his prior infection gives him superior
7	immunity to COVID-19 than vaccinated individuals. <u>Id.</u> ¶ 10.
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9	On November 9, 2021, Gold filed his complaint seeking declaratory and
10	injunctive relief based on the alleged unconstitutionality of the Policy. Compl.,
11	ECF No. 1. On November 19, 2021, Gold filed an emergency application for a
12	temporary restraining order and an order to show cause why a preliminary
13	injunction should not issue. ECF No. 10. On December 2, 2021, the case was
14	assigned to this Court. See ECF No. 26.
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15 16	II. LEGAL STANDARD
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 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 	Courts look to substantially the same factors when determining whether to issue a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction. <u>See Stuhlbarg</u> <u>Intern. Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush and Co., Inc.</u> , 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). The plaintiff has the burden to establish that (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary relief is not granted, (3) the balance of equities favors the plaintiff, and (4) the injunction is in the public interest. <u>Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.</u> , 555 U.S. 5, 20

1	In the Ninth Circuit, the <u>Winter</u> factors may be evaluated on a sliding scale:
2	"serious questions going to the merits, and a balance of hardships that tips sharply
3	toward the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary injunction, so long as
4	the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the
5	injunction is in the public interest." Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632
6	F.3d 1127, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2011). "To reach this sliding scale analysis, however,
7	a moving party must, at an 'irreducible minimum,' demonstrate some chance of
8	success on the merits." Global Horizons, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 510 F.3d
9	1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Arcamuzi v. Cont'l Air Lines, Inc., 819 F.2d
10	935, 937 (9th Cir. 1987)).
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12	III. DISCUSSION
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14	A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
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16	The Court begins by considering the most important factor in the
17	preliminary injunction analysis, whether it is likely that Gold's complaint will
18	succeed on the merits. See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015).
19	Gold brings three causes of action: (1) violation of substantive due process rights
20	protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, Compl. $\P\P$ 116-129; (2) violation of the
21	Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, $\underline{id.} \P\P$ 130-139; and (3)
22	violation of the Fourth Amendment, <u>id.</u> ¶¶ 140-144. The Court begins by
23	considering Gold's likelihood of success on the Fourteenth Amendment claims
24	before turning to the Fourth Amendment claim.
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26	i. Fourteenth Amendment Claims
27	The Due Process Clause "provides heightened protection against
28	government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests."

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). Supreme Court 1 jurisprudence "establish[es] a threshold requirement-that a challenged state action 2 implicate a fundamental right-before requiring more than a reasonable relation to 3 a legitimate state interest to justify the action." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722. 4 Gold's complaint alleges that the Policy violates his "right of self-determination, 5 personal autonomy and bodily integrity, as well as the right to reject medical 6 treatment." Compl. ¶ 117. The Court finds that Gold has not established that the 7 Vaccine Policy implicates a fundamental right. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722 8 (describing the "tradition of carefully formulating the interest at stake in 9 substantive-due-process cases"); Williams v. Brown, - F. Supp. 3d -, 2021 WL 10 4894264, at *9 (D. Or. Oct. 19, 2021) ("This Court joins [the] growing consensus 11 and concludes that there is no fundamental right under the Constitution to refuse 12 vaccination."). Accordingly, rational basis review is the appropriate standard to 13 14 apply to the substantive due process claim.

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Alternatively, Gold argues that the Policy violates the Equal Protection 16 Clause. To prevail on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must "show that a class 17 that is similarly situated has been treated disparately." Boardman v. Inslee, 978 18 19 F.3d 1092, 1117 (9th Cir. 2020). If there is no suspect class at issue, differential treatment is presumed to be valid so long as it is "rationally related to a legitimate 20 state interest." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cent., 473 U.S. 432, 440 21 (1985). Gold alleges that the Policy treats unvaccinated individuals in a punitive 22 way, see Compl. ¶ 132, but does not cite to any binding precedent to suggest that 23 unvaccinated individuals constitute a suspect class. Cf. Bauer v. Summey, No. 24 25 2:21-CV-02952-DCN, 2021 WL 4900922, at *11 (D.S.C. Oct. 21, 2021) (holding that government policies that "treat vaccinated persons differently than 26 unvaccinated persons, including those who have natural immunity" do not target a 27

suspect class). Accordingly, the Court applies rational basis review to Gold's Equal Protection claim.

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The rational basis review test is functionally the same under substantive due 4 process and the Equal Protection Clause. See Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 5 F.3d 300, 307 (9th Cir. 1997). Substantive due process only requires a rational 6 relationship between the challenged policy and a legitimate governmental 7 objective. See Brach v. Newsom, 6 F.4th 904, 924 (9th Cir. 2021). Under the 8 Equal Protection Clause, if there is no suspect class at issue a policy "need only 9 rationally further a legitimate state purpose to be valid." Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. 10 Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 291 (1984) (internal quotations omitted). "Given 11 the standard of review, it should come as no surprise [courts] hardly ever strike[] 12 down a policy as illegitimate under rational basis scrutiny." Trump v. Hawaii, 138 13 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018). 14

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The two-tiered rational basis inquiry first asks whether the challenged law 16 has a legitimate purpose, then whether the challenged law promotes that purpose. 17 See Erotic Serv. Provider Legal Educ. and Research Project v. Gascon, 880 F.3d 18 450, 457 (9th Cir. 2018). The Defendants' stated purpose of mitigating the spread 19 of COVID-19 and preventing severe illness, hospitalizations, and deaths is clearly 20 a legitimate purpose.² See Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. 21 Ct. 63, 67 (2021) ("Stemming the spread of COVID-19 is unquestionably a 22 compelling interest."). The Policy's references to governmental guidance and 23 scientific research shows that the University considered relevant data before 24

 ² See Letter from Lisa Scherych, Administrator, Division of Public and Behavioral Health, to the Honorable Steve Sisolak, Governor of the State of Nevada (Aug. 20, 2021), https://gov.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/govnewnvgov/Content/News/Press/2021_docs/2021-08-20_BO H_Regulation.pdf (recommending immediate adoption of the emergency regulation requiring students at Nevada universities and colleges to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19).

deciding to implement the Policy. <u>See, e.g.</u>, Compl. ¶ 27. While Gold cites to
numerous studies that he alleges show that the Policy is misguided, that does not
mean that his challenge is likely to succeed. Under rational basis review, courts
"do not require that the government's action actually advance its stated purposes,
but merely look to see whether the government *could* have had a legitimate reason
for acting as it did." <u>Wedges/Ledges of California, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, Ariz.</u>,
24 F.3d 56, 66 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original).

9 Because the Policy easily survives rational basis review, the Court finds that
10 Gold has not shown that his Fourteenth Amendment claims are likely to succeed
11 on the merits.

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iv. Fourth Amendment Claim

Gold also alleges that the Policy violates his Fourth Amendment rights by 15 infringing on his privacy. Compl. ¶¶ 140-44. The only case law he cites to support 16 that proposition that Fourth Amendment rights are violated is inapposite. See 17 Anderson v. Taylor, No. 04-74345, 2005 WL 1984438 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 11, 2005) 18 (finding mandatory blood draws for lipid testing as a condition of employment a 19 violation of privacy interests). Nasal swab testing for COVID-19 does not create 20 21 an intrusion under the skin, does not involve any genetic testing, and there is no 22 use of the sample for law enforcement purposes. Accordingly, the Court finds that 23 Gold is unlikely to succeed on his Fourth Amendment claim. See Streight v. Pritzker, No. 3:21-cv-50339, 2021 WL 4306146 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2021) 24 25 (denying preliminary injunction because plaintiff had not shown that Fourth Amendment challenge to university policy requiring vaccination or saliva testing 26 27 to attend in-person classes was likely to succeed on the merits).

C. Irreparable Harm, Balance of the Harms, Public Interest

- Within the Ninth Circuit, "serious questions going to the merits, and a
 balance of hardships that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support issuance of a
 preliminary injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood
 of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest." <u>Alliance for</u>
 <u>the Wild Rockies</u>, 632 F.3d at 1134-35. At this stage, Gold has not only failed to
 show a likelihood of success, he has not raised serious questions going to the
 merits.
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Even if the Court had found that Gold raised serious questions going to the 11 merits, the other factors would weigh against granting a temporary restraining 12 order. The balance of equities tips sharply towards the Defendants. The 13 Defendants are attempting to protect a campus community with thousands of 14 students, faculty, and staff from a deadly infectious disease. This far outweighs 15 any harm Gold may face in choosing between receiving a medically-approved 16 vaccination or receiving his education in an alternate manner. The public interest 17 also weighs heavily in favor of the Defendants. See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 18 562 U.S. 223, 226 (2011) (describing "the elimination of communicable diseases 19 through vaccination" as "one of the greatest achievements of public health in the 20 20th century") (internal quotations omitted). 21

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In light of the failure to raise serious questions going to the merits, the balance of hardships that weighs heavily towards the Defendants, and the strong public interest that weighs against an injunction, the Court **DENIES** the request for an temporary restraining order.

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1	IV. CONCLUSION
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3	For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the emergency request for a
4	temporary restraining order and declines to issue an order to show cause.
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6	IT IS SO ORDERED.
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8	DATED: December 3, 2021
9	James J Achina
10	HONORABLE JAMES V. SELNA
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12 13	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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