UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CENTER FOR SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC
INTEREST
LINDA FRANULOVIC,
Plaintiff, 07-539 (RMB-JS)
-vs-

THE COCA-COLA COMPANY, et als.,
Defendants.
Mitchell H. Cohen United States Courthouse
One John F. Gerry Plaza
Camden, New Jersey 08101
MARCH 20, 2009
BEFORE:
THE HONORABLE RENEÉ MARIE BUMB UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
APPEARANCES:
Willims, Cuker \& Berezofsky
BY: Mark R. Cuker. Esquire
Center For Science In The Public Interest
BY: Stephen Gardner, Esquire
Michael Quirk, Esquire
Kate Campbell, Esquire
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
McCarter \& English, LLP
BY: Peter J. Boyer, Esquire
Scott Elder, Esquire
Shani Thome, Esquire
ATTORNEYS FOR COCA-COLA COMPANY
Oral Pottinger, Esquire ATTORNEY FOR NESTLE

Certified as true and correct as Required byTitle 28, USC, Sec. 753 /S/ Theodore M. Formaroli
Theodore M. Formaroli, CSR, CRR
Official U. S. Reporter
New Jersey Cert. No. 433

THE COURT: Good morning. You may be seated. We're here in the matter of Franulovic versus Coca-Cola, 07-539. May I have your appearances, please. I'll start with the plaintiff.

MR. GARDNER: Good morning. Steve Gardner for
Ms. Franulovic. With me is Mike Quirk, Mark Cuker and Kate Campbell, who is with my office but is not on the pleadings. Mr. Quirk and I will be probably sharing argument.

THE COURT: Okay. Good morning. Welcome.
For the defendant?
MR. ELDER: Scott Elder for the Coca-Cola Company. MR. BOYER: Peter Boyer also for the Coca-Cola Company.

MR. POTTINGER: Oral Pottinger for Nestle USA.
MS. THOME: Shani Thome from the Coca-Cola Company.
THE COURT: Okay. So, good morning. Welcome.
Who will be arguing on behalf of the defendants?
MR. ELDER: I will.
THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Elder.
Mr. Elder, can you tell me how your motion for summary judgment fits in with the motion for class certification? Let me tell you how I'm thinking of it. I'm thinking of it in your motion for summary judgment, which goes to the plaintiff as a class representative and it goes to the plaintiff as an individual, that because she's not an
appropriate class representative, class certification should be denied and because of her failure to make out a claim, given her deposition testimony, her individual claims should be denied and summary judgement granted. Do I have that right? Is that -- yes.

MR. ELDER: Would you like me to --
THE COURT: Wherever you're comfortable. If I can't hear you, I'll ask you to go over there.

MR. ELDER: That's right. Her individual claims fail on their own merit because of her admissions about what she knew about calories and so forth and how she understood the advertising, so summary judgment as to her individual claims is appropriate. And then also because of those admissions she's not an adequate class representative for other reasons, but including the fact that she'll be occupied with those unique defenses and therefore she puts the class claims at jeopardy through her admissions related to her own individual claims.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me hear from -- Mr. Gardner, do you want to argue the certification motion?

MR. GARDNER: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right, I'll hear from you.
MR. GARDNER: Your Honor, I know the Court has read the motion and the other briefing, $I$ will try to just hit on the points that --

THE COURT: You can count on me interrupting you, Mr. Gardner. I know I will. At some point I'll want you to fill in some gaps. But go ahead, yes.

MR. GARDNER: I was kind of opening up to that
solicitation, your Honor. I would appreciate it. I will therefore just skirt over quickly what we have to show.

First, under Rule $23(a)$ we need to show numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy. I will touch on a few points on those but we have covered them generally adequately in our briefing. Assuming we meet the $23(a)$ standards, we then move to --

THE COURT: Can $I$ talk to you about a couple of those?
MR. GARDNER: Yes, ma'am.
THE COURT: I don't know that $I$ agree with you about your common sense approach of why someone would buy Enviga. I can think of several different reasons why someone would buy Enviga. So, how do you prove that someone bought -- that the class is the same as Franulovic, that someone who bought Enviga bought it for the same reasons that she did? Isn't that subjective? And how you would you prove that?

MR. GARDNER: We could prove it, your Honor, at trial using testing, opinion from experts, the same way that Coke attempted to use Mr. Steckel's testimony drawing conclusions from pre-marketing testing.

THE COURT: So that's a merits issue I shouldn't
reach?
MR. GARDNER: I would say so, your Honor, but I've got what I think is a better answer, which is we're passed the standing issue, Article III standing the Court has already ruled on. Coke keeps come back to it, but on Article III standing the Court has held that Ms. Franulovic does have it.

We then move to what is sometimes called standing under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, the CFA, and that the New Jersey state courts, including the Supreme Court, have repeatedly held that once you establish that the main plaintiff has ascertainable loss and therefore standing to bring her own action under the CFA, it is unnecessary to prove what the other members of the class, what other New Jersey consumers thought, did or believed, that all we need to do in order to get injunctive relief is to show that she has standing, both Article III and CFA standing, and at that point the New Jersey courts are clear.

THE COURT: No, but this goes to how do you define the class? In other words, how is the class being defined? Is it being defined as someone who is similarly situated as Franulovic who bought Enviga as a weight-loss product versus someone who bought it because it had green tea in it or someone who bought it because they had a coupon, or whatever the reason is? But how does the class get defined? And then my question is it seems to have a subjective element into it
and isn't that fraught with problem?
MR. GARDNER: Yes, it is potentially fraught with problem, your Honor. There are ways around that. You can have claim forms if it is certified. And if we were to win at trial, at the trial of our -- what amounts to our test plaintiff case, then the Court could order restitution, were we seeking it, based on claim forms.

Here, in order to avoid that potential problem, we define the class more broadly so we wouldn't have a subjective test. And there is no harm in having an overbroad definition so that everyone who buys Enviga, if we were to be successful, would understand that it is not a guaranteed weight-loss. So we could define it, your Honor, but in a more restrictive way.

But, in all honesty, I could not figure out a way that did not run afoul of the subjective aspect that the Court has raised. I don't think there is a problem in defining it more broadly because we are not seeking damages and we would not have preclusive effect on the class members because it is injunctive only.

THE COURT: Your comment raises an interesting question and -- maybe it's not. I mean, maybe it's not an appropriate question but it does raise the question. If you are only seeking injunctive relief, why is it that you need a class action?

MR. GARDNER: We don't. In fact, your Honor, if the

Court were to deny the motion for summary judgment, deny class certification, we would move forward with Ms. Franulovic, establish her own case and seek permanent injunction. It's procedurally cleaner to do it as a class action, we think, but we don't under New Jersey law -- and also by doing it as a class, we don't have to face the inevitable arguments from Coke that we're in federal court and we can't use the CFA as a form of getting relief without complying with federal
requirements. We believe we can. But in the same way that we defined the class conservatively, we're taking a conservative approach seeking the relief -- to obtain the relief that we are seeking.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. GARDNER: To go a little more into the ascertainable loss type standing, your Honor, I did want to address briefly, and if the Court doesn't want to hear it please do interrupt, the use of Mr. or Dr. Stickle. We briefed this but it arises again, the most recent I believe it's in the pleading Coke filed the other day, and I know it's in the sur reply.

Although what other class members thought, intended and did is irrelevant under the Consumer Fraud Act, I want to point out what Mr. -- I'll say "doctor" so I'm erring on that side -- Dr. Stickle said he did. He looked at studies that Coke, and I assume Nestle, had performed when they were
developing the product and when they were rolling out and considering how to market the product. These were studies not of the actual product, not of that can, not of the ads that actually appeared in New Jersey or -- that's actually the new can. The original can, none of that was tested. These tests were on prototypes and conceptual ads. They may have been identical but Dr. Stickle could not tell me at deposition whether he knew that the ads that were the subject of the studies, the marketing studies that Coke and Nestle had done, were the same.

THE COURT: Were the same as the ones he reviewed, is that what you mean?

MR. GARDNER: He reviewed -- no, ma'am, I think that's what I said, but it's not what I meant.

THE COURT: Oh.
MR. GARDNER: He looked at the tests and the ads and cans that were tested pre-market. He could not say that any of those cans, or I think cans, I know advertising, marketing efforts, were the same ads as actually appeared in New Jersey. So, he was drawing conclusions as to how people would react from ads that people may not have seen. He also --

THE COURT: How do you get around the plaintiff's testimony that she didn't believe them anyway?

MR. GARDNER: She did believe them. What she said was that she didn't think it was a guaranteed weight-loss, but she
did believe them. She said she bought them because she thought -- based on what they said, she believed that they would make her lose weight. And she candidly answered in response to a very narrow question by Mr. Elder that no, she did not believe that it was a guarantee, that's a hundred percent certainty. She believed that she had a shot at it, that's why she bought it, that's why she used it and her deposition testimony is quite --

THE COURT: But then her next hurdle is that she didn't even keep control of the calories that she was consuming.

MR. GARDNER: She did, your Honor.
THE COURT: She did?
MR. GARDNER: She did. And I can -- she --
THE COURT: See, let me just put everything in a nutshell. This case has had some fine tuning and originally this case was being presented, as I understood it, as a case where the plaintiff was alleging that the claims that Coke was making were false and misleading. And the plaintiff then sought to amend the complaint to add the implied weight-loss aspect of the case because the question that I had had from the beginning is where is the loss? So, now the plaintiff's allegations seem to be that she bought this because it contained an implied weight-loss provision that if she bought -- that if she drank three cans of Enviga a day, she'd
lose weight. Okay? So, this other claim that Enviga doesn't do what it says it's going to do seems to be -- I still see them as distinguishable, but at the end of the day I'm not so sure it matters. So, the first part is that the claim that Coke is making is a false claim, they can't substantiate it.

MR. GARDNER: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. And the plaintiff seems to say I really didn't believe it anyway, and we'll get to that, $I$ didn't believe it anyway.

The second claim, and it sort of is a -- maybe it's a nuance, but the second claim is, well, I thought I could lose weight on it, it implied weight-loss and therefore $I$ bought it but I didn't lose weight. But the problem is that she didn't keep track of her calories, she just -- you know, maybe she was eating the way she was eating before, but how could a reasonable jury conclude that -- because she didn't keep tabs of her caloric intake, how could a reasonable jury conclude that as a result she didn't lose weight? So that's the problem I'm having, putting aside for a moment whether or not she's an adequate class representative.

MR. GARDNER: Stepping back to the issue as to the lack of prior substantiation, initially we said she didn't -I think we said she didn't lose weight. If that was true, we may not have, until the Court instructed us -- as I understood the Court's ruling, we could not merely say that there was
ascertainable loss in that she bought something for which there was no substantiation. We, in complete respect, differed with the Court on that but decided because we agreed with the Court that essentially we get to the same place --

THE COURT: Well, that's what I'm saying. It still seems that that claim, over which there was some dispute, that that claim stills survives because it still seems to me that the plaintiff is alleging that Enviga said if you drink three cans a day, you are going to burn so many calories. And if that claim is false that the plaintiff would not have bought it if she knew that claim was false. Right?

MR. GARDNER: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. GARDNER: It's still in there and we would seek ruling on that, that's not -- both sides have teed up the weight-loss issue, but yes.

THE COURT: It's still in there. And so what I'm saying is -- and then, of course, that gets to the other issue of class representation because if she's seeking damages and any other class members are not entitled to damages is she really an adequate and appropriate class representative? But let's hold that off for a second.

So, her allegation is she wouldn't have bought it if she knew that the claim was false, but I still get back to her deposition testimony where she says well, I really didn't
think it was -- I didn't really believe it. Where is the language $I$ wanted to quote to that is causing me such consternation?

MR. GARDNER: The language I know that Coke focused on was in response to a question, I believe it was Mr. Elder's question, did you believe it was a guarantee of weight-loss and she said no.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, what language do you want me to look at?

MR. GARDNER: "Was it your under --" this is on page 88, line eight, $I$ believe it's other testimony.

THE COURT: 88, line eight.
MR. GARDNER: Yes, ma'am. "Was it your understanding that the calorie burning effect of drinking Enviga would be in the range of 60 to 100 calories while you were drinking Enviga in 2007?" She said "Yes." And she goes on to testify in other places in her deposition in response to Mr. Elder's questions that she did think it would make her lose weight, but she wasn't fool enough to believe, as very few people believe, that it's a hundred percent certainty, that a representation by Coke in an advertisement or in a marketing campaign is a dead certainty. That's all when she said that it wasn't a guarantee, but it was rather a representation. She believed it enough to drink it for weeks and weeks and stopped when she learned that it was probably, or as we say, definitely not
going to have any effect on her weight-loss.
THE COURT: Then how do you prove that she didn't burn 60 to a hundred calories when she was drinking it? She wasn't wearing a --

MR. GARDNER: Your Honor --
THE COURT: I mean, how do you --
MR. GARDNER: -- we can't. We have said that prior.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. GARDNER: But we don't need to for two reasons.
THE COURT: Why?
MR. GARDNER: One is we can show we believe that they didn't have adequate substantiation for that claim and the burden on Coke is to have it before making the claim. So once we show -- we can dispute the study, we do dispute the study. As far as we know, that is the only study, the people they locked up.

But secondly, the effect of that, your Honor, is to say that unless you put yourself in a closed environment with constantly monitored calorimetry and completely controlled diet, you should not expect this stuff to work. What it says is the calorie burner -- I don't know if you can see it from there, I can hand it up -- but it is representing that the calorie burner -- on the back of the new cans it discusses the possibility of weight-loss. The representation is not the calorie burner for people who monitor their calories on an
ongoing basis or in a locked room and have a perfectly controlled diet, the representation to the public at large is if you drink this it will burn more calories than it contributes. The implicit representation is: Thereby, you will lose weight. So we think we can prove that.

I hope that answered your question.
THE COURT: Well, I'm just having trouble. Are there two claims that you are asserting and they look like one? Is the one claim that she wouldn't have bought it if she knew that it didn't do what it said it was going to do, which was it wasn't going to burn 60 to a hundred calories while she was drinking it, and therefore she wouldn't have paid the $\$ 3$ per can, or whatever it is; or is it she wouldn't have bought it if she thought she couldn't lose weight, the implied weight-loss? I mean, what is this case all about, I guess? It's not that clear to me. It seems like the plaintiff keeps wanting to mesh the two together and I'm having a hard time. Tell me, just set me straight.

MR. GARDNER: What the case is about is that Coke misrepresented the effects of this product. It said it was a -burner. The evidence they have does not substantiate that claim. It was as to most people false, as to many other people 'deceptive or misleading. That's what the case is about, is that what Coke told the public, including Ms. Franulovic, was not true, that Coke misled about the effects of Enviga.

THE COURT: And therefore she wouldn't have bought the can?

MR. GARDNER: That was initially how we pled it. The Court indicated some problem with our being able to show ascertainable loss under that pleading and we therefore acceded to the Court's suggestion that we amend to say that she would not have lost weight, that she did not lose weight. She, in fact, gained five pounds over the course of treatment with Enviga.

The second one is essentially a subset of the first. Either way, had she known the truth, she wouldn't have bought it. She didn't know the truth either globally or that she would not lose weight. She bought it for that effect and she didn't get it.

THE COURT: I'm just wondering how the Hoffman case changes the analyses since my earlier ruling. Does it?

MR. GARDNER: Your Honor, I'm going to confess I'm drawing a blank on what that case -- I know the name. Just a moment.
(Short Pause).
MR. GARDNER: I now remember it.
THE COURT: Hold on one second.
(Short Pause)
THE COURT: So, okay, you remember the Hoffman case now? I'm just wondering, it's a case that the plaintiffs have
asked me to pay a lot of attention to, does it change --
MR. GARDNER: No, your Honor. In that one, as I recall it -- we were citing to it for a different reason, but as I recall it the plaintiff there said he bought these alleged erectile dysfunction drugs but he also said he had no reason -- he did not think they would work at the time he bought them. He was -- from what $I$ can read into it --

THE COURT: He never used them.

MR. GARDNER: Yeah, he never used them. He was a test plaintiff and I think this is one of those -- not just bad cases makes bad law, but badly brought cases make for unfortunate decisions. This is a case that reading from it, I don't know the details, your Honor, but it looks to be one where some people were trying to bring it as -- with a test plaintiff as a test case, he merely bought it in order to be a plaintiff. Whether this was his idea going in or it was something after he consulted counsel, I have no idea. But that's the narrow point on which the Court was ruling.

What we cited to is the statement that a private party need not allege that he used a product in order to state a claim under the CFA.

THE COURT: And $I$ was confused why you wanted me to rely on that because it's not an issue in our case because she used it and I was having a hard time understanding why you wanted me to rely on Hoffman.

MR. GARDNER: That would be a failure to explicate on our part, for which I apologize. The reason we used it, your Honor, is we have more -- we are way past that burden. Under the substantive law of the CFA, if they buy it it's clear that the right to bring a claim is vested. Our point was that's all Ms. Franulovic needed to say, she does not need to prove that she used it or on the back end that it didn't work, all she needs to prove is that she bought it based on representations that violate the CFA.

THE COURT: See, there is where I disagree with you on the back end because $I$ also have a pending motion for summary judgment and that's why $I$ asked counsel my very first question, how do these two motions interplay. So if she can't meet the back end, then how can she be an appropriate class representative?

I agree, we're all past the $12(\mathrm{~b})(6)$ motion stage, now we're looking to summary judgment. I know you want further discovery, and we're going to get to that, I don't know how further discovery is going to help you.

MR. GARDNER: May I address that now or --

THE COURT: No, I want to stick to --
MR. GARDNER: Okay. To answer the same question you asked Mr. Elder, if the Court grants summary judgment this case is finished at this level and it will go up on appeal, but it will be done at this point because if she -- if there
is summary judgment against her, absent our seeking permission to go find a new plaintiff, it's done.

But the reason there is a difference here is although we say Coke was premature in bringing the motion for summary judgment, that is an appropriate way to resolve those fact issues as to Ms. Franulovic and if the Court rules against us there, the case at this level for the time being is dead. Plus, we don't have to prove it and that's the difference. We allege we show facts --

THE COURT: Right. But the motion for summary judgment addresses her adequacy as a class representative. So if $I$ were to grant summary judgment on that grounds, are you then left with looking for a new class representative?

MR. GARDNER: We would appeal, your Honor. In complete candor, we could, we could seek Court permission to substitute, but there is no better plaintiff. I have done a lot of class actions, I've been, you know, a consultant, an expert witness on many more, I studied, I've never seen, this is just personal, I've never seen --

THE COURT: A better --
MR. GARDNER: -- a plaintiff who is more involved, more knowledgeable. She is a great plaintiff. And if the Court believes that because she wasn't --

THE COURT: In terms of her testimony she's a great plaintiff?

MR. GARDNER: In terms of her -- if you read the entire deposition, yes. In the cherry-picking by Coke, they can pull out stuff where she gave honest answers, but she was on top of it.

THE COURT: No, I mean, honest is what we're striving for. What do you mean by that, they could pull out honest answers?

MR. GARDNER: No, they can say did you think it was a guarantee? And she says no. But, what Coke was not emphasizing is that she did think it would work. She thought the odds were enough, she was betting that it would work. She bet her money, Coke won the bet. She did not think that it was a -- you know, this is not a Bernie Matoff situation where she thought she would absolutely win. She knew she was taking a chance, but she was willing to take the chance because she believed that the representations were probably true. It doesn't go to her adequacy. It does, your Honor, but the basic point is if she cannot bring this case, the case is done. It's not just adequacy, it's finished.

THE COURT: Well, all right.
Well, let's talk about whether or not she's an adequate class representative since we keep coming back to that issue. You talked about the numerosity, and $I$ think the problem's inherent in that and perhaps that may have to wait for another today, which is the class is defined as someone
who bought this drug -- drug -- product with the understanding that it would burn calories if they drank three cans a day and that they would lose weight from it, and that's how the class would be defined. And I guess through questionnaires you would develop your class.

Now, let's just go to whether or not Ms. Franulovic will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class, let's talk about that. Isn't it a problem that she's not seeking damages for the class?

MR. GARDNER: Your Honor, I would --
THE COURT: Particularly if that other claim is still in there, which is she wouldn't have bought the product but for the misrepresentation. Isn't that a problem?

MR. GARDNER: No, your Honor. We briefed this. The claim-splitting cases are -- basically they are the minority of cases, there are just a few of them scattered around the country and they go against the great weight of cases which says that in $a(b)(2)$ case you can bring an action for damages and even in an employment situation you can leave it up to individual class members to bring their own back wages or damages cases later on.

The reason we didn't is because under class action jurisprudence as it now stands, you notice Coke said we should have, they didn't say we could have. We would lose on that issue on every probability. We believe that we should be able
to get that, but the case law now on that precise issue tends to say that it's not a superior means of resolving the problem because there are all these issues, it will be hard to manage because you'll have to prove up in many trials everybody's claims. It is not necessary, it would -- if Coke stipulated that we could in fact bring that case, we would seek leave to amend. I doubt Mr. Elder will tell you he thinks we would succeed on that claim. They criticize us for not bringing it, but they also know the difficulties of bringing it. If we had, you would have a whole lot of briefing on why this case cannot be certified as a damages class. And since the prime desire of Ms. Franulovic was to stop the ongoing practice and because of the inherent difficulties in getting a small retail purchase damages class certified because of proof of the individual damages, we elected to bring it as an injunctive class. The cases are just inapposite. Judge Shineland's opinion out of -- I think she's Southern District New York, it details that this is an exception. She gives good reasons for why in that particular case it could be because of potential issues preclusion, but that doesn't exist here. So it just -it does not create a problem and if we had pled it as such our odds of succeeding would be very, very small because of the state of case law right now. It was a -- that was an informed decision by class counsel in consulting with her.

THE COURT: Can you elaborate on that?

MR. GARDNER: I'm sorry, ma'am?
THE COURT: Can you elaborate on that?
MR. GARDNER: What $I$ was saying, that the -- most cases now say when you have -- when you can't prove damages on paper, it says that a (b) (3) class, which has standards different from a (b) (2) class, that it's not superior to other methods, to individual cases, or that it becomes an unmanageable case because of the need to develop facts and damages for each retail purchase.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. GARDNER: And we'd love to do it, but the case law doesn't support our doing it. I think, in complete candor, I think that Rule 23 does support it. I think courts have gone a little off the rails on saying that it can't be brought, but that is the reality. I'm not going to argue with where courts are because I know I'm going to lose.

THE COURT: Okay.
(Short Pause)

MR. GARDNER: And the Court has asked me every
question $I$ wanted to cover, your Honor. So unless the Court has more, I will step down.

THE COURT: Let me hear from Mr. Elder.
MR. GARDNER: Thank you, ma'am.
THE COURT: Mr. Elder, do you agree with me that when the plaintiffs amended the complaint -- because when we were
last together one of the concerns I had was that the plaintiffs really hadn't raised an ascertainable injury. And it sounds like in the third amended complaint, or it doesn't sound like but it appears in the third amended complaint that it appears to be two injuries that they are alleging. One is that she wouldn't have bought it if she had known; and secondly, that she didn't lose weight and it was an implied weight-loss product. Do you agree with that? And it seems that these two different theories, if you will, seem to keep getting mixed together. Am I right?

MR. ELDER: I believe you are right as to the second question, Judge, which is these two theories keep getting mixed together.

As to the first question, I think the problem here is that there has been a shifting of what's been pled versus then what's discussed in the papers and in argument.

THE COURT: And I think that it's been caused, if my memory is serving me correctly, is that when we were last together I didn't see anywhere in the complaint where plaintiff was alleging an injury. And the conversation back then, and I reviewed the transcript from last December or when we were here, I read through that transcript yesterday and it seemed that the conversation flowed into a weight-loss misrepresentation. But, as $I$ was reviewing the last amended complaint, the third amended complaint, it seems that, and I'm
looking at Paragraph 50 for example, the allegation is that she would not have purchased three cans a day if she had known the lack of reasonable support for Coke's claims. And then the other claim deals with the implied weight-loss.

So, it seems like while a lot of focus is on the implied weight-loss, it still seems as if there really are two separate theories, but everybody seems to be talking about them as one and that's why it's getting so -- I just want to get this fleshed out. So, go ahead.

MR. ELDER: Let me take a stab at it. When you dismissed their claim, your Honor, you did so because they failed to plead, and they've conceded, and they conceded it again here today, they cannot prove whether or not she burned calories. This is not about whether or not Enviga burns calories, period, in any one. That is not the claim in this case. That claim was dismissed and you told -- your Honor told both the Melfi and Simmens plaintiffs and Ms. Franulovic that if they wanted to proceed with a weight-loss claim on their theory that this advertising contains an implied message of weight-loss and that she didn't lose weight, they can proceed with that without filing a motion for leave to amend. If they wanted to pursue the calory-burning claim, they needed to file a motion for leave to amend. Melphy and Simmens filed a motion, Ms. Franulovic filed a third amended complaint abandoning her calory-burning claim pursuant to your Honor's
order.

THE COURT: Well, see, therein do you agree with that, that you abandoned your calory-burning claim? And that's what I'm wondering and I think this is -- did you?

MR. GARDNER: I don't think so, your Honor. We shifted for proving her individual damages to make the ascertainable loss proof. What the Court said we needed to prove, we included that. But as the Court noted in Paragraph 50, it's still there.

THE COURT: I know, but they didn't -- see, I don't know if this -- I don't know if everybody's talking -- you see, they think you abandoned that claim and you say you don't think so, so I think that's critical to figure this out.

MR. GARDNER: Well --

THE COURT: Because that's what I'm saying, I still think there is confusion that is still in my mind, there seems to be two theories going here and they seem to be talked about as one. And so $I$ see the one as sort of a contractual problem/allegation, there was this implied weight-loss promise, and I see the other one is sort of a false advertising/misrepresentation and that's you said it was going to burn calories and it didn't. And it sounds like you are talking about them as if it's just one and I don't think it is. Is it?

MR. GARDNER: I can hear Mr. Elder trying to talk,
since he's standing. Did you want to hear my response or -THE COURT: Well, did you abandon that claim? MR. GARDNER: No, ma'am. You read Paragraph 50, it's there.

THE COURT: I know, but I've read these briefs, you know, ten times each and $I$ don't see anybody making this distinction.

Let me hear from Mr. Elder, I keep interrupting. MR. ELDER: Your Honor, I think it's important to go back, and I'm going back to the March 10,2008 order that I believe governs this issue. Your order permitted the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint alleging a so-called weight-loss claim but instructed them to move for leave to file an amended complaint alleging in addition to the approved weight-loss claim, a so-called calory-burning claim if they wished to pursue that claim. They did not move for leave to amend. And the reason -- your Honor, this language did not get lost on the parties here because two parties, Ms. Melfi and Ms. Simmens, filed such a motion. So, that's why we believe it's been abandoned. And let me just address the fundamentals whether -- I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Can you print out that order? What's the docket entry?

MR. ELDER: That, your Honor, is -- I'm sorry, I don't have the docket entry.

THE COURT: What's the date of it?
MR. ELDER: It's March 10, 2008.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. ELDER: But to back up a little bit, Judge, we believe that the reason that that was appropriate is because nowhere in the original -- do you want me to keep going?

THE COURT: No, now it's making sense to me because my concern -- and now this is why it's making sense to me, but I had forgotten the part that you just reminded me of, which was both claims were being discussed and because $I$ allowed them to amend as to the weight-loss did not necessarily mean that they could not move to amend to state a calory-burning/false advertising claim, whatever it is, that they wanted to allege, I didn't preclude that. But they didn't do that and now what I have is a second amended complaint that seems to have both in there, but the parties seem to be talking about only the weight-loss, which is the source of my confusion. And now it's all clicked. Okay.

MR. ELDER: And the operative complaint, your Honor, is the third amended complaint.

THE COURT: The third amended, yes.
MR. ELDER: And, your Honor, let me just sort of address the --

THE COURT: And which explains why defendants didn't really parse out this calory-burning/false advertising claim
because you were of the view, right, that it's not in?
MR. ELDER: We're not only of the view that it's not in but it's not in because of their concession that they cannot prove whether or not Ms. Franulovic burned calories.

And I think it's important to also note --
THE COURT: But that's -- wait a minute. What about the allegation that she wouldn't have bought it if she knew that allegation was false? Let's take the Hoffman case. He alleged that he would not have bought this sex enhancing product if he knew that it was false and therefore he's out the money. Okay. So that's a little bit of a different claim, right? So if here she was alleging that she wouldn't have bought the Enviga if she didn't think it didn't burn calories, doesn't matter whether or not they can't prove whether she didn't actually burn the calories. But if the studies show that it didn't do what the label said it did, then isn't that an appropriate claim?

MR. ELDER: It's not and the reason is causation. So -- and I will address -- I want to get back to Hoffman, but, your Honor, Ms. Franulovic individually unquestionably has to show an ascertainable loss and she can't meet that showing if -- so, they're saying their ascertainable loss is the purchase price of the product. Well, if they can't prove that she did not burn calories, then the purchase price of the product is not a loss. So you have to have that causation,
that causal link between the alleged misrepresentation and the loss, and that's the calory-burning. And the reason -- and I think -- are you going to ask why they can't use the studies in general?

THE COURT: Um-hum.
MR. ELDER: The reason they can't do that is because they said they couldn't do that. And here's what I mean, your Honor. They were not willing to come in and say we know that Ms. Franulovic didn't burn calories because this product doesn't work at all. They could have moved in response to your order and made that allegation explicitly and said we're going to come in and we're going to prove that, but they don't say that.

And let me direct the Court to their complaint. At paragraphs 28 and 33 they say there's in fact no substantiation or reasonable basis for claiming that Enviga -I'm skipping some language -- has any effect on calory balance or weight for the majority of adults who are not young, healthy and thin.

They say in another paragraph in fact, Enviga does not burn calories in a significant proportion of consumers. And it's this loose language, your Honor. That doesn't say Enviga doesn't work, that says we don't think it works in some proportion of people that remains undefined that they've offered no evidence of in support of their class motion and
they failed to respond to your direction that they seek leave to amend and properly allege this calory-burning claim.

THE COURT: As I recall, the last time we were here I do recall the conversation dealt with, well, if the allegation is that the studies don't substantiate that claim, then I remember someone from your side of the table, her name escapes me, but saying that simply can't -- then we want to see the evidence because there is simply no evidence. And I did think I got a concession on that.

MR. ELDER: I believe the concession that you received, Judge, was we cannot prove that she didn't burn calories. That's not just an individual statement. If the way you intend to prove that is by proving that the product doesn't work, then you can't prove it; and if you've conceded that you can't, then you've conceded that you can't through any method of proof.

THE COURT: Was there a concession that the claim was not unsubstantiated?

MR. ELDER: Your Honor, we believe that there was. I'm not -- I'm not telling you I can point you to the transcript where they said we concede that it burns calories, they said they can't prove that it doesn't. And our point at that hearing was they haven't alleged it doesn't work in any one, they haven't alleged here it doesn't work at all. What they continue to try to allege, your Honor, is that it's Coke's
burden to prove that it does work.
We don't believe there is any showing that that's the law here. Under the Consumer Fraud Act, they have to establish an unlawful practice, an ascertainable loss and causation, and so this effort to shift the burden to us to some -- to prove the product, that the science -- there is science that's discussed, you know, in their motion to the fact that they disagree with it, but they're not willing to say that it simply doesn't work and it didn't work in her. And, you know, we -- we were here before --

THE COURT: That's the missing link, isn't it, that the plaintiffs are not alleging -- let's take the Hoffman example, okay? There the allegation was that the product said that it would do something but in actuality that was a false promise because it was just made up of vitamins, I don't know what it was, but let's just say that. Okay? Let's see. That plaintiff alleged that the product did not produce the results promised, advertised -- well, no, that's a bad example. But, in that case, the plaintiff bought the product because he thought that it would do what it said it would do but then when he looked at the ingredients he said, you know, it's just made up of, you know, vitamins and it's not going to do what it says, therefore it's false advertising. But the plaintiffs here are not saying or have never said that the claims by Enviga that drinking three cans a day would help in burning 60
to 100 calories was false because there is no studies to substantiate that.

MR. ELDER: I think that's right, your Honor. And to address Hoffman for a second, Hoffman first --

THE COURT: Because, like if they were saying Coke is making this representation that drinking three cans a day results in calory-burning and the plaintiff were alleging -and that is false because actually the studies show that when you drink it you consume a thousand calories more -- you know, I'm just giving a hypothetical -- that would be similar to what the Hoffman case was, right?

MR. ELDER: It would be -- it would be more similar. But to address Hoffman, your Honor, Hoffman is a pleading case first and foremost, it's not a motion for a summary judgment --

THE COURT: Right.
MR. ELDER: -- like we have here. But Hoffman -actually, the plaintiff cites Hoffman for the proposition that it doesn't matter whether Ms. Franulovic even drank Enviga, she can allege whatever she wants and all that other stuff doesn't matter. Well, the first answer to that is that's absolutely incorrect because she has to show causation. And there are --

THE COURT: No, but -- Mr. Elder, I'm sorry to keep interrupting. That's why this has been so confusing is
because it sounds like what are we talking about? If we're talking about the implied weight-loss claim? Absolutely. Are we talking about this other claim that appears not to be there but the plaintiffs think is there, the false representation claim, then her causation is she wouldn't have bought it, right, she wouldn't have spent the money because it doesn't work?

MR. ELDER: If they're going to prove she didn't burn calories --

THE COURT: Right.
MR. ELDER: -- because it doesn't work at all, which they've said they're not going to.

And to return to Hoffman, the plaintiff in Hoffman, the Court -- Hoffman actually -- they cite Hoffman for this proposition where the Court said -- used the language that, well, you don't have to have used the product in order to make your allegations, but it's important to understand the context of Hoffman.

The Court pointed out in dismissing Hoffman's complaint -- Hoffman's complaint was dismissed. The Court pointed out: Plaintiff, you don't even allege that you used the product. And the plaintiff responded by saying: Your Honor, it's dangerous, I shouldn't have to allege that I used a dangerous product. And it was in that context that the court responded and said: Well, you really wouldn't even have to
use the product in order to allege in your complaint that it doesn't work at all in its entirety. And so I think that's the consistency you are getting with Hoffman, but Hoffman certainly doesn't stand for the proposition that the plaintiff's experience with the product and whether or not in our case she burned calories or lost weight doesn't matter.

In fact, it's quite the opposite, that the Court's concern in Hoffman was you haven't alleged your experience with the product, and then the Court said I'm not going to let you get out of that by saying it's dangerous and you didn't want to use it before you made your allegations.

But again, it goes back to the issue here of in the paragraphs of their complaint and in their concessions here and in response to your prior order they have not said we are simply going to prove that Enviga does not work at all.

THE COURT: Right. That is not before me.
MR. ELDER: Yes, correct.
THE COURT: And therefore, because the can doesn't do what it says it would do, she wouldn't have bought it, that claim is not viable in front of me.

MR. ELDER: Correct.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. ELDER: Right. And, your Honor, to address some of the other questions that came up on -- and I want to back up a little bit and make sure that your question about the
interplay between the summary judgment motion and the class certification motion was answered adequately. I think Mr. Gardner was accurate when he said if you grant summary judgment, this case is over and so you need not reach the class certification issues if you are inclined to grant summary judgment. So I just wanted to make sure that any questions on that issue had been answered.

Also --
THE COURT: Well, I think -- but the whole source of my confusion, $I$ guess it's apparent by my questioning, has been clarified because what I really am dealing with is the implied weight-loss claim and I'm having a difficult time seeing how she meets that burden because she herself says she didn't really keep track of her calories and related matters. And so I don't know how a reasonable jury could find that Enviga didn't do what it said it would do if she thought it was a weight-loss program and she didn't even do anything to that end. The fact that there is no claim in the case that Enviga didn't do what the product said it would do, that is a false advertising/representation claim, and, therefore, Franulovic sustained a loss, i.e., the purchase of the can, is not in the case because of my prior ruling and there was no subsequent motion filed I think answers the concerns that I had and I don't have to really look at: Well, did she believe it or not because it's not really that relevant to the implied
weight-loss claim. Right?
MR. ELDER: I think whether she believed it or not is actually fatal to both claims, whether it's the claim --

THE COURT: Well, doesn't she lose on causation now?
MR. ELDER: She does. And the import of her
admissions, your Honor, she has admitted that she understood the calory-burning process, she understood how this worked, she understood the relationship between calories and weight, and she particularly understood that Enviga was not a guarantee of weight-loss. Now plaintiffs want to draw some kind of distinction that I'm still not clear on between a guarantee and a promise, or whatever it is they're saying, they're saying that we told consumers, we promised consumers that weight-loss in fact would happen. That's the claim here, there would be weight-loss.

THE COURT: No. Here what I'm saying is her testimony that, well, I didn't really believe it or I really didn't believe it was a guarantee when I purchased it, do I even need to have to decide that interpretation of the testimony because the defendants put one spin on it and the plaintiff has put their spin on it if the evidence is uncontroverted that she didn't keep track of her weight-loss and no reasonable jury would conclude that the implied representation was the causation?

MR. ELDER: Exactly. And, I'm sorry, I was lumping her
admissions in together. But, you're correct, her admission that she didn't care about calories, she didn't count calories, she didn't weight herself, you know, she doesn't know -- she simply just admitted frankly, I don't know about weight-loss because I didn't weigh myself.

Now, the only response to that that the plaintiffs have offered is this notion that she knew it because her pants didn't fit any differently. And I think, as your Honor has already pointed out, the threshold is not a scintilla of evidence or something you can possibly think of, it's evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find in your favor. They haven't met that threshold here, they can't meet it in the light of those admissions, so whether it's that she can't prove causation or that she can't prove that there was even an implied weight-loss claim, either one, warrents summary judgment.

Your Honor, to move to some of the class issues that were addressed, and as we've said we believe that the undisputed evidence here -- and I should point out, your Honor, that our statement of undisputed material facts went un-responded to in the papers, so I think that's important. But on the facts here, we believe summary judgment is warranted.

But even if the Court were to find that summary judgment wasn't warranted, these admissions, even without
summary judgment, render Ms. Franulovic an inadequate class representative. And this is in my mind, I think, most pointed up by the issue of are there defenses unique to her? And the reason that that doctrine exists is because if the plaintiff is subject to unique defenses that put the class claims at risk, then that plaintiff is not adequate. And whether or not summary judgment is ultimately granted, her admissions certainly put her claim at risk. And these admissions are unique to her. Other people might not have the same answers to the questions that were asked of Ms. Franulovic. And so just by virtue of the fact that she has made these concessions that really go to the heart of the issues in this case, she's not an adequate class representative and she is certainly not adequate if the Court grants summary judgment.

On that issue, your Honor, you asked Mr. Gardner about wouldn't there be individual issues in this case because it is a claim of an implied representation that nowhere on that can does it say you are going to lose weight, this is Ms. Franulovic's -- and Mr. Gardner answered that he believed that he could prove that through class wide proof in the form of an expert or some other way. And while he might be able to introduce that type of testimony, it doesn't answer the question because the other side of that coin is the defenses that Coke can assert. And, your Honor, I'll refer you to the Third Circuit's decision in Newton versus Merrill Lynch, which
is at 259 F.3d 154, and the Third Circuit recognized in Newton that defenses can raise individual issues that prevent class certification.

THE COURT: So what are you saying then that Coke would then have to say to each class member is that really why you bought it?

MR. ELDER: Well, we would have to pose the same questions that were posed to Ms. Franulovic, or at least to a substantial number of class members, because, as we've seen here, the answers matter, they impact the theory that there is an implied weight-loss claim here. So although you can call an expert and you can offer class wide proof, it doesn't mean that's the only proof in the case.

THE COURT: But what if the class were defined as anyone who bought it believing it to imply a weight-loss and that's how the class is defined, wouldn't a questionnaire to each class member, putative class member, "why did you buy it?", then they have different reasons to check-off, wouldn't that be sufficient, or no?

MR. ELDER: I don't believe so. You have a number of issues there. First of all, if you defined your class as the people who believed they would lose weight, you've defined your class entirely through a subjective state of mind which I don't believe comports with Rule 23. They're trying to get around that by defining the class too broadly and defining the
class as all purchasers who consumed Enviga, but of course that class includes -- on this record that class potentially includes everyone who purchased Enviga other than Ms. Franulovic because they've made no showing at the class certification stage, as is their burden to prove, the element of Rule 23 that anyone else interprets this messaging the same way Ms. Franulovic does. And I think that's important here because we set a schedule in this case to address the class certification issues, that schedule included provisions for expert discovery if people needed -- wanted to introduce experts. We introduced an expert. They have quibbled with what that expert said, but their quibbling with that is not evidence. His testimony is the only evidence in the case.

So we have on this record two sources of evidence regarding what people thought about the Enviga claims. Ms. Franulovic, and she's clear there wasn't an implied weight-loss message, and Dr. Stickle, and he's clear that people bought Enviga for all kinds of reasons. So for the additional reason, your Honor, that they just haven't met their burden of the Rule 23 elements, class certification is not appropriate.

THE COURT: In a case such as this can there ever be class certification then under your argument when you have these -- and that's the point that your adversary was making, which is when you have these subjective issues, it's better to
define it broadly than narrowly and that's what $I$ think his argument is. Can you address that?

MR. ELDER: Could you ever have class certification in an alleged false advertising case? I believe the answer is yes. I think it's much more likely when you are not dealing with an implied claim. There are express advertising, you know, claims and there are implied claims. When you are dealing with an implied claim, it's obviously much more difficult because it's a much more subjective test and the plaintiff has to adequately address the problems with certifying that type of a class. And so is it possible to certify an implied class? It might be possible. On this record, it's woefully inadequate.

So, you know, we're not taking a position that that's simply an impossibility depending on what your class is, depending on what the implied messaging is and depending on what your class representative has said about that implied messaging and depending on what proof you offer in support of your certification motion.

THE COURT: Can I give any weight to -- or should, should this factor have any weight in my consideration, that Ms. Franulovic could get through her own individual proceeding, through the doctrine of res judicata it would apply to any putative other class members anyway and therefore why certify the class? Should that have any bearing on my
decision?

MR. ELDER: I'm not following the question, I'm sorry.
THE COURT: Okay, it was a bad question. It was a
question $I$ asked counsel before, which is why does
Ms. Franulovic have to bring a class action if she's only seeking injunctive relief on behalf of the class? Wouldn't she just bring it individually and after the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion anybody else who -- then if Coke is enjoined, then the public is benefited, any putative class members benefited. My question is does that play a role in my decision at all, that fact, or should it?

MR. ELDER: Your Honor, I'm not sure that it should. I think here that summary judgment is appropriate separate and apart from that fact, denial of class certification is appropriate separate and apart from that fact. But to address the question, I believe that while Ms. Franulovic could pursue injunctive relief only on her own behalf, $I$ believe she runs into some standing problems there. And because standing to seek equitable relief is different from standing to seek monetary relief, and so --

THE COURT: But that's what she's doing here, she's seeking injunctive relief.

MR. ELDER: On behalf of a class.
THE COURT: Oh, I see.
MR. ELDER: And so there is a different -- and the
reason it's different -- and, your Honor, it bring me to an issue that I'd like to discuss at the appropriate time, which is that we believe there is a larger issue of mootness in this case as a result of the settlements that have been reached to date, and so I just want to flag that issue and I'd like to discuss it with the Court at the appropriate time.

But, the standing to seek equitable relief, there has to be a risk of future harm. And if you are pursuing that claim individually, it's difficult to show that harm because you're aware -- if you accept your claims, you're aware of the alleged false advertising, you are not going to buy Enviga anymore, and you can be compensated with money damages. So if you don't bring the broader group in --

THE COURT: No, but if there is a finding that it is false advertising and there has been a final finding and Coke is enjoined from marketing the product with that advertising --

MR. ELDER: And I guess what I'm saying is I'm not -whether or not that injunction would be proper in an individual case --

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. ELDER: -- I think is a question of some doubt.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. ELDER: Would you like me to address the issue that we think there is a global mootness issue here?

THE COURT: Yes, you've intrigued me.
MR. ELDER: Can I approach?
THE COURT: You may.
MR. GARDNER: Your Honor, may $I$ respond to the arguments -- may we respond to the arguments to --

THE COURT: Oh, absolutely.
MR. GARDNER -- class certification and motion for summary judgment before we get into this new issue freshly brought to the Court today?

THE COURT: All right, that's fair.
MR. GARDNER: Thank you, your Honor. I'll do it from here.

I want to harken back to what claims are live. For ascertainable loss for Ms. Franulovic, the Court said we need to plead either/or, one or the other or both, that she did not burn calories or that she did not lose weight.

THE COURT: And that she wouldn't have bought the product if she had known that the claims were false, that they didn't burn calories.

MR. GARDNER: That claim is still in there, that was not -- the Court's instructions was that for the -- we needed to -- the Court wanted us to amend if we chose to to plead burning -- that it did not burn calories and that she -- or that she did not lose weight. But the --

THE COURT: I don't --

MR. GARDNER: If I may, your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. GARDNER: Step back to look at the prior substantiation doctrine, which was originally a Federal Trade Commission doctrine, and it's not actually false advertising, your Honor, it's unfair or deceptive under the FTC formulation, which is not the same as false.

THE COURT: I know, I was just using it generically. MR. GARDNER: But it's an important distinction here.

THE COURT: But that --
MR. GARDNER: The Federal Trade Commission -- I didn't mean to interrupt, your Honor.

THE COURT: But that claim's not in here in this case.
MR. GARDNER: It's in Paragraph 50, your Honor, you read it. And it's not -- the fact that Coke didn't move for summary judgment on it does not mean it's not alive. We focused on what the court wanted us to focus on, an ascertainable loss.

THE COURT: Can we take a ten-minute break? I want to read my ruling from the last time we were here in March. Or, was it March?

MR. ELDER: I believe the Court --
THE COURT: Yes, I want to read through this. I need to resolve this because $I$ really need to resolve this. Okay, let's take a ten-minute break. Can we do that?

THE DEPUTY CLERK: All rise.
(Short recess).
THE COURT: I'm sorry, counsel, but I literally read from beginning to end the transcript of the March hearing and I feel like it was déjà vu all over again. I feel like what I was saying this morning was what $I$ was saying in March. And it was very clear to me then, as it is now, that the problem I had was that there seemed to be these two theories going on and I allowed the parties to amend the complaint to more specifically state what $I$ had called the weight-loss claim. And the problem I had with the Franulovic complaint was that nowhere in there did she allege an ascertainable loss. She didn't allege that as a result of the -- that the representations were false and she didn't burn any calories, or that based upon all the studies she believed she didn't burn calories. She didn't allege any of that.

Coke argued, Ms. Thorpe argued, well, we would be very surprised to see any of those studies because I don't think that they can allege that. And that is why $I$ then said well then file a motion to amend if you want to pursue that claim, and Franulovic didn't do that. So $I$ think what remains in the case is the weight-loss claim only because, I mean, I can cite to various portions throughout the transcript where Ms. Thorpe -- page 25. "Your Honor, what's really significant as well is the plaintiffs is not plead that Enviga did not
burn calories in anybody, which would be another way -- I mean, in saying that Enviga does not burn calories in anybody, the science isn't there to support this claim. Then they can make that broader allegation and then that would cover the individual plaintiffs, but they haven't made that allegation either." And there are -- see, the problem was back then that -- and I found this interesting when Ms. Thorpe said: "This is a case in which they have to prove actual ascertainable loss and they do that by going to hire an expert witness who looks at the science, the substantiation of Enviga, and says Enviga does not burn calories in anyone and they have not done that. And there is a reason, your Honor, they have not done that and they are very -- this complaint is -- you know, they have done everything they can coming up against that, you know, they won't say that and they don't want to plead that it happens in this plaintiff and the reason they want to avoid this, Mr. Gardner said it very explicitly, this issue will come back to bite them at the class certification stage."

So the problem was is when I listened to the parties back in March it was not clear to me that Franulovic had alleged an ascertainable loss with respect to the calory-burning, she hadn't said, you know, that it was false, the advertising was false because it doesn't burn calories and I wouldn't have bought the product because it was false. And I
didn't see that in the complaint. And so because there was -and I was very clear throughout that I wanted the parties to be clear what claims they were pursuing so that the defendants knew what they were defending.

And so, Mr. Gardner, it seems like the plaintiff failed to amend to add that. Am I wrong?

MR. GARDNER: Pretty much, your Honor. May I? The reason we didn't fail to amend to add the -- we didn't -- I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Show me.
MR. GARDNER: As to whether she failed to burn calories, $I$ may have misunderstood the question, that's absolutely true. We said then, we say now with hindsight it's just impossible to go back and put her into a new locked room and test her, which is the only way to determine calory-burning.

THE COURT: No. But you could have alleged that based upon all of these studies that show it doesn't do what it says it does she believed she was harmed and therefore she wouldn't have bought it, but $I$ don't see that in the complaint anywhere.

MR. GARDNER: The Paragraph 50 the Court read earlier today --

THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. GARDNER: -- goes to that, that's the
ascertainable -- I'm sorry, that's the --
THE COURT: I know, but the defendant's beef with that is that you didn't proceed the way I wanted you to proceed, which is you need to get permission because if the amendment had been futile, I wouldn't have permitted it.

MR. GARDNER: It was already in there and that was not --

THE COURT: No, it wasn't, that's what I'm saying. MR. GARDNER: Paragraph 50 is new? I didn't think so, your Honor. It may be --

THE COURT: I sat down and did a word by word comparison and if it was in the second amended complaint, then my bad, I'm not aware of that.

MR. GARDNER: But we were not -- may I go ahead and get into the prior substantiation doctrine which is what the Paragraph 50 is based on?

THE COURT: No.
MR. GARDNER: Okay.
THE COURT: No, no, no, I because I need to know whether or not that's in the case and it seems to me it's not because it wasn't in -- show me in the second amended complaint where it was.

MR. GARDNER: We can try to find it. I'm sorry, your Honor, I didn't bring the second with us. But if we have it -THE DEPUTY CLERK: I can print it.

MR. GARDNER: What we were allowed, we were allowed to include one of the two things --

THE COURT: Or both.
MR. GARDNER: -- but because we -- yes. Because we could not within good conscience say that as to her she didn't burn calories, I don't believe that we would statistically prove that. I know that about ten people in this country did pursuant calories because I believe that --

THE COURT: But you could have alleged, not specifically as to her, but based upon information and belief because the allegations were such that you believed that she didn't burn calories because the representations were false and misleading.

MR. GARDNER: We could have, your Honor, and just -that was not the way we heard the Court's direction, we believed we had to say she did not burn calories.

THE COURT: She believed she did not burn calories? What's her loss?

MR. GARDNER: Well, if she believed it -- her loss is that she bought a product that didn't work as to her own weight-loss and that she bought a product based on a representation for which there was no substantiation. If Coke without -- just as to posit a hypothetical, if Coke had introduced this and called it the cancer cure and had no studies for it and she bought it, she wouldn't have to prove
that she didn't get cancer or that she did get cancer. It would violate the prior substantiation doctrine not because it was false, which it would have been, but because they didn't have substantiation for that claim. She bought based on calory-burning and the implicit weight-loss claim. We pled, as the Court offered for us to amend if we chose, that she did not lose weight, but with all respect to the Court we did not ever believe we needed to because we pled that they made a claim for which they did not have substantiation, that under New Jersey law establishes it. If you buy something -- it's akin to bait and switch, your Honor. If you tell somebody you got something that will do a given thing and you have no reason to know that, they buy it, that is the ascertainable loss. The fact that they got it based on a false pretense or --

THE COURT: I think the problem herein lies is that I directed the parties to more specifically lay out what their claims were because back in March it was clear to me that these claims were getting entwined, and I used that word a couple of times, and so I told Franulovic to go back and amend and to add the implied weight-loss but with respect to the calory-burning claim to, you know, file your motion. I said --

MR. GARDNER: Well, your Honor, if we misunderstood, my apologies, but we understood that you were saying if we wanted to say it did not burn calories in her we needed to
file a motion just the same way that you gave us leave without motion to file to say it she did not lose weight because of the Court's concerns about ascertainable loss. We believed that under New Jersey law we met the ascertainable loss test by pleading that she wouldn't have bought it had she known they didn't have the proof.

THE COURT: So I don't think that was in your second amended complaint.

MR. GARDNER: And we are looking, your Honor. If

THE COURT: I think in the Simmens and Malfi, if I I'm recalling it correctly, it was, but that's not in front of me.

MR. GARDNER: They did amend to bring in the calory --
THE COURT: Sometimes I feel like we go backwards. It's terrible, isn't it?

MR. GARDNER: Yes.
THE COURT: Well, can you tell me if that was in the second amended complaint, that she wouldn't have bought it? (Short Pause).

MR. GARDNER: In paragraph 20 we said, "Weight-loss representations for the product, whether express or implied, cannot be substantiated because the small number of studies that exist are conflicting and inadequate."

THE COURT: Yeah, and that was the whole colloquy about is this calory-burning or weight-loss.

MR. GARDNER: And we said that "after she read the representations about calory-burning she increased her consumption to three cans per today with the understanding this would help her lose weight."

THE COURT: That goes to weight-loss. I don't see that --

MR. GARDNER: There is -- I beg your pardon, your Honor.

THE COURT: See, in the second amended complaint there was no allegation that it was false representation and if she had known it was false she wouldn't have bought it and therefore she's out the purchase price of the can. I don't remember seeing that. It's now in Paragraph 50 in the third amended complaint, it was kind of like squished in there. So the question is how do I deal with it because I see those to be two separate claims.

Don't you, Mr. Elder?
MR. ELDER: We do see those as two separate claims. And for us, your Honor, there are two key things here. First of all, even in Paragraph 50 of this complaint that they're pointing to they conflate weight-loss and calory-burning and they say it was the weight-loss and the calory-burning. This complaint was filed in response to a court order saying if you want to go with weight-loss, just file your complaint; if you want to do something different, file a motion. So, you know,
we --

THE COURT: Right. I mean, because I just spent the last half hour, Mr. Gardner, reviewing this transcript and it was very clear that there was this mass confusion about is this a weight-loss, is this a misleading false representation claim? Coke and Nestle have to know what they're defending against and, you know, I feel like a year has passed by and they thought they were defending against something and now it seems like the plaintiff is saying no, that's really not our case, which all explains my confusion when $I$ took the bench about what is the claim here.

So, it's very clear the weight-loss claimed survives, is in the third complaint, and I'm inclined to grant summary judgment because $I$ don't think that this plaintiff makes out a case. The question is what do $I$ do with this other claim that you think you have that $I$ don't think is in?

MR. GARDNER: Your Honor, if they've moved for summary judgment and the Court grants it --

THE COURT: No, no, no, but I've got to know what I'm granting.

MR. GARDNER: Well --

THE COURT: I mean, I don't want you to just say we're going to appeal you and we'll deal with another court, I want to be -- you know, I mean, I've got to know what I'm granting. If it's the weight-loss claim but you thought you had another
claim, I mean, I'm going to have to deal with that because if I don't deal with it you know what the Circuit's going say, they're going to sent it back and say well, what are you dealing with? So that's the question.

MR. GARDNER: I would like to ask Mr. Quirk to address the weight-loss claim, and if the Court would consider argument on that. I hear the Court's inclination.

THE COURT: Yeah, I mean, I'm telling what my inclination is.

MR. GARDNER: Also while he's talking, I will look through these to see. I don't want to try to speed read and tell you exactly what the second one versus third said, but I will try to give you an answer after Mr. Quirk, if I may, your Honor, or if not we'll ask to supplement.

THE COURT: See, when I looked at my March order, I called it the weight-loss claim and the calory-burning claim and I equate that with the implied weight-loss versus the misrepresentation about it burning calories. And so now here we are today and Coke has filed summary judgment on the only claim they believe survives, which is the weight-loss, and I think they're right, but you think that both claims are still in the case.

MR. GARDNER: Not the claim as to Ms. Franulovic not losing calories, that clearly is not. The wouldn't-have-bought-if-she-had-known-the-truth we think is --

THE COURT: And that's news to Mr. Elder, right?

MR. ELDER: Absolutely.
MR. GARDNER: That would suggest that -- I'm sorry, no, I don't have a response to that. If it's in the complaint it should not be news to Mr. Elder.

THE COURT: But it wasn't, see, that's the -- well --

MR. GARDNER: And I do want to look at it, your Honor, and if -- because when we amended, we did not include the calory-burning claim as to her, thereby did not seek leave to amend as the Court had instructed us we must do.

THE COURT: But you snuck 50 in.
MR. GARDNER: We either clarified the pleading or snuck it in, your Honor. I don't think we snuck it in and it's been there and that's the --

THE COURT: No, no, no, no, no, don't say it's been there. It wasn't there.

MR. GARDNER: It has been there since we filed it and Coke cannot say --

THE COURT: Oh, yes.
MR. GARDNER: -- that it was something that was filed in April 14 th of last year, that it was a surprise to it that it is in that complaint.

MR. ELDER: Your Honor, if I may, I'm a little unclear on the "it" that's supposed to be in the complaint.

THE COURT: Paragraph 50.

MR. ELDER: Okay.
THE COURT: And what he's saying Paragraph 50 is is the -- instead of calling it calory-burning, let's call it misleading claim.

MR. ELDER: Well, I think that's the problem because, your Honor, the basis of the dismissal, and this is in the October 25th opinion, Franulovic has not alleged that she or members of the class failed to burn more calories or lose weight, and it goes on. So --

THE COURT: And he says that that's what that does.

MR. ELDER: And this is the problem: Saying I
wouldn't have bought it had I known this, that or the other doesn't cure the flaw that the Court identified and that we discussed at length, which was you haven't alleged that Ms. Franulovic failed to burn calories.

THE COURT: Right. And that was the problem I had because they could have said either she didn't burn calories and we know that because we put a thing on her arm, or based upon all of the studies that we reviewed of Coke's we believe she didn't burn calories because, for whatever reason, and discovery would bear that out. That was the missing piece and that's why I wanted the -- I call it the calory-burning claim, let's call it the false representation claim/misleading claim, that's why $I$ wanted that fleshed out.

MR. ELDER: And, your Honor, in the operative
complaint, the third amended complaint, Paragraph 53, "Although Franulovic did not lose weight while drinking Enviga, she does not know and cannot prove whether she actually did not burn calories as a result of drinking Enviga." That's in the operative complaint.

THE COURT: And what could have been alleged is that she doesn't know but based upon information and belief she believes that she and other members probably didn't because the studies showed $X$, and that's not in there.

MR. ELDER: And I would add to that it's not only not in there but in the paragraphs that deal with the studies, they certainly say we don't like your studies, we don't like your science, but they also say they didn't show it in a significant portion of consumers, they didn't show it in everyone. You know, this language, it's this continued hedge, and it doesn't say it doesn't work, it didn't work in her, and that could have been alleged and we would be in a different standpoint, but there was --

THE COURT: Yeah, or based upon information and believe we don't believe it worked in her because --

MR. ELDER: And from --
THE COURT: -- the studies were flawed or, you know, bogus, whatever. That was the missing piece, that ascertainable loss piece that was missing.

MR. GARDNER: I will completely agree with your Honor.

I did not understand that we could have brought an information and belief. We understood that the Court wanted us to say flatly whether or not she did or did not or failed to burn calories, just as whether or not she did not lose weight. So we kept very strict to what the Court said there.

But we did -- Coke can't pretend surprise in an effort to make clear what we saying about Ms. Franulovic. We went from 3 to 11 paragraphs that just gave more factual detail but did not add in the calory-burning claim. 50 says she would not have purchased three cans had she known there is a lack of reasonable support, would not have chose it to drink as a beverage because of the cost. 52, it was of no value to her. 53, although, and I will be real honest with the Court, although she says she didn't lose weight, she can't say she didn't burn it. Would I recon, given that she gained five pounds, did she have a net calory gain over that time? Probably not. But it's guesswork and we thought the Court wanted us to plead specificity as to whether or not she did. We may have been in error there, but that's -- we couldn't plead what we thought the Court said.

THE COURT: Well, $I$ just wanted specificity as to what the claim was. And if the claim was one of false advertising, there was no allegation that it was, at least as I saw the second amended complaint, that the representations were false, that they don't believe that she burned calories, or others
similarly situated burned calories and therefore she wouldn't have bought it and she wasted her money and she's out the money. I didn't see that in the second amended complaint, unless I'm --

MR. GARDNER: You know, your Honor, absent sitting down when $I$ have quiet time, $I$ believe the Court is quite right.

THE COURT: Right. And that's why I said if you want to amend, amend --

MR. GARDNER: We amended -- I'm sorry.
THE COURT: -- and flesh that out. Because what was clear, you know, through that whole proceeding was it just wasn't clear what you were alleging. And I remember that the complaint, the Franulovic complaint did vary from the Melfi and Simmens complaints, if I recall correctly.

MR. GARDNER: The amended one certainly did because they were -- the initial complaints were copied verbatim from ours, in large part were identical. Whether they did on that or not, I don't know. I recall that they did amend to allege that they didn't burn calories. So at least in the amended one they did allege that.

THE COURT: No, but in the -- but in the --
MR. GARDNER: Initial.
THE COURT: In the initial there was no allegation that she would not have bought it if she had known about the
misrepresentation, so you didn't even have that in there.
MR. GARDNER: It is in there now.
THE COURT: I know.
MR. GARDNER: And I don't believe that was -- we pled more facts to be more detailed about the claim, we wanted to be quite clear that we were to not making a calory-burning claim but a misrepresentation claim that she would not have bought it but for the deceptive and misleading advertising which, as we detailed earlier on the page 11 of the third amended was, in significant part, that they didn't have prior substantiation. We're not -- we did as the Court instructed and said that she did not lose weight because it was true, she didn't, she gained weight.

THE COURT: Where is it they didn't have prior substantiation and the misleading claim and she wouldn't have bought it?

MR. GARDNER: May I approach? I can just hand you this.

THE COURT: Which complaint are you looking at?
MR. GARDNER: Oh, it's the third amended, it's the second sentence of Paragraph 50.

THE COURT: Right, but that -- and we're talking in circles.

MR. GARDNER: Oh.
THE COURT: But that came about -- you snuck in the
weight-loss and calory burning in the same sentence, that's the problem, I wanted them fleshed out.

MR. ELDER: Your Honor, if I could. There was a comment that they were -- that there might have been some ambiguity about how to go about this calory-burning claim and I would submit that that wasn't the case because we had this same lengthy discussion --

THE COURT: I know.
MR. ELDER: -- in this courtroom about how to do it. And I believe earlier when you came back in you quoted Ms. Thorpe's argument they're not saying it doesn't work in anyone, here's how you do this. And so there wasn't any ambiguity about what we have been saying is not in there, there is no ambiguity about what the import of that was for their claims through your order and they didn't comply with the court order.

And finally, I would point out Paragraph 48 of the third amended complaint says "Over the period of approximately 90 days that Franulovic used Enviga as prescribed by Coke, i.e. drinking three cans of it per day, she did not lose any weight and thus did not get the weight-loss benefits promised by Coke." We believe, your Honor, that is the case that they have plead, that they chose to plead in response to your order and this other claim, however it is defined, is not in this case.

THE COURT: Do you agree, Mr. Elder, that if the claim is that the representation on the claim was false, we can prove that it was false, that calories aren't burned and if she knew it was a false claim she wouldn't have bought it and she's out the money, that that's sufficient?

MR. ELDER: I would agree that that would get a lot closer. I'd want to see a drafted complaint before I agreed that they stated a claim.

THE COURT: Yes, which is where $I$ was back in March.
MR. ELDER: And when we received an amended complaint and no motion, we went forward with this case on a weight-loss theory, we moved for summary judgment on a weight-loss theory, we questioned Ms. Franulovic on a weight-loss theory, and at least that theory, I think it's clear, has failed. Whether they could state a claim or succeed on a claim that Enviga just doesn't burn calories in anyone under any circumstances, it's water, you know, it has the same effect, you don't know. But, I'd like to see that complaint, it's not the one $I$ have in front of me.

THE COURT: Right, I agree.
And that's the claim you think is in front of me, right?

MR. GRANGER: Yes, your Honor. But $I$ will not whip the horse further, unless the Court wants it whipped more.

THE COURT: I've never been called a horse before.

MR. GARDNER: And let the record reflect that you are not being called one now. I was referring to the third amended complaint, the second amended would have been a pony. We think it is in there and I've reiterated why we think it is in there, but we don't want to argue that with the Court.

THE COURT: All right. Well, you know, we've gone forward to some degree because I think the weight-loss claim has been sufficiently fleshed out.

So now let me hear you, Mr. Elder, on this --
MR. QUIRK: We haven't responded to their summary judgment argument, your Honor.

THE COURT: Oh, yes. Okay, go ahead.
MR. QUIRK: Good afternoon, your Honor.
THE COURT: Yes. Do you folks need to take a break? Are you okay? You want to take a lunch break for half hour or no? You all right?

MR. ELDER: I think I'm fine to proceed, if you all prefer.

MR. QUIRK: Prefer to proceed.
THE COURT: If I see you start falling over --
MR. QUIRK: Steve will catch me.
As to the weight-loss claim, we believe that the record shows that summary judgment is not appropriate, that Ms. Franulovic's deposition transcript shows that whatever other claims she may or may not have that she has provided
sufficient evidence as to the weight-loss claim.
THE COURT: But how do you get around the fact that she wasn't keeping tract, she wasn't, you know, monitoring her intake? How could a reasonable jury ever find -- the fact that her pants were loose and she thought the pants were loose, I mean even though the non-moving party gets all the reasonable inferences in their favor, they have to be reasonable inferences. And there is no evidence that she even attempted to incorporate this into a weight-loss regiment. So how could a reasonable jury find that the -- find in her favor?

MR. QUIRK: If Ms. Franulovic were to testify as she did in pages 27 through 32 of her deposition, we think that this does show a weight maintenance, at the very least, regimen. Starting on page 27 at deposition Mr. Elder asked her about what she ate and she goes into great description. She talks about her daily diet of one cup of soy milk, one cup of Go Lean cereal, lunch probably a banana, chicken and then chicken again. She was very aware of what it was she was eating during the time and what she was eating was consistent with somebody who is trying to lose weight.

What she didn't have were exact numbers. She didn't have the -- she didn't have an exact calory count, but she was very careful about her diet. And at the end of this period of having followed this diet she said that her pants were tighter
and that she gained weight and there is no evidence that's contrary to that. That's the sum total of the evidence that's in the record as to her dietary practices and her weight, and we think that --

THE COURT: But that's all -- isn't that all
speculation?
MR. QUIRK: No, it's testimony as to what happened in her life. She's not speculating as to what she ate and what kind of diet she maintained. And as to the -- she is not speculating as to how her clothes fit. I mean --

THE COURT: Okay, but she testified she doesn't even weigh herself.

MR. QUIRK: Right, but her belief that she gained weight is not speculation, it's informed by the fact that at the end of the period her clothes were tighter.

THE COURT: Yes, but if she's not -- if there is no evidence that she ate more, ate less, she says, well, I sort of ate the same throughout, and she wasn't keeping track of what she was eating, whether or not she was exercising more or exercising less, how can $I$ then make the -- I think it's a theoretical conclusion that she gained weight. I just think it's all hypotheticals and speculation.

MR. QUIRK: I don't think it's hypothetical at all. What it shows is that she ate the same throughout, that she wasn't taking in more or doing something that would offset

Coke's alleged calory-burning benefit, that she maintained a constant, she added in Enviga and at the end of the time she was bigger, not smaller. That's what she knows happened to herself.

THE COURT: Well, her pants were tighter. It doesn't mean she was bigger, it could just mean her weight shifted.

MR. QUIRK: Well, I mean, her --
THE COURT: She never weighed herself, how can you tell me that she was bigger?

MR. QUIRK: Well, she said that she believed she gained weight because her clothes were tighter. Now that's -she's in the best position to know, and there is no evidence to the contrary and we think that that's enough to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether she received the implied weight-loss benefit from Enviga.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. QUIRK: And that's really it.
Mr. Elder raised a separate argument that I'd at least like to address, and if possible amend. He said that in filing our opposition to summary judgment that we didn't follow the correct form under Local Rule 56.1. As to that, if the Court would permit, what we've prepared is a supplemental statement of -- or response to their statement of undisputed facts essentially saying what we said in the brief but doing it in numbered paragraphs and saying which allegations we
disagree with, which allegations we agree with and providing the deposition citations, all of which were appended to our opposition, if the Court would permit.

THE COURT: Well, you know the law in this district is that a failure to file that can be an automatic basis for the admission of the statement, a failure to comply with 56.1.

MR. QUIRK: Well, our feeling is their statement of undisputed facts in their brief was not entirely numbered paragraphs. It are started with essentially a prose section, had a heading called "Franulovic's deposition," which was then set apart by numbers, and then jumped straight to the legal argument. We feel like we responded largely in the form that they filed it, but if the form has created any problems, we would like to fix that because it's not a problem as to substance, it's a problem as to form. And we're not adding new information, we're just putting it in the way that they say that we failed to in a brief that was filed nine days after its deadline. Their reply on summary judgment was due on March 9th and they filed it two nights ago, and that's where this argument was raised and we're trying to address it simply by putting the same information into numbered paragraphs, if the Court will permit.

THE COURT: I'm not going to hold you to the rule. Although I have discretion, I'm not going to enforce the rule. I mean, from this point forward you know what the local rules
require.
MR. QUIRK: Well, if it would help, we can put it in anyway simply as a matter of -- if it helps the Court with understanding where are the points of agreement and where are the points of disagreement better than our original, then we would submit it, if the Court would permit.

THE COURT: Let me think about it.
MR. QUIRK: Okay.
And just finally, I mean, in addition to
Ms. Franulovic's dietary practices and her -- you know, what happened to her weight, Coke also has raised issues as to what her actual expectations were as to what Enviga would do and I just want to address the relevant deposition points there.

On page 40 Mr . Elder asked Ms. Franulovic, "Did you during --" this is starting at line ten. "During this time period when you were drinking Enviga, did you believe that Enviga would make you lose weight?"

Her answer was: "I believed it would burn calories."
"And by your answer do $I$ understand that burning calories and losing weight aren't necessarily the same thing?"

Her answer is, "They can be.
"Okay, they can be but they don't have to be?"
"For me they are."
So she believed that this would help her both burn calories and lose weight. That was her belief as to their
advertisements.

And again, I mean, even more clearly on page 88 of her deposition Mr. Elder asked her, "Was it your understanding that the calory-burning affect of drinking Enviga would be in the range of 60 to 100 calories while you are drinking Enviga in 2007?

Her answer is "Yes."
The record is clear that she expected a calory-burning and a weight-loss benefit from Enviga.

Mr. Elder is right on the separate point. She understands that it's not a magic bullet. The discussion we had a year ago, that if she had a can of Enviga in one hand and six Big Macs in the other, she gets that. What she did understand though was that if she did what she was doing all along, which was not six Big Macs, it was a highly regulated diet as set out on page 27 of her deposition, if she maintained what she was doing and added Enviga, it would help her and it didn't. That is her weight-loss claim and we think there is enough in this transcript to -- in her deposition to survive summary judgment.

THE COURT: I just want to look at page 27 and see what you are referring to.

MR. QUIRK: She starts on line seven of page 27 and the discussion of her diet actually -- and the discussion of her diet actually goes on for several pages. They spent quite
a bit of time talking about what she ate and what she was eating during this time was a healthy person's diet. And the -- okay.
(Short Pause)
THE COURT: See, I think that what you want me to do, Mr. Cuker, is that you want me to conclude that because she pretty much had the same routine that she had before she started drinking Enviga and the fact that her pants were tighter, that therefore the weight-loss claim -- that she survives the weight-loss claim and it becomes a jury question. The problem is that to get to that conclusion $I$ have to do a lot of speculating, it seems to me. I have to speculate that without much uncertainty she ate the same things, the same quantities and the same caloric intake that she did pre-Enviga and all she speaks to are generalities, and so I have to make that leap which I don't think is permissible.

MR. QUIRK: She says that she ate the same things. THE COURT: Same things.

MR. QUIRK: Mr. Elder certainly had the opportunity to ask her did you eat any more. He didn't.

THE COURT: But she couldn't -- I mean, the thing is she was very non-specific about what she ate because she wasn't keeping track, she wasn't keeping track of her caloric intake, and she wasn't keeping track of -- let's see. And she just spoke in terms of typicality, she wasn't speaking in
terms of specifics. So because she was speaking in terms of generalities, it kind of begs me then to speak in terms of generalities: Well, then, since her pants were tighter, then she must not have lost weight. And that all seems very speculative to me.

You see what I'm saying?
MR. QUIRK: I see what you are saying. I don't think it's speculative. The two things she describes are living life as she always had and at the end of the day her clothes being tighter, and while those may not be the only types of evidence that would support a non-weight loss claim, the support the -they support -- they support it. She talks about maintaining her lifestyle and at the end of the period believing she gained five pounds based on the way that her clothes fit. It's not clear what more she could do, she or any ordinary living person who is expecting to receive this benefit from the product could do.

THE COURT: I don't think anyone will dispute that she could have done a lot more. I mean, anyone who is on a serious weight-loss regimen keeps track of their caloric intake. You go in any of the Weight Watcher programs, for example, etcetera, etcetera, I mean, that's what they all do and she didn't do that here and so she is speaking in generalities and she wants me to conclude in generalities that she must not have lost weight and, therefore, the weight-loss claim must be
false and misleading.
MR. QUIRK: Well, those are the arguments that we have, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I'll read through the deposition again.

Did you want respond to what he said?

MR. ELDER: Just briefly, your Honor. First of all, I think the vagueness here belies the claim that there is an implied weight-loss message in this advertising, and there doesn't have to be that message, and Ms. Franulovic's testimony has demonstrated that it's not there.

And these discussions about her diet, first of all, just to address her diet quickly, you're absolutely right, she talked in vague generalities but she also -- the consistency that they're saying was there, it was just absolutely consistent, isn't there. On page 31 of her deposition she was asked about basically what she would eat for lunch and, you know, said "What would that be?"

And she said "Besides the chicken and the vegetables?"
"Right."
"Fruit, yogurt, power bars. Sometimes I would bring the Crunch --" that was some cereal, "the Go Lean Crunch as a snack. I'm always eating healthy."
"So, sometimes you eat fruit, sometimes you eat
yogurt, sometimes you eat a power bar, you eat chicken, you eat vegetables?"

I mean, just like anyone else, your Honor. The import of this testimony is while her diet was somewhat consistent, possibly even more consistent than, you know, the average person, it was varied, she ate different things at different times. She said she ate Mike and Ike's candies. So the idea that she had --

THE COURT: But sometimes she didn't.
MR. ELDER: Sometimes she didn't. Sometimes she ate those, sometimes she didn't. So, like anyone else, her diet varied and she doesn't have a basis for saying -- for allowing a jury to conclude that she was at this caloric balance that you would have to be at, and that's part of the issue. She understood it was a hundred calories we're talking about. A hundred calories, to lose weight you'd have to be at a pretty tight caloric balance. She understood it was a hundred calories, she understood there was no guarantee of weight-loss and she understood why there was no guarantee of weight-loss, and I think that's important as well.

THE COURT: What was the claim, if you drank three cans you could burn up to 60 to a hundred calories?

MR. ELDER: 60 to a hundred calories, three cans. And she testified that she had read that and she was aware of it. And I think Mr. Quirk pointed it out, she said she thought it
was a hundred calories.
And, your Honor, to -- her testimony about whether she gained or lost weight is equally speculative. At her deposition on page 32 she's asked the question:
"Between November of 2006 and May of 2007, how did your weight change, if at all?"
"I gained five pounds.
"Is there a particular reason that you remember that?
"Because I was trying to lose five pounds.
"But you don't know what you weighed in February of '07?
"No, I just know my clothes were tight."
Your Honor, she doesn't even have -- her basis for saying that she gained five pounds, "I know I was trying to lose it," the testimony doesn't have factual significance, it is her speculation about what she thinks happened to her and she can't support it.

Finally, your Honor, just briefly on the procedural issues.

THE COURT: Can you just remind me, counsel, why is the questioning between November of 2006 and May 2007, is that when she alleges she bought it?

MR. ELDER: That's when she alleges she was using it, correct.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Go ahead.

MR. ELDER: Just to briefly touch on the procedural issues. Your Honor, the reason that we filed our reply brief when we did is because plaintiffs didn't just respond to our motion for summary judgment, they moved for affirmative relief in their own motion seeking under Rule $56(f)$ for more time. So, we combined our -- as they did, they moved in a motion and then tacked on to the second part of that their reply brief, so we responded to that motion and added our reply as well. That's why it was filed and it was timely.

And just briefly on the statement of undisputed material facts, I'm not sure to what Mr. Quirk was referring but it's Docket Number 105-2 and, your Honor, it's a list of paragraphs beginning with paragraph one, it's a separate pleading and going through the end so --

THE COURT: No, I think it complies.
MR. ELDER: Okay. Unless there are any other questions, that's all I have.

THE COURT: Thank you.
Mr. Gardner, or whoever is going to argue it, talk to me about your motion for the further discovery.

MR. GARDNER: Your Honor, we don't know what Coke knows about how people measure weight-loss because Coke steadfastly refused to produce many, many documents, I forget, but a couple of dozen objections, because it was a merits based question. They are in control of things that went to
this issue, as what does happen, talk to us about weight gain.
THE COURT: How would any of that matter?
MR. GARDNER: Well, it would matter if as --

THE COURT: How does it matter how they measure weight gain versus how Ms. Franulovic does?

MR. GARDNER: If they know that it is a standard way of people who are monitoring their weight that they can -that people can tell, the same way people can tell that a car is speeding is -- they don't have a radar gun, they can just tell. People can tell when they have gotten bigger. We presented evidence that many diet plans are based on losing inches about your weight. The entire issue on weight gain as a rule is -- not the entire but a big issue about weight gain is appearance, and appearance means when you lose weight you get smaller. This is how people do things.

THE COURT: What does it have to do with discovery? MR. GARDNER: We would like -- I suspect Coke has information knowing -- saying they know full well that people use tight pants, things like that, as an indicator of weight gain. We'd like to know what they know about it. All we know is what they're criticized Ms. Franulovic --

THE COURT: I'm sorry, I'm not following this.
MR. GARDNER: We would like to know what information
they have on the merits as to how consumers behave when judging weight gain. It's pure speculation, your Honor.

THE COURT: What's speculation?
MR. GARDNER: On my part that we would have that. But absent the discovery, $I$ can only speculate, $I$ don't know. We are faced with addressing an issue that goes on merits.

THE COURT: Right. And so if you need further discovery to really adequately respond to the motion, that's something I need to consider, but I'm having a hard time seeing what more you need in connection with this motion for summary judgment with respect to Franulovic because you've got her deposition, you know what she ate, you know what she drank, you know whether she gained weight or not. Why do you need discovery from Coke and Nestle about how they think people should be measured when they gain weight? Why does it matter if their evidence shows you should step on a scale or you should look in the mirror? Why is that relevant?

MR. GARDNER: Because their entire premise of attacking Ms. Franulovic is that no sane person would judge weight gain by whether or not your pants got tight. Our position is that many sane people would and we have reason to believe that Coke knows that as well. So, what Coke has done --

THE COURT: Okay, let's just assume that you are right, let's assume that Coke has in its files somewhere that we know that people measure their weight gain by how their pants fit. Let's just assume they have that. I don't
understand why that's even relevant to the motion. So let's just assume that she gained five pounds.

MR. GARDNER: If we assume that, in all candor, your Honor, we don't need further discovery, we need it to address that stuff, not --

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. GARDNER: -- not what she should have done.
I would want to point out that you can lose weight in two ways -- several ways, but one way is to find a way to burn calories, and there are drugs that do that. When I was with the Attorney General's Office we brought suit against a doc who had an extremely effective but also sometimes fatal calory-burning pill. Ms. Franulovic, her testimony shows that her intake, she doesn't have raw calory numbers, but her intake stayed the same before, during and after her treatment with Enviga, stayed the same.

THE COURT: Well, that's your spin.
MR. GARDNER: Well, she says that -- well, in response, she ate the same stuff all along. It may have been that on Tuesday she ate different than Wednesday, but, again, so does everyone else they're advertising to. It's our spin and it's also I think something that's completely supported by the facts. There might be a fact dispute, but it is at best that. It stays flat. If the one thing she changes over that time is drinking this stuff and if it does in fact burn those
calories and will have an effect over time, then she should have lost about a pound a month. A hundred calory loss over 30 days is 3,000, and I believe that's what you need to lose about a pound. So, her expectation over that period was to lose five, it was a reasonable expectation because she should have if this stuff actually over time resulted in a reduced net calories.

The other problem with these claims is that small drops in calories, and this also gets to merits issues, your Honor, that we have not fleshed out, but the science is clear that a short-term caloric drop does not mean that there will even be a caloric drop a week later. The body is a fantastic and miraculous mechanism that can adjust to small drops in caloric intake by doing other things or doing less in other things. But if you accept that she did flat, and that is her testimony, she didn't keep a log, your Honor, because she didn't assume Coke was lying to her. She was a human, this is not a test case, this is someone who read and ad, believed it and added it as the -- added it to her diet believing that it would work. She did not -- you know, if we can go back and reinvent her and say, you know, Linda, we want you to keep track of everything you eat, the calories, do not vary it, in other words, behave over that multi month period as though you were in a locked chamber -- well, I wouldn't do it because I wouldn't ask anyone to do that, but that's what Coke is saying
you must do in order to state a claim for deception on weight-loss. The only -- no one can do that whether they weighed themselves constantly or --

THE COURT: I don't know that they're saying that. I think they're saying you have to do it with much more specificity and less speculation.

MR. GARDNER: That is goes to the quality of the evidence and that again is a question for a trier of fact. It may not be that -- whether it's the Court or a jury, they might not buy it.

THE COURT: I think it goes to whether or not on a motion for summary judgement $I$ deal with conclusory allegations or $I$ deal with facts. And if those facts are very conclusory, then are they really speculative versus concrete facts? And that's, $I$ think, the question I'm being call upon to decide.

MR. GARDNER: There is sauce for both the geese and the ganders for that, your Honor. It is Coke's initial burden to set up a fact issue. It's using the same testimony that it is now criticizing as being vague and ambiguous to say that she didn't -- that she can't prove it. It relies on the same things we are relying on. If it's unreliable as to us, it has to be unreliable as to them and the initial burden is theirs. If we can't -- if our using it and the way we think it works does not work because of the variability, it can't work for
them to prove the contrary. It is sauce for both of us.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. GARDNER: Thank you, your Honor.
Mr. Quirk wants to get it right, if we could.
MR. QUIRK: I probably won't, but I'll speak anyway.
On the point about --
THE COURT: Mr. Quirk, I think I called you Mr. Cuker before. I'm sorry. Go ahead.

MR. QUIRK: I'm honored by the association. On the point about the need for discovery, part of this was a protective measure because Coke goes back and forth in its motion and its briefing as to the basis on which its seeking summary judgment. At times it looks like what its arguing is that it's seeking summary judgment on the narrow grounds relating to Franulovic's ascertainable loss, but Coke says in its brief on page eight that plaintiff cannot prove that Coke engaged in any unlawful conduct. Well, that's a very different question because unlawful conduct under the Consumer Fraud Act is any deception or misrepresentation, regardless of whether anybody was deceived. And what they're saying is that Franulovic aside, that we can't prove that they made deceptive and misrepresentative statements.

THE COURT: Well, they believe you conceded the point, that's the problem, they believe you conceded -MR. QUIRK: What they say here is that we can't prove,
and our position is that --
THE COURT: Because of your concession by not bringing it forward, isn't that what you meant, I assume?

MR. QUIRK: Well, even as to the implied weight-loss claim, remember the implied weight-loss --

THE COURT: Counsel, I have a conference call. It's not going to take me too long. I don't want to keep the parties waiting, they've been waiting on hold. Can we just take a five-minute break and then we'll get back and let you finish up this point, then $I$ want to move to the last point.

MR. QUIRK: Sure.
THE COURT: Okay? Let's just take a five-minute break.
THE DEPUTY CLERK: All rise.
(Short recess)
THE COURT: Let's just finish this last issue. I think, Mr. Quirk, were you addressing me?

MR. QUIRK: Yes, your Honor. Just on the point about discovery that as to the deception element of her implied weight-loss claim Coke made the assertion that we cannot prove that claim and the relevant evidence for that claim is all of the testing and everything that they've done with the product, and they've consistently told us when we sought discovery that now is not the time for merits discovery and as part of their motion for summary judgment they're now asking for judgment on that basis as well as the others. And at times their argument
seems to be focused narrowly on the Franulovic-specific ascertainable loss issues, but they say a lot more than that and as to the broader statements we think to the discovery that we've sought and has been denied is relevant to whether the calory-burning representation is a deceptive practice, ascertainable loss aside, because they've asked your Honor to grant them judgment on that claim as well.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
MR. QUIRK: Thank you.
THE COURT: Did you want to respond, Mr. Elder?
MR. ELDER: Sure. We've gone back to calory-burning is
the response. We pled in our brief and we said in our brief they cannot prove an unlawful practice as to Ms. Franulovic because her claim is that: You promised me I would lose weight. And she said in her deposition she understood no such promise was made and she knew why and so this motion doesn't tee up the issue of does this product burn calories, it tees up the issue of did Ms. Franulovic understand what she was buying, and we believe we've shown that she did, and they haven't articulated anything that they could possibly discover that would change her admissions.

And I would add, your Honor, that we didn't just decide not to produce documents to them, this was litigated in front of Judge Schneider and he made rulings and required us to produce certain documents and not others. And so, you
know, this wasn't just Coke objecting, this was setting the bounds of discovery to address the issues that need to be addressed in front of the Magistrate and they had a full opportunity to make their case to him if they needed anything. So, we're talking about what Ms. Franulovic has conceded and that's the basis for our motion.

MR. QUIRK: Your Honor, a one sentence response? What we litigated in front of Judge Schneider was the appropriate discovery for class certification. What we're talking about here is discovery relating to summary judgment, that was never in front of Judge Schneider because Judge Schneider's order ordered discovery pertaining to class certification, the summary judgment motion came later and that's why these questions were not raised in front of Judge Schneider.

THE COURT: Well, except that they're intertwined I guess is the issue. All right, we don't need to reargue that.

Okay, let me hear -- you handed me a document you wanted me to look at, Mr. Elder.

MR. ELDER: I did.
THE COURT: Here it is.
MR. ELDER: And we wanted to make the Court --
THE COURT: I'm sorry, one other question for
plaintiff's counsel. Do you agree that if $I$ were to grant summary judgment as to the weight-loss claim that the motion for class certification as to that claim falls as well?

MR. GARDNER: I believe so, your Honor. I may not be tracking it, but --

THE COURT: You may not be understanding me?
MR. GARDNER: I may not being thinking -- I understand the question, I'd kind of want to think of the ramifications, but an immediate and honest answer is I believe the Court is absolutely right.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. GARDNER: And if I am persuaded how absolutely wrong I was, we will advise the Court later.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. GARDNER: But, yeah, if you say she loses, it's not an adequacy issue, she's gone, the claim is gone from the case. Therefore, absent substitution, there is no one there that can raise it.

THE COURT: All right.
Go ahead, Mr. Elder.
MR. ELDER: Your Honor, the plaintiffs have eluded some to their pleadings and it's been in the press, I don't know if you were aware, there was an General Attorney investigation of the Enviga advertising and the result of that investigation is what I've handed you, which is the claims on the label will be modified as per the language they have in front of you. And the language that's important for our purposes, your Honor, has the stars by it. On the left hand
side of your page there is three bullets there. One says -begins "three cans." The middle bullet says "Enviga burns calories but it's not by itself a guaranteed weight-loss solution." That is new language. And then the third bullet says "remember, weight-loss requires a reduced calory diet and regular exercise." That's new language as well. The other language that makes up those bullets has just been moved from different places on the can.

THE COURT: Is this in effect now?
MR. ELDER: It is being rolled into effect as inventory is used up, and we believe that that will be used up by September, so it's on a rolling basis per the agreement.

And the reason we believe this is important, your Honor, is because we have a class here that's seeking only injunctive relief. To have injunctive relief there has to be a risk of future harm. We believe that changing the label eliminates any potential for future harm and moots the claims of the class.

THE COURT: Except if the cans are still on the shelves though, right?

MR. ELDER: But by the time this issue comes to a head, the cans will not still be on the shelves. So it's happening and it will be complete in a matter of months, you know, we believe around September but it depends on the rate at which the cans turn over and stores replace existing
inventory.
THE COURT: Is this something I need to address now? MR. ELDER: It is not something we need address now, but we wanted to bring it to the Court's attention because we believe if you are going to have a class seeking only injunctive relief and what you want is a change to the label and the label has been changed, then you've got a mootness issue. And I'm certain that the plaintiffs will contend that this label is also inadequate, but that's an issue that needs to be litigated and discussed before we move forward here.

MR. GARDNER: I think not, your Honor. You know, early on in the case we served discovery on Coke asking if there were governmental investigations. They refused to answer. We moved to compel. Judge Schneider said they did not need to answer. At that time Coke said the governmental investigations, including this one, were moot -- or did not matter for this lawsuit. Now that they've gotten the settlement from the $A G$, they blind-side us by coming in today saying we're fixing to change and when we do, that will moot it, therefore think about it now. I think that's completely inappropriate, your Honor.

We were aware of the settlement, but not from Coke. This is the first mention -- this is the first contact we've had from Coke about the settlement, is as we are in the courtroom today. But, yes.

One thing, your Honor. (Indicating) This is what consumers see when they buy it, they don't see the little print on the back.

THE COURT: What? That's what your whole case is about.

MR. GARDNER: This is what our whole case is about, is the calorie burner. But if we look at the print on the back, we believe that a copy test will show that this may well racket up deception and it certainly doesn't cure it because now for the first time they do tell -- make claims about weight-loss, so it may not work for you, but that also mean it may work for you.

So, these are not good enough to resolve the lawsuit, anyway, but it is completely speculative as to what will in fact happen in September. It's just as likely that Enviga will be completely off the shelves. This is not a product succeeding in the marketplace, it has been withdrawn from distribution in some areas of the country, according to Mr. Elder. So, this is -- it's an unripe thing, Mr. Elder's trying to bias you into thinking well, it's moot, so why shouldn't I throw a few bones his way, it's an inappropriate thing.

THE COURT: No, no, no, I'm not throwing any bones any way. If it's moot, it's moot, it's a jurisdictional issue. MR. GARDNER: Then bring a motion on that and show why
this does not deceive. We believe it still will, your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, no, don't you have a whole other host of problems, a jurisdictional problem, because your class plaintiff says that she bought it on an old label and if you are going to seek to enjoin them from this label, that's a whole other case?

MR. GARDNER: No, your Honor, we would seek to enjoin Coke from future representations regarding the efficacy of these products, not "don't say that." But, we're not trying to rewrite their label. An injunction would not be, at least in my mind, a mandatory injunction but prohibitory: Do not represent, as we've told Coke repeatedly, that this is a calory-burning product because based on the evidence you have, that's not true for most people, you have no adequate substantiation to make that claim. That's the injunction we seek.

THE COURT: I thought you said earlier in your pleadings that there -- see, oh, boy, here we go again. But I thought for sure you said that Coke has studies that show that it burns calories in people and then your big beef at the time was but that was only in a group of people and they didn't tell -- the label didn't tell Ms. Franulovic that and therefore she was deceived. Now they do exactly what you say they're studies showed. And so, so what?

MR. GARDNER: The study -- the study, unless Coke has
more that it has not produced to us, there is one study of Enviga, it was 20 to 30 below average body mass index, BMI, active young people that were put in the box and whose calories --

THE COURT: Healthy, normal weight 18 to 35-year olds, perhaps?

MR. GARDNER: I need to look at the numbers again. But, your Honor, that statement does not say to others that it won't work for a 36-year-old, they're just putting that in as a qualifier. It is still -- this is deceptive, your Honor, the big print. The tiny print on the back is -- again, a basic tenet of consumer protection law is that putting something in a footnote or an explanation telling the truth in the fine type does not amount to curing a deception in the big print.

THE COURT: I know, but I thought that you said -- I thought that you said their studies showed that it does burn calories.

MR. GARDNER: It -- well --
THE COURT: So --
MR. GARDNER -- they're studies. And what it also showed is that for some people in that study, it made them -they burned less calories, so in theory they gained weight. Not everyone in that study burned calories, even in that small boxed up group of people. There is no evidence that it will burn calories past the three days even for those people. If
they'd been tested longitudinally over time, there is no evidence. They might have a case, but there is no evidence at all that it worked other than in a closed room environment. Nothing.

THE COURT: Well, I guess I'll just have to deal with it at the time, right now it's not before me. But it seems to me that there is a whole host of jurisdictional hurdles that will surface and I guess I'll address them at the time.

MR. GARDNER: If it cures the problem, your Honor, it is moot; if it doesn't cure the problem, it's not.

THE COURT: Well, if $I$ hear what you are saying, that just if they're having the calory burner on there, that's problematic, well, okay, but what's coming to my mind, and again it's not before me, is what does that have to do with Franulovic because now we're talking about a different product in September --

MR. GARDNER: Different label, same product, as far as I know.

THE COURT: Yeah, but she -- different what?
MR. GARDNER: The labeling, the label is changed, or will be change in the future.

THE COURT: Yes. So how can she be a class representative of this label? Well, you know what? We're just --

MR. GARDNER: Okay, your Honor.

THE COURT: We don't need to go there.
MR. GARDNER: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: I think it was a -- I think it's going to be problematic, I think it's going to be problematic, but I'll deal with it when $I$ need to.

Okay, anything else? I'm going take the matter under advisement. I thank counsel for their presentation. I didn't mean to leave you folks out. You're happy just to sit there and let Mr. Elder do all the --

MR. BOYER: I enjoyed hearing the arguments very much, your Honor, I have nothing to add.

THE COURT: Mr. Pottinger?

MR. POTTINGER: Nothing to add on my part, your Honor.
MR. GARDNER: For clarity, Judge, Nestle's not a party to this case, so....

THE COURT: Oh, they're not, that's right.
MR. GARDNER: He's just a friendly interloper.

THE COURT: It's always nice to have friends in the courtroom.

All right, counsel, thank you.
MR. GARDNER: Thank you nor your time, Judge.
THE DEPUTY CLERK: All rise.
(Proceeding ended at 1:56 PM)



| 90:13; 92:12 | causation [8] - | citing ${ }_{[1]}-16: 3$ | $25 ; 40: 1,4,8,20,23 ;$ | $\text { 47:14; 88:18; } 92: 13$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| calory-burning [30] - | $\begin{aligned} & 28: 18,25 ; 31: 5 ; \\ & 32: 22 ; 33: 5 ; 36: 4, \end{aligned}$ | CIVIL [1] - 1:4 | $41: 3,11-12,15,17,$ | comment [2]-6:20; |
| 26:15; 29:2; 30:2; | 37:14 | $7 ; 10: 1,4-5,10-11 ;$ | 44:7; 47:18; 57:8; | ssion [2] |
| 32:7; 36:7; 47:23; | caused [1] - 23:17 | 11:6, 10-11, 24 ; | 85:9, 12, 25; 87:14, | 45:5, 11 |
| 48:16; 51:5, 22; | using [1] - 12:2 | 13:12; 14:9, 22; | 18; 88:5; 90:3; 92:22 | common [1] - 4:15 |
| 52:25; 53:2, 21-22; | CENTER ${ }_{[1]}-1: 3$ | 16:21; 17:5; 20:11, | aner [1]-7:4 | monality [1] |
| 55:16; 56:9; 57:3, 22; | enter ${ }_{[1]}-1: 15$ | 15; 21:8; 24:4, 11, | clear [21]-5:17; | 4:8 |
| 59:9; 61:6; 62:5; 67:1; | cereal [2] - 65:18; | 15-16, 18, 22, 25; | 14:16; 17:4; 36:1 | COMPANY [2] - 1:7, |
| 70:4, 9; 79:13; 84:5, | 73:23 | 25:3, 12, 26:2, 13, | 40:16; 46:7; 47:21; |  |
| $11 ; 90: 13$ <br> calory-burning/ | Cert [1] - 1:25 certain [2]-84:25; | $\begin{aligned} & 15-16 ; 27: 13,25 \\ & 28: 11,17 ; 30: 2,5,17 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 48: 2 ; 51: 18 ; 54: 4,12 ; \\ & 59: 7 ; 60: 12 ; 61: 6 ; \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Company [3]-2:11, } \\ & 13,15 \end{aligned}$ |
| false [2] - 27:12, 25 | 88:8 | 33:2, 5; 34:20; 35:12, 18,$20 ; 36: 1,3,14 ;$ | $\begin{aligned} & 63: 14 ; 70: 8 ; 72: 15 ; \\ & 80: 10 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { comparison [1] - } \\ & 49 \cdot 12 \end{aligned}$ |
| Camden [1] - 1:10 campaign [1]-12:21 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { certainly [7]-34:4; } \\ & 38: 8,13 ; 58: 12 ; \end{aligned}$ | $37: 15 ; 38: 8,17 ;$ | clearly [2] - 55:24; $70 \cdot 2$ | compel [1] - 88:14 |
| ```Campbell [2]-1:16; 2:7``` | 60:16; 71:19; 89:9 | $\begin{aligned} & 39: 11 ; 41: 6,8 ; 42: 8 ; \\ & 43: 9 ; 44: 20 ; 46: 10, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 70:2 } \\ & \text { CLERK }_{[4]}-46: 1 ; \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { compensated }[1] \text { - } \\ & 43 \cdot 12 \end{aligned}$ |
| cancer [3] - 50:24; | $12: 20,22$ | 21-22; 47:3; 51:4, 9, | $49: 25 ; 83: 13 ; 93: 22$ | complaint [49] |
| 51:1 candidly [1]-9:3 | $\begin{array}{r} \text { certification [19] } \\ 2: 22 ; 3: 1,20 ; 7: 2 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 22 ; 54: 6,11,15,25 ; \\ & 55: 1,6,16,20,23 ; \end{aligned}$ | clicked [1] - 27:18 <br> closed [2] - 13:18; | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 9:20; 22:25; 23:3, 19, } \\ & 25 ; 24: 24 ; 26: 12,14 ; \end{aligned}$ |
| candies [1]-74:7 candor [3]-18:15; | $\begin{aligned} & 35: 2,5 ; 39: 3 ; 40: 5,9, \\ & 20,23 ; 41: 3,19 ; \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 56: 9 ; 57: 4,22-23 ; \\ & 59: 9,22 ; 61: 5,7,15 ; \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 92:3 } \\ & \text { closer }[1]-63: 7 \end{aligned}$ | 27:15, 19-20; 29:14; |
| 22:12; 79:3 | 42:14; 44:7; 47:19; | $\begin{aligned} & 62: 5,24 ; 63: 1,4,8, \\ & 15,21 ; 64: 7,22 ; 65: 1 \end{aligned}$ | clothes [6] - 66:10, <br> 5.67:11. $72 \cdot 9,14$; | 11; 47:13; 48:1, 20; |
| 21:10; 24:13; 28:4; | certified [3]-6:4; | 70:18; 71:9; 72:11, | 75:12 | $53: 9,14,20,23-24 ;$ |
| 30:11; 52:22; 56:18; | 21:11,14 | 25; 73:8; 74:21; 81:1; | COCA [2] - 1:7, 20 | 54:13; 56:4, 22, 24; |
| 58:3; 82:16; 83:19; | Certified [1]-1:23 | 83:5, 19-20; 84:7, 14; | Coca [4]-2:2, 11-12, | 58:1, 5; 59:24; 60:3, |
| $\begin{aligned} & 84: 13 \\ & \text { cans [19]-8:17; } \end{aligned}$ | certify [2] - 41:12, 25 certifying [1] - 41:11 | $\begin{gathered} 85: 24 ; 86: 13 ; 90: 15 \\ \text { claim's }[1]-45: 13 \end{gathered}$ | $\stackrel{15}{\operatorname{COCA}-C O L A}[2]$ | $\begin{aligned} & 14 ; 61: 19 ; 62: 18 \\ & 63: 7,10,18 ; 64: 3 \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 9:25; 11:9; 13:23; } \\ & \text { 20:2; 24:2; 31:25; } \end{aligned}$ | CFA [7] - 5:8, 12, 16; | claim-splitting [1] 20:15 | $1: 7,20$ | complaints [2] - <br> 60:15, 17 |
| 20:2; 24:2; 31:25; | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline 7: 7 ; 16: 21 ; 17: 4,9 \\ \text { chamber }[1]-80: 24 \end{array}$ | claim/misleading ${ }_{[1]}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Coca-Cola [4]-2: } \\ & 11-12,15 \end{aligned}$ | complete [4]-11:2; |
| 62:20; 74:22; 87:2, | ance [2]-19:15 | $\begin{aligned} & -57: 23 \\ & \text { claimed }[1]-54: 12 \end{aligned}$ | Cohen [1] - 1:9 | 18:14; 22:12; 87:23 |
| $19,22,25$ | change [6] - 16:1; | claimed [1] - 54:12 <br> claiming [1]-29:16 | $\text { coin }_{[1]}-38: 23$ | completely $[6]$ <br> 13:19; 58:25; 79:22 |
| [1] - 37:2 |  | claims [31] - 3:3, 9, | $19,2$ | 88:20; 89:14, 16 |
| careful [1]-65:24 | changed [2]-88:7; | 12, 16, 18; 9:18; 14:8; | 10:5; 12:4, 21; 13:13; | complies [1]-76:15 |
| case [66] - 6:6; 7:3; | 92:20 | 21:5; 24:3; 27:10; | 14:19, 24-25; 18:4; | comply [2]-62:15; |
| 9:16, 21; 14:15, 19, | changes [2]-15:16; | 31:24; 36:3; 38:5; | 19:2, 9, 12; 20:23; | 68:6 |
| 23; 15:15, 18, 24-25; | 79:24 | 40:15; 41:7; 43:10; | 21:5; 32:5; 38:24; | complying [1] - 7:8 |
| 16:12, 15, 23; 17:24; | hanging ${ }_{[1]}-87: 16$ | 44:13, 18; 48:3; | 39:4; 42:8; 43:15; | comports [1] - 39:24 |
| 18:7; 19:18; 20:18; | leck [1] - 39:18 | 51:18; 53:16, 18; | 45:15; 46:17; 50:22; | concede [1] - 30:21 |
| 21:1, 6, 10, 19, 23; | heck-off [1] - 39:18 | 55:21; 62:15; 64:25; | 54:6; 55:19; 56:18; | conceded [7] - |
| 22:8, 11; 24:16; 28:8; | nerry [1] - 19:2 | 80:8; 86:22; 87:17; | 59:6; 62:19, 22; | 24:12; 30:14; 82:23; |
| 31:19; 32:11, 13; | cherry-picking [1] | 89:10 | 69:11; 76:21; 77:17; | 85:5 |
| $\begin{aligned} & 34: 6 ; 35: 4,18,22 ; \\ & 38: 12,16 ; 39: 13 ; \end{aligned}$ | 19:2 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { clarified [2]-35:11; } \\ & 56: 12 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 78: 12,20,23 ; 80: 17, \\ & \text { 25; 82:11, 15, 17; } \end{aligned}$ | conceptual $[1]-8: 6$ <br> concern [2] - 27:8; |
| $40: 8,13,22 ; 41: 4 ;$ | chicken [4]-65:18 | clarity [1] - 93:14 | 83:19; 85:1; 88:12, | 34:8 |
| 43:4, 20; 45:13; | chose [4] - 44:22 | class [90]-2:21, 24; | 15, 22, 24; 90:8, 12, | concerns [3]-23:1; |
| 46:22; 47:8; 49:20; | $51: 6 ; 59: 11 ; 62: 23$ | 3:1, 14, 16; 4:18; | 19, 25 | 35:23; 52:3 |
| 54:10, 15; 55:22; | circles [1]-61:23 | $5: 13,19,24 ; 6: 9,18,$ | Coke's [5]-24:3; | concession [5] - |
| 62:6, 22, 25; 63:11; | Circuit [1] - 39:1 | $\begin{aligned} & 24 ; 7: 1,4,6,10,21 ; \\ & 10: 20 ; 11: 19-21 ; \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 30: 25 ; 57: 19 ; 67: 1 ; \\ & 81: 18 \end{aligned}$ | $28: 3 ; 30: 9,17 ; 83: 2$ |
| 88:12; 89:4, 6; 90:6; | Circuit's [2]-38:25; | 17:14; 18:11, 13, 17; | $\text { COLA [2] - 1:7, } 20$ | concessions [2] |
| $\begin{aligned} & 92: 2 ; 93: 15 \\ & \text { cases }[9]-16: 11 ; \end{aligned}$ | 55:2 circumstances [1] - | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 19:22, 25; 20:3, 5, 7, } \\ & 9,20,22 ; 21: 11,14, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Cola }[4]-2: 2,11-12 \text {, } \\ & 15 \end{aligned}$ | conclude [6] - 10:16; 36.23. $71 \cdot 6 \cdot 72 \cdot 24$. |
| 20:15-17, 21; 21:16; | 63:16 | 16, 24; 22:5; 29:25; | colloquy $[1]$ - $52: 24$ | 36:23; 71:6; 72:24; 74:13 |
| 22:4, 7 <br> catch [1] - 64:21 causal [1] - 29:1 | cite [2] - 33:14; 46:23 <br> cited [1] - 16:19 <br> cites [1] - 32:18 | 35:1, 5; 37:17; 38:1, <br> 5, 13, 20; 39:2, 5, 9, <br> 12, 14, 16-17, 21, 23, | combined [1] - 76:6 comfortable [1]-3:7 coming [4] - 19:22; | conclusion [2] 66:21;71:11 conclusions [2] |


| ```4:23; 8:20 conclusory [2] - 81:12,14 concrete [1] - 81:14 conduct [2] - 82:17 conference [1] - 83:6 confess[1] - 15:17 conflate [1] - 53:21 conflicting [1] - 52:23 confused [1] - 16:22 confusing [1] - 32:25 confusion [5] - 25:16; 27:17; 35:10; 54:4,10 connection [1] - 78:8 conscience [1] - 50:5 conservative [1] - 7:10 conservatively [1] - 7:10 consider [2] - 55:6; 78:7 consideration [1] - 41:21 considering [1] - 8:2 consistency [2] - 34:3; 73:14 consistent [4] - 65:20; 73:16; 74:5 consistently [1] - 83:22 constant [1] - 67:2 constantly [2] - 13:19; 81:3 consternation [1] - 12:3 consultant [1] - 18:17 consulted [1] - 16:17 consulting [1] - 21:24 consume [1] - 32:9 consumed [1]-40:1 Consumer [4] - 5:8; 7:22; 31:3; 82:19 consumer [1] - 91:12 consumers [7] - 5:14; 29:21;36:13; 58:14;77:24; 89:2 consuming [1] - 9:11 consumption [1] - 53:3 contact [1] - 88:23 contained [1] - 9:24 contains [1] - 24:19 contend [1]-88:8 context [2] - 33:17, 24``` | ```continue [1] - 30:25 continued [1] - 58:15 contractual [1] - 25:18 contrary [3] - 66:2; 67:13; 82:1 contributes [1] - 14:4 control [2] - 9:10; 76:25 controlled [2] - 13:19; 14:2 conversation [3] - 23:20, 23; 30:4 copied [1] - 60:17 copy [1] - 89:8 correct [5]-1:23; 34:17; 37:1; 67:21; 75:24 Correct [1] - 34:21 correctly [3] - 23:18; 52:12; 60:15 cost [1] - 59:12 Counsel [1] - 83:6 counsel [9]-16:17; 17:12; 21:24; 42:4; 46:3; 75:20; 85:23; 93:7, 20 count [3] - 4:1;37:2; 65:23 country [3]-20:17; 50:7; 89:18 couple [3] - 4:12; 51:20; 76:24 coupon [1]-5:23 course [3]-11:18; 15:8; 40:1 court [4] - 7:7; 53:23; 54:23; 62:16 COURT[225] - 1:1; 2:1, 9, 16, 19; 3:7, 19, 22; 4:1, 12, 14, 25; 5:18; 6:20; 7:13; 8:11, 15, 22; 9:9, 13, 15; 10:7; 11:5, 13, 17; 12:8, 12; 13:2, 6, 8, 10; 14:7; 15:1, 15, 22, 24; 16:8, 22; 17:10, 21; 18:10, 20, 24; 19:5, 20; 20:11; 21:25; 22:2, 10, 17, 22, 24; 23:17; 25:2, 10, 15; 26:2, 5, 22; 27:1, 3, 7, 21, 24; 28:6; 29:5; 30:3, 17; 31:11; 32:5, 16, 24; 33:10; 34:16, 18, 22; 35:9; 36:4, 16; 39:4, 14; 40:22; 41:20; 42:3, 21, 24; 43:14,``` | 21, 23; 44:1, 3, 6, 10, <br> 17, 25; 45:2, 8, 10, <br> 13, 19, 23; 46:3; <br> 48:10, 17, 24; 49:2, 8 , <br> 11, 17, 19; 50:3, 9 , <br> 17; 51:16; 52:7, 11, <br> 14, 17, 24; 53:5, 9 ; <br> 54:2, 19, 22; 55:8, 15; <br> 56:1, 6, 11, 15, 19, <br> 25; 57:2, 10, 16; 58:6, <br> 19, 22; 59:21; 60:8, <br> 11, 22, 24; 61:3, 14, <br> 19, 22, 25; 62:8; 63:1, <br> 9, 20, 25; 64:6, 12, <br> 14, 20; 65:2; 66:5, 11, <br> 16; 67:5, 8, 16; 68:4, <br> 23; 69:7; 70:21; 71:5, <br> 18, 21; 72:18; 73:4; <br> 74:9, 21; 75:20, 25; <br> 76:15, 18; 77:2, 4, 16, <br> 22; 78:1, 5, 22; 79:6, <br> 17; 81:4, 11; 82:2, 7, <br> 23; 83:2, 6, 12, 15; <br> 84:8, 10; 85:15, 20, <br> 22; 86:3, 8, 11, 16; <br> 87:9, 19; 88:2; 89:4, <br> 23; 90:2, 17; 91:5, 15, <br> 19; 92:5, 11, 19, 22; <br> 93:1, 3, 12, 16, 18 <br> Court [61] - 3:23; 5:4, <br> 6, 9; 6:6, 15; 7:1, 16; <br> 10:24; 11:3; 15:4; <br> 16:18; 17:23; 18:6, <br> 15, 23; 22:19; 25:7; <br> 29:14; 33:14, 19-20, <br> 24; 34:9; 37:24; <br> 38:14; 43:6; 44:9, 14, <br> 22; 45:17, 22; 48:22; <br> 51:6; 54:18; 55:6; <br> 56:10; 57:13; 59:2, 5, <br> 13, 17, 20; 60:6; <br> 61:11; 63:24; 64:5; <br> 67:22; 68:3, 22; 69:3, <br> 6; 81:9; 85:21; 86:6, <br> 10 <br> Court's [8]-10:25; <br> 15:6; 34:7; 44:21; <br> 50:15; 52:3; 55:7; <br> 88:4 <br> Courthouse [1] - 1:9 <br> courtroom [3] - 62:9; <br> 88:25; 93:19 <br> courts [4]-5:9, 17; <br> 22:13, 15 <br> cover [2] - 22:20; <br> 47:4 <br> covered [1]-4:9 <br> create [2]-21:21; <br> 67:13 <br> created [1] - 68:13 | ```critical [1] - 25:13 criticize [1]-21:8 criticized [1] - 77:21 criticizing [1] - 81:20 CRR[[]] - 1:24 Crunch [2] - 73:23 CSR[1] - 1:24 Cuker [5] - 1:14; 2:6; 71:6; 82:7 cup [2]-65:17 cure [4]-50:24; 57:13; 89:9; 92:10 cures [1] - 92:9 curing [1] - 91:14 daily [1] - 65:17 damages [13]-6:17; 11:19; 20:9, 18, 21; 21:11, 14-15; 22:4, 9; 25:6; 43:12 dangerous [3] - 33:23; 34:10 date [2]-27:1; 43:5 days [4]-62:19; 68:17; 80:3; 91:25 dead [2]-12:22; 18:7 deadline [1] - 68:18 deal [9]-53:15; 54:23; 55:1; 58:11; 81:12; 92:5; 93:5 dealing [4]-35:11; 41:5, 8; 55:4 deals [1]-24:4 dealt [1] - 30:4 deceive [1]-90:1 deceived [2] - 82:20; 90:23 December [1] - 23:21 deception [5] - 81:1; 82:19; 83:18; 89:9; 91:14 deceptive [5] - 45:6; 61:8; 82:22; 84:5; 91:10 decide [3] - 36:19; 81:16; 84:23 decided [1] - 11:3 decision [4]-21:24; 38:25; 42:1, 11 decisions [1]-16:12 defendant [1] - 2:10 defendant's [1] - 49:2 defendants [4] - 2:17; 27:24;36:20;``` | ```48:3 Defendants [1] - 1:8 defending [3] - 48:4; 54:6, } defenses [5] - 3:16; 38:3, 5, 23; 39:2 define[4]-5:18; 6:9, 13;41:1 defined [11] - 5:19, 24;7:10; 19:25; 20:4; 39:14, 16, 21-22; 62:24 defining[3]-6:16; 39:25 definitely [1] - 12:25 definition[1] - 6:10 degree [1] - 64:7 demonstrated [1] - 73:11 denial [1] - 42:14 denied [3] - 3:2, 4; 84:4 deny [2] - 7:1 deposition [20] - 3:3; 8:7; 9:8; 11:25; 12:17; 19:2; 64:24; 65:13, 15; 68:2, 10; 69:13; 70:3, 16, 19; 73:4, 16; 75:4; 78:10; 84:15 DEPUTY [4]-46:1; 49:25; 83:13; 93:22 describes [1] - 72:8 description [1] - 65:16 desire [1]-21:11 detail [1]-59:9 detailed [2]-61:5,9 details [2] - 16:13; 21:18 determine [1] - 48:15 develop [2] - 20:5; 22:8 developing [1] - 8:1 diet [17] - 13:20; 14:2; 65:17, 24-25; 66:9; 70:16, 24-25; 71:2; 73:12; 74:4, 11; 77:11; 80:19; 87:5 dietary [2] - 66:3; 69:10 differed [1] - 11:2 difference [2] - 18:3, 8 different [18]-4:16; 16:3; 22:6; 23:9; 28:11; 39:18; 42:19, 25;43:1; 53:25; 58:17; 74:6; 79:20; 82:18; 87:8; 92:15, 19 Different[1] - 92:17``` |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |


| differently ${ }_{[1]}$ - 37:8 | 17:25; 18:2, 16 | Either [1]-15:11 | [1] - 93:10 | - 85:15 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| difficult [3]-35:12; | 19:19; 47:12-14; | either [5]-15:12; | entire [4]-19:3 | 1]-21 |
| $\begin{aligned} & 41: 9 ; 43: 9 \\ & \text { difficulties [2] - 21:9, } \end{aligned}$ | $72: 19 ; 78: 21 ; 79: 7$ $83: 21$ | $\begin{aligned} & 37: 15 ; 47: 6 ; 56: 12 \text {; } \\ & 57: 17 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 77:12; 78:16 } \\ & \text { entirely [2] - 39:23; } \end{aligned}$ | exercise [1] - 87:6 exercising [2] - |
| $13$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { doubt [2] - 21:7 } \\ & 43: 22 \end{aligned}$ | either/or [1] - 44:15 elaborate [2]-21:25; |  | 66:1 |
| di | 2:21 |  | ed [1] - 11 | 52 |
| ${ }_{\text {direction [2] - 30:1 }}^{50 \cdot 15}$ | 49:11; 60: | 2. | [2] - 26:23, | ing $[1]-87: 2$ |
| sagree [3] - | r [4]-7:17, 24; | 17:23; 21:7; 22 | ga [53] | [1] - 13:20 |
| 31:8; 68:1 disagreemen | $\begin{gathered} \text { 40:17 } \\ \text { draft } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 24 ; 25: 25 ; 26: 8 ; \\ & 32: 24 ; 53: 17 ; 56: 1,5 ; \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 17,19 ; 5: 21 ; 6: 11 \\ & 9: 25 ; 10: 1 ; 11: 8 ; \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { expectation [2] - } \\ & 80: 4 \end{aligned}$ |
| 69:5 <br> discover [1] - 84:20 discovery [20] - | drank [5] - 9:25; 20:2; 32:19; $74: 2$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 63:1; 64:9; 65:15; } \\ & \text { 67:18; 69:14; 70:3, } \end{aligned}$ | $12: 14 ; 14: 25 ; 15: 9$ 24:14:28:13; 29:16 | expectations [1] - |
|  | 20:2; 32:19; 74:21; <br> 78:11 <br> draw [1] - 36:10 <br> drawing [3]-4:23; | 67:18; 69:14; 70:3, <br> 10; 71:19; 84:10; <br> 85:18; 86:17; 89:19; | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 24:14; 28:13; 29:16, } \\ & \text { 20, 23; 31:25; 32:19; } \end{aligned}$ | expected $[1]-70: 8$ |
| 17:18; 40:10; 57:21; |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 34: 15 ; 35: 16,19 ; \\ & 36: 9 ; 40: 1,3,15,18 ; \end{aligned}$ | xpecting [1] - 72:16 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 76:20; 77:16; 78:3, 6, } \\ & \text { 12; 79:4; 82:10; } \end{aligned}$ | drawing [3] - 4:23; | 85:18; 86:17; 89:19; 93:9 | $\begin{aligned} & 36: 9 ; 40: 1,3,15,18 ; \\ & 43: 11 ; 46: 25 ; 47: 2, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { experience }[2] \text { - } \\ & 34: 5,8 \end{aligned}$ |
| 83:18, 22-23; 84:3; | drink $[5]$ - 11:8; | $\begin{gathered} \text { ELDER }[67]-2: 11,^{18 ; 3: 6,9 ; 23: 11 ;} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 43: 11 ; 46: 25 ; 47: 2, \\ & 11 ; 58: 3,5 ; 62: 19 ; \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline 34: 5,8 \\ \text { expert }[7]-18: 18 ; \end{array}$ |
| 85:2, 9-10, 12; 88:12 | 12:24; 14:3; 32:9 59:11 | $\begin{aligned} & 4,19,22 ; 28: 2,18 ; \\ & 29: 6 ; 30: 10,19 ; 32: 3 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 63: 15 ; 67: 2,15 ; \\ & 69: 12,16-17 ; 70: 4,9 \end{aligned}$ |  |
| discuss [2]-43:2, 6 discussed [5] - | drinking [14] - 12:14 13:3; 14:12; 31:25; |  | 69:12, 16-17; 70:4, 9, $12,17 ; 71: 8,14 ;$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { experts [2]-4:22; } \\ & 40: 11 \end{aligned}$ |
| 23:16; 27:10; 31:7; | $32: 6 ; 58: 2,4 ; 62: 20$ 69:16; 70:4; 71:8; | $\begin{aligned} & 12,17 ; 33: 8,11 ; \\ & 34: 17,21,23 ; 36: 2,5, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 89:15; } 91: 2 \\ & \text { environment }[2] \text { - } \end{aligned}$ | ```40:11 explains [2]-27:24;``` |
|  | 79:25 | $42: 2,12,23,25 ;$ <br> 43:18, 22, 24; 44:2; | 13:18; 92:3 equally [1] - 75:3 | $\begin{aligned} & 54: 10 \\ & \text { explanation }[1] \text { - } \end{aligned}$ |
|  | drop [2] - 80:11 <br> drops [2] - 80:9, 13 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 43:18, 22, 24; 44:2; } \\ & 45: 22 ; 53: 18 ; 56: 2, \end{aligned}$ | equally [1] - 75:3 <br> equate [1] - 55:17 | $\begin{aligned} & 91: 13 \\ & \quad \text { explicate }[1]-17: 1 \end{aligned}$ |
| 62:7; 70:11, 24 | drug [2]-20:1 | $\begin{aligned} & 23 ; 57: 1,5,11,25 ; \\ & 58: 10,21 ; 62: 3,9 ; \\ & 63: 6,10 ; 64: 17 ; 73: 7 \end{aligned}$ | 43:7 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { explicitly [2]-29:11; } \\ & 47: 17 \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline 73: 12 \\ \text { dismissal }[1]-57: 6 \\ \text { dismissed }[3]- \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 79:10 } \\ & \text { due }{ }_{[1]}-68: 18 \\ & \text { during }[4]-65: 20 ; \\ & 69: 15 ; 71: 2 ; 79: 15 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 63:6, 10; 64:17; 73:7; } \\ & 74: 10,23 ; 75: 23 ; \\ & 76: 1,16 ; 84: 11 ; \\ & 85: 19,21 ; 86: 18 ; \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { erectile }[1]-16: 5 \\ & \text { erring }_{[1]}-7: 23 \\ & \text { error }[1]-59: 19 \\ & \text { escapes }[1]-30: 6 \end{aligned}$ | ```47:17 express [2] - 41:6; 52:21 extremely [1] - 79:12``` |
| $\begin{array}{\|r\|} \hline 24: 11,16 ; 33: 20 \\ \text { dismissing [1] - } \end{array}$ | During [1] - 69:15 | 87:10, 21; 88:3 <br> Elder's [3]-12:5, 17; | Esquire [8] - |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & 33: 19 \\ & \text { dispute }[5]-11: 6 ; \\ & \text { 13:14; 72:18; 79:23 } \\ & \text { distinction }[3]-26: 7 ; \end{aligned}$ | 16:5 <br> déjà [1] - 46:5 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 89:19 } \\ & \text { elected }[1]-21: 15 \\ & \text { element }[3]-5: 25 ; \end{aligned}$ 40:5; 83:18 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 1:14-16, 18-19, } 21 \\ & \text { essentially [4]- } \\ & 11: 4 ; 15: 10 ; 67: 24 ; \\ & 68: 9 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \mathbf{F}^{\mathbf{F}} \mathbf{3 d}[1]-39: 1 \\ & \text { face }[1]-7: 6 \end{aligned}$ |
| $36: 11 ; 45: 9$ <br> distinguishable [1] - | E | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 40:5; 83:18 } \\ & \text { elements [1] - 40:20 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { establish [3] - 5:10; } \\ & 7: 3 ; 31: 4 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { faced }[1]-78: 4 \\ & \text { fact }[27]-3: 15 ; 6: 25 ; \end{aligned}$ |
| $10: 3$ distributio | $\begin{aligned} & \text { early }[1]-88: 11 \\ & \text { eat }[8]-71: 20 ; 73: 17 \text {, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 87: 17 \\ & \text { eluded }[1]-86: 18 \end{aligned}$ |  | 29:15, 20; 31:8; 34:7; |
| 89:18 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { eat }[8]-71: 20 ; 73: 17, \\ & 25 ; 74: 1 ; 80: 22 \end{aligned}$ |  | et [1]-1:7 <br> etcetera [2] - 72:22 | $\begin{aligned} & 35: 18 ; 36: 14 ; 38: 11 ; \\ & 42: 11,14-15 ; 45: 15 ; \end{aligned}$ |
| District [1] - 21:17 district [1] - 68:4 DISTRICT [3]-1:1, | $\begin{array}{r} \text { eating }[7]-10: 15 \\ 65: 20 ; 66: 19 ; 71: 2 \end{array}$ | 19:10 employment [1] | etcetera [2] - 72:22 evidence [26] - | 51:14; 65:2, 4; 66:14; <br> 67:14; 71:8; 79:23, |
| 12 <br> doc [1] - 79:11 <br> Docket ${ }_{[1]}$ - 76:12 <br> docket [2] - 26:23, | ```73:24 effect [10] - 6:18; 12:14; 13:1, 17; 15:13; 29:17; 63:17; 80:1; 87:9``` | ```20:19 end [12] - 10:3; 17:7, 11, 14; 35:18; 46:4; 65:24; 66:15; 67:2; 72.9, 13.76.14``` | $\begin{array}{\|l} 36: 21 ; 37: 10,19 ; \\ 40: 13 ; 65: 1,8 ; 66: 1, \\ 17 ; 67: 12 ; 72: 10 ; \\ 77: 11 ; 78: 14 ; 81: 8 ; \end{array}$ | $\begin{gathered} 25 ; 81: 8,19 ; 89: 15 \\ \text { factor }[1]-41: 21 \\ \text { facts }[12]-18: 9 ; \\ 22: 8 ; 37: 20,22 ; 61: 5 ; \end{gathered}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & 25 \\ & \text { doctor }[1]-7: 23 \\ & \text { doctrine }[7]-38: 4 ; \end{aligned}$ | effective [1] - 79:12 <br> effects [2] - 14:20, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 72:9, 13; 76:14 } \\ & \text { ended }[1]-93: 23 \\ & \text { enforce }[1]-68: 24 \\ & \text { engaged }[1]-82: 17 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 83:20; 90:13; 91:24; } \\ & 92: 2 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 79: 23 ; 81: 13,15 \\ & \text { factual }[2]-59: 8 ; \end{aligned}$ |
| $41: 23 ; 42: 7 ; 45: 4 ;$ $49: 15 ; 51: 2$ | $25$ | English $[1]-1: 18$ enhancing [1]-28:9 | Exactly [1] - 36:25 exactly [2] - 55:12; | $\begin{aligned} & 75: 15 \\ & \text { fail [2] - 3:9; 48:8 } \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 49:15; 51:2 } \\ & \text { document }[1]-85: 17 \\ & \text { documents }[3]- \\ & 76: 23 ; 84: 23,25 \\ & \text { done }[12]-8: 9 ; \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { effort [2] - 31:5; 59:7 } \\ & \text { efforts }[1]-8: 19 \\ & \text { eight }[3]-12: 11 \text {; } \\ & 82: 16 \end{aligned}$ | enhancing [1] - 28:9 enjoin [2] - 90:5, 7 enjoined [2]-42:9; | $\begin{aligned} & 90: 23 \\ & \text { example }[4]-24: 1 ; \\ & 31: 13,18 ; 72: 21 \\ & \text { Except }[1]-87: 19 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { failed }[9]-24: 12 ; \\ & 30: 1 ; 48: 6,11 ; 57: 8 \\ & 15 ; 59: 3 ; 63: 14 ; 68: 17 \\ & \text { failure }[4]-3: 2 ; 17: 1 ; \end{aligned}$ |




|  | $\qquad$ <br> 58:2; 50,4 <br> 62:20; 65:21; 69:17, <br> 25; 74:16; 75:9, 15; <br> 77:14; 79:8; 80:3, 5; <br> 84:14 <br> loses [1] - 86:12 <br> losing [3] - 55:24; <br> 69:20; 77:11 <br> loss [109]-5:11, 21; <br> 6:12; 7:15; 8:25; 9:20, <br> 22, 24; 10:12; 11:1, <br> 16; 12:6; 13:1, 24; <br> 14:15; 15:5; 23:8, 23; <br> 24:4, 6, 18, 20; 25:7, <br> 19; 26:13, 15; 27:11, <br> 17; 28:21, 25; 29:2; <br> 31:4; 33:2; 35:12, 17, <br> 21; 36:1, 10, 14-15, <br> 22; 37:5, 15; 39:11, <br> 15; 40:17; 44:14; <br> 45:18; 46:10, 12, 22; <br> 47:9, 22; 50:18, 21; <br> 51:5, 14, 21; 52:3, 20, <br> 25; 53:5, 21-22, 24; <br> 54:5, 12, 25; 55:6, <br> 16-17, 20; 58:24; <br> 62:1, 21; 63:11-13; <br> 64:7, 22; 65:1, 9; <br> 67:15; 70:9, 18; 71:9; <br> 72:11, 20, 25; 73:9; <br> 74:18; 76:22; 80:2; <br> 81:2; 82:15; 83:4, 19; <br> 84:2, 6; 85:24; 87:3, <br> 5; 89:11 <br> lost [7] - 15:7; 26:18; <br> 34:6; 72:4, 25; 75:3; <br> 80:2 <br> love [1] - 22:11 <br> lumping [1] - 36:25 <br> lunch [3]-64:15; <br> 65:18; 73:17 <br> lying [1] - 80:17 <br> Lynch [1] - 38:25 <br> M <br> ma'am [6] - 4:13; <br> 8:13; 12:13; 22:1, 23; <br> 26:3 <br> Macs [2] - 70:13, 15 <br> magic [1]-70:11 <br> Magistrate [1] - 85:3 <br> main [1]-5:10 <br> maintained [3] - <br> 66:9; 67:1; 70:17 <br> maintaining [1] - <br> 72:12 <br> maintenance [1] - | ```65:14 majority [1] - 29:18 Malfi [1] - 52:11 manage [1] - 21:3 mandatory [1] - 90:11 March [11] - 26:10; 27:2; 45:20; 46:4, 6; 47:21; 51:18; 55:15; 63:9;68:19 MARCH [1] - 1:11 MARIE [1] - 1:12 Mark [2]-1:14; 2:6 market [2] - 8:2,17 marketing [5] - 4:24; 8:9, 18; 12:21; 43:16 marketplace [1] - 89:17 mass [2] - 54:4; 91:2 material [2] - 37:20; 76:11 Matoff [1] - 19:13 matter [14]-2:2; 28:14; 32:19, 21; 34:6; 39:10; 69:3; 77:2-4; 78:14; 87:23; 88:17; 93:6 matters [2] - 10:4; 35:14 McCarter [1] - 1:18 mean [33] - 6:21; 8:12; 13:6; 14:15; 19:5; 27:11; 29:7; 39:12; 45:12, 16; 46:22; 47:2; 54:2, 22, 24; 55:1, 8; 65:6; 66:10; 67:6; 68:25; 69:9; 70:2; 71:21; 72:19, 22; 74:3; 80:11; 89:11; 93:8 means [2]-21:2; 77:14 meant [2]-8:14; 83:3 measure [4] - 76:22; 77:4; 78:24; 82:11 measured [1] - 78:13 mechanism [1] - 80:13 meet [4] - 4:10; 17:14; 28:21;37:12 meets [1] - 35:13 Melfi [3]-24:17; 26:18; 60:14 Melphy [1] - 24:23 member [3] - 39:5, 17 members [10] - 5:13; 6:18; 7:21; 11:20; 20:20; 39:9; 41:24;``` | ```42:10; 57:8; 58:8 memory [1] - 23:18 mention [1] - 88:23 merely [2] - 10:25; 16:15 merit [1] - 3:10 merits [6] - 4:25; 76:24; 77:24; 78:4; 80:9; 83:23 Merrill [1] - 38:25 mesh [1] - 14:17 message [4] - 24:19; 40:17; 73:9 messaging [3] - 40:6; 41:16, 18 met [3] - 37:12; 40:19; 52:4 method [1] - 30:16 methods [1] - 22:7 Michael [1]-1:16 middle [1] - 87:2 might [7] - 38:9, 21; 41:12; 62:4; 79:23; 81:10; 92:2 Mike [2] - 2:6;74:7 milk [1] - 65:17 mind [5]-25:16; 38:2; 39:23; 90:11; 92:13 minority [1] - 20:15 minute [5] - 28:6; 45:19, 25; 83:9, 12 miraculous [1] - 80:13 mirror [1] - 78:15 misleading [8] - 9:19; 14:23; 50:13; 54:5; 57:4; 61:8, 15; 73:1 misled [1] - 14:25 misrepresentation [7]-20:13; 23:24; 29:1; 55:18;61:1, 7; 82:19 misrepresentative [1] - 82:22 misrepresented [1] - 14:20 missing [4] - 31:11; 57:21;58:23 misunderstood [2] - 48:12; 51:23 Mitchell [1]-1:9 mixed [2]-23:10, 13 modified [1] - 86:23 moment [2] - 10:19; 15:19 monetary [1] - 42:20 money [7] - 19:12; 28:11; 33:6; 43:12;``` | ```60:2; 63:5 monitor [1] - 13:25 monitored [1] - 13:19 monitoring [2] - 65:3; 77:7 month [2]-80:2, 23 months [1] - 87:23 moot [6]-88:16, 19; 89:20, 24; 92:10 mootness [3] - 43:3, 25; 88:7 moots [1] - 87:17 morning [5] - 2:1, 5, 9, 16;46:6 most [5] - 7:18; 14:22; 22:3; 38:2; 90:14 motion [44] - 2:20, 23; 3:20, 24; 7:1; 17:11, 16; 18:4, 10; 24:21, 23-24; 26:19; 29:25; 31:7; 32:14; 35:1, 23; 41:19; 44:7; 46:20; 51:22; 52:1; 53:25; 63:11; 76:4-6, 8, 20; 78:6, 8; 79:1; 81:12; 82:12; 83:24; 84:16; 85:6, 13, 24; 89:25 motions[1] - 17:13 move [10] - 4:11; 5:7; 7:2; 26:13, 16; 27:12; 37:17; 45:15; 83:10; 88:10 moved [7] - 29:10; 54:17; 63:12; 76:4, 6; 87:7; 88:14 moving [1] - 65:6 MR [232] - 2:5, 11-12, 14, 18; 3:6, 9, 21, 23; 4:4, 13, 21; 5:2; 6:2, 25; 7:14; 8:13, 16, 24; 9:12, 14; 10:6, 21; 11:12, 14; 12:4, 10, 13; 13:5, 7, 9, 11; 14:19; 15:3, 17, 21; 16:2, 9; 17:1, 20, 22; 18:14, 21; 19:1, 8; 20:10, 14; 22:1, 3, 11, 19, 23; 23:11; 24:10; 25:5, 14, 25; 26:3, 9, 24; 27:2, 4, 19, 22; 28:2, 18; 29:6; 30:10, 19; 32:3, 12, 17; 33:8, 11; 34:17, 21, 23; 36:2, 5, 25; 39:7, 20; 41:3; 42:2, 12, 23, 25; 43:18, 22, 24; 44:2, 4, 7, 11, 20; 45:1, 3, 9,``` |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |




| ```reasonable [13] - 10:16; 24:3; 29:16; 35:15; 36:22; 37:11; 59:11; 65:4, 7-8, 10; 80:5 reasons[7] - 3:14; 4:16, 19; 13:9; 21:18; 39:18; 40:18 recalling[1] - 52:12 receive [1] - 72:16 received [3] - 30:11; 63:10; 67:14 recent [1] - 7:18 recess[1]-83:14 recess) [1]-46:2 recognized [1] - 39:1 recon [1] - 59:15 record [7] - 40:2, 14; 41:13; 64:1, 23; 66:3; 70:8 reduced [2] - 80:6; 87:5 refer [1] - 38:24 referring [3]-64:2; 70:22; 76:11 reflect [1] - 64:1 refused [2] - 76:23; 88:13 regarding [2] - 40:15; 90:8 regardless [1] - 82:20 regimen [2]-65:15; 72:20 regiment [1] - 65:9 regular [1] - 87:6 regulated [1] - 70:15 reinvent [1] - 80:21 reiterated [1] - 64:4 related [2] - 3:17; 35:14 relating [2]-82:15; 85:10 relationship [1] - 36:8 relevant [6] - 35:25; 69:13; 78:15; 79:1; 83:20; 84:4 relief [15] - 5:15; 6:23; 7:8, 11; 42:6, 17, 19-20, 22; 43:7; 76:4; 87:15; 88:6 relies [1] - 81:21 rely [2] - 16:23, 25 relying [1] - 81:22 remains [2] - 29:24; 46:21 remember [8] - 15:21, 24; 30:6; 53:13; 60:13; 75:8;``` | $\begin{aligned} & 83: 5 ; 87: 5 \\ & \text { remind }[1]-75: 20 \\ & \text { reminded }[1]-27: 9 \\ & \text { render }[1]-38: 1 \\ & \text { RENEÉ }[1]-1: 12 \\ & \text { repeatedly }[2]-5: 10 ; \\ & 90: 12 \\ & \text { replace }[1]-87: 25 \\ & \text { reply }[5]-7: 20 ; \\ & 68: 18 ; 76: 2,7 \\ & \text { Reporter }[1]-1: 25 \\ & \text { represent }[1]-90: 12 \\ & \text { representation }[16] \text { - } \\ & 11: 19 ; 12: 20,23 ; \\ & 13: 24 ; 14: 2,4 ; 32: 6 ; \\ & 33: 4 ; 36: 23 ; 38: 17 ; \\ & 50: 22 ; 53: 10 ; 54: 5 ; \\ & 57: 23 ; 63: 2 ; 84: 5 \\ & \text { representations }[8]- \\ & 17: 8 ; 19: 16 ; 46: 14 ; \\ & 50: 12 ; 52: 21 ; 53: 2 ; \\ & 59: 24 ; 90: 8 \\ & \text { representative }[13]- \\ & 2: 24 ; 3: 1,14 ; 10: 20 ; \\ & 11: 21 ; 17: 15 ; 18: 11, \\ & 13 ; 19: 22 ; 38: 2,13 ; \\ & 41: 17 ; 92: 23 \\ & \text { representing }[1]- \\ & 13: 22 \\ & \text { require }[1]-69: 1 \\ & \text { Required }[1]-1: 23 \\ & \text { required }[1]-84: 24 \\ & \text { requirements }[1]- \\ & 7: 9 \\ & \text { requires }[1]-87: 5 \\ & \text { res }[2]-41: 23 ; 42: 7 \\ & \text { resolve }[4]-18: 5 ; \\ & 45: 24 ; 89: 13 \\ & \text { resolving }[1]-21: 2 \\ & \text { respect }[5]-11: 2 ; \\ & 47: 22 ; 51: 7,21 ; 78: 9 \\ & \text { respond }[7]-30: 1 ; \\ & 44: 4 ; 73: 6 ; 76: 3 ; 78: 6 ; \\ & 84: 10 \\ & \text { responded }[6]- \\ & 33: 22,25 ; 37: 21 ; \\ & 64: 10 ; 68: 12 ; 76: 8 \\ & \text { response }[14]-9: 4 ; \\ & 12: 5,17 ; 26: 1 ; 29: 10 ; \\ & 34: 14 ; 37: 6 ; 53: 23 ; \\ & 56: 4 ; 62: 23 ; 67: 23 ; \\ & 79: 19 ; 84: 12 ; 85: 7 \\ & \text { restitution }[1]-6: 6 \\ & \text { restrictive }[1]-6: 13 \\ & \text { result }[5]-10: 18 ; \\ & 43: 4 ; 46: 13 ; 58: 4 ; \\ & 86: 21 \\ & \text { resulted }[1]-80: 6 \\ & \text { results }[2]-31: 17 ; \\ & 32: 7 \end{aligned}$ | ```retail [2]-21:13; 22:9 return [1] - 33:13 reviewed [4]-8:11, 13; 23:21; 57:19 reviewing [2] - 23:24;54:3 rewrite [1] - 90:10 rise [3] - 46:1; 83:13; 93:22 risk [4] - 38:6, 8; 43:8; 87:16 role [1] - 42:10 rolled [1] - 87:10 rolling[2]-8:1; 87:12 room [3] - 14:1; 48:14; 92:3 routine [1] - 71:7 Rule [7] - 4:7; 22:13; 39:24; 40:6, 20; 67:21;76:5 rule [3]-68:23; 77:13 ruled [1] - 5:5 rules [2] - 18:6; 68:25 ruling [6] - 10:25; 11:15; 15:16; 16:18; 35:22; 45:20 rulings [1] - 84:24 run [1]-6:15 runs [1] - 42:17 sauce [2] - 81:17; 82:1 saw [1]-59:23 scale [1] - 78:14 scattered [1] - 20:16 schedule [2] - 40:8 Schneider [5] - 84:24; 85:8, 11, 14; 88:14 Schneider's [1] - 85:11 SCIENCE [1] - 1:3 science [6] - 31:6; 47:3, 10; 58:13; 80:10 Science [1]-1:15 scintilla [1] - 37:9 Scott [2] - 1:19; 2:11 seated [1]-2:1 Sec [1]-1:23 second [20]-10:10; 11:22; 15:10, 22;``` | ```23:11; 27:15; 32:4; 49:12, 21, 24; 52:7, 18; 53:9; 55:12; 59:24;60:3; 61:21; 64:3; 76:7 secondly [2] - 13:17; 23:7 section [1] - 68:9 See [5] - 9:15; 17:10; 53:9; 55:15; 71:5 see [32] - 10:2; 13:21; 23:19; 25:2, 10, 12, 18, 20; 26:6; 30:7; 31:16; 42:24; 46:18; 47:6; 48:1, 20; 53:5, 15, 18; 55:11; 56:6; 60:3; 63:7, 18; 64:20; 70:21; 71:24; 72:6; 89:2; 90:18 seeing [3] - 35:13; 53:13; 78:8 seek [12] - 7:3; 11:14; 18:15; 21:6; 30:1; 42:19; 43:7; 56:9; 90:5, 7, 16 seeking [15] - 6:7, 17, 23; 7:11; 11:19; 18:1; 20:9; 42:6, 22; 76:5; 82:13; 87:14; 88:5 seem [4] - 9:23; 23:9; 25:17; 27:16 sense [3]-4:15; 27:7 sent [1] - 55:3 sentence [3]-61:21; 62:1; 85:7 separate [8] - 24:7; 42:13, 15; 53:16, 18; 67:18; 70:10; 76:13 September [4] - 87:12, 24; 89:15; 92:16 serious [1] - 72:19 served [1] - 88:12 serving [1] - 23:18 set [5] - 14:18; 40:8; 68:11;70:16; 81:19 setting [1] - 85:1 settlement [3] - 88:18, 22, 24 settlements [1] - 43:4 seven [1] - 70:23 several [3] - 4:16; 70:25; 79:9 sex [1]-28:9 Shani [2]-1:19; 2:15 sharing [1]-2:8 shelves [3]-87:20, 22; 89:16``` | ```shift [1] - 31:5 shifted [2]-25:6; 67:6 shifting [1] - 23:15 Shineland's [1] - 21:16 short[1] - 80:11 Short [7] - 15:20, 23; 22:18; 46:2; 52:19; 71:4; 83:14 short-term [1] - 80:11 shot [1] - 9:6 show [20] - 4:6; 5:15; 13:11, 14; 15:4; 18:9; 28:15, 21; 32:8, 22; 43:9; 48:18; 49:21; 58:13; 65:14; 89:8, 25;90:19 Show [1] - 48:10 showed [4] - 58:9; 90:24; 91:16, }2 showing [3] - 28:22; 31:2; 40:4 shown[1]-84:19 shows [5]-64:23; 66:24; 78:14; 79:13 side [5] - 7:24; 30:6; 38:23; 87:1; 88:18 sides [1] - 11:15 significance [1] - 75:15 significant [4] - 29:21;46:24; 58:14; 61:10 similar [2] - 32:10, 12 similarly [2] - 5:20; 60:1 Simmens [5] - 24:17, 23; 26:19; 52:11; 60:15 simply [8] - 30:7; 31:9; 34:15; 37:4; 41:15; 68:21;69:3 sit [1] - 93:8 sitting [1] - 60:5 situated [2] - 5:20; 60:1 situation [2] - 19:13; 20:19 six [2]-70:13, 15 skipping [1] - 29:17 skirt [1] - 4:6 small [6] - 21:13, 22; 52:22; 80:8, 13; 91:23 smaller [2] - 67:3; 77:15 snack [1] - 73:24 snuck [4] - 56:11,``` |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |


| ```13;61:25 so-called [2] - 26:12, 15 so... [1]-93:15 solicitation [1] - 4:5 solution[1]-87:4 someone [10] - 4:15-18; 5:20, 22-23; 19:25; 30:6; 80:18 Sometimes [4] - 52:14; 73:22; 74:10 sometimes [7] - 5:7; 73:25; 74:1, 9, 11; 79:12 somewhat [1] - 74:4 somewhere [1] - 78:23 sorry [16] - 22:1; 26:21, 24; 32:24; 36:25; 42:2; 46:3; 48:9; 49:1, 23; 56:3; 60:10; 75:25; 77:22; 82:8; 85:22 sort [5] - 10:10; 25:18, 20; 27:22; 66:17 sought [3] - 9:20; 83:22; 84:4 sound [1] - 23:4 sounds [3] - 23:3; 25:22; 33:1 source [2]-27:17; 35:9 sources [1] - 40:14 Southern [1] - 21:17 soy [1] - 65:17 speaking[3] - 71:25; 72:1, 23 speaks [1] - 71:15 specific [2] - 71:22; 84:1 specifically [3] - 46:10; 50:10; 51:17 specificity [3]- 59:18, 21; 81:6 specifics [1] - 72:1 speculate [2] - 71:12; 78:3 speculating [3] - 66:8, 10; 71:12 speculation [7] - 66:6, 14, 22; 75:16; 77:25; 78:1;81:6 speculative [5] - 72:5, 8; 75:3; 81:14; 89:14 speed [1] - 55:11 speeding [1] - 77:9 spent [3] - 33:6; 54:2; 70:25``` |  | ```stores [1] - 87:25 straight [2]-14:18; 68:11 strict [1] - 59:5 striving [1] - 19:5 studied [1] - 18:18 studies [23]-7:24; 8:2, 9; 28:15; 29:3; 30:5; 32:1, 8; 46:15, 18; 48:18; 50:25; 52:22; 57:19; 58:9, 11-12, 22; 90:19, 24; 91:16,20 study [8] - 13:14; 90:25; 91:1, 21, 23 stuff [7] - 13:20; 19:3; 32:20; 79:5, 19, 25; 80:6 subject [2] - 8:8; 38:5 subjective [7] - 4:20; 5:25; 6:9, 15; 39:23; 40:25; 41:9 submit [2] - 62:6; 69:6 subsequent [1] - 35:23 subset [1] - 15:10 substance [1] - 68:15 substantial [1] - 39:9 substantiate [4] - 10:5; 14:21; 30:5; 32:2 substantiated [1] - 52:22 substantiation [14] - 10:22; 11:2; 13:12; 29:16; 45:4; 47:10; 49:15; 50:22; 51:2, 4, 9; 61:11, 15; 90:15 substantive [1] - 17:4 substitute [1] - 18:16 substitution [1] - 86:14 succeed [2] - 21:8; 63:15 succeeding [2] - 21:22; 89:17 successful [1] - 6:11 sufficient [3]-39:19; 63:5; 65:1 sufficiently [1] - 64:8 suggest [1] - 56:3 suggestion [1] - 15:6 suit [1]-79:11 sum [1] - 66:2 summary [43]-2:21, 23; 3:4, 12; 7:1;``` | $17: 11,17,23 ; 18: 1,4$, <br> 10,$12 ; 32: 14 ; 35: 1,3$, <br> $6 ; 37: 15,22,24 ; 38: 1$, <br> 7,$14 ; 42: 13 ; 44: 8 ;$ <br> $45: 16 ; 54: 13,17 ;$ <br> $55: 19 ; 63: 12 ; 64: 10$, <br> 23; 67:20; 68:18; <br> $70: 20 ; 76: 4 ; 78: 9 ;$ <br> $81: 12 ; 82: 13 ; 83: 24 ;$ <br> $85: 10,13,24$ <br> superior $[2]-21: 2 ;$ <br> 22:6 <br> supplement $[1]-$ <br> 55:14 <br> supplemental $[1]-$ <br> $67: 22$ <br> support $[12]-22: 12 ;$ <br> $24: 3 ; 29: 25 ; 41: 18 ;$ <br> $47: 3 ; 59: 11 ; 72: 11 ;$ <br> $75: 17$ <br> supported $[1]-$ <br> $79: 22$ <br> supposed $[1]-56: 24$ <br> Supreme $[1]-5: 9$ <br> sur $[1]-7: 20$ <br> surface $[1]-92: 8$ <br> surprise $[2]-56: 21 ;$ <br> $59: 6$ <br> surprised $[1]-46: 18$ <br> survive $[1]-70: 20$ <br> survives $[4]-11: 7 ;$ <br> $54: 12 ; 55: 20 ; 71: 10$ <br> suspect $[1]-77: 17$ <br> sustained $[1]-35: 21$ <br> switch $[1]-51: 11$talks [2]-65:17;72:12tea [1]-5:22tee [1] - 84:17teed [1]-11:15tees [1]-84:17ten [5]-26:6; 45:19,25; 50:7; 69:15ten-minute [2] -45:19, 25tends [1]-21:1tenet [1]-91:12term [1]-80:11terms [6]-18:24;19:1; 71:25; 72:1terrible [1] - 52:15test [10]-6:5, 10;16:9, 14-15; 41:9; | ```48:15; 52:4; 80:18; 89:8 tested [3] - 8:5, 17; 92:1 testified [2] - 66:11; 74:24 testify [2] - 12:16; 65:12 testimony [19] - 3:3; 4:23; 8:23; 9:8; 11:25; 12:11; 18:24; 36:16, 19; 38:22; 40:13; 66:7; 73:11;74:4; 75:2, 15; 79:13; 80:16; 81:19 testing [3] - 4:22, 24; 83:21 tests [2] - 8:5,16 THE [232]-1:1, 3, 7, 12; 2:1, 9, 16, 19; 3:7, 19, 22; 4:1, 12, 14, 25; 5:18; 6:20; 7:13; 8:11, 15, 22; 9:9, 13, 15; 10:7; 11:5, 13, 17; 12:8, 12; 13:2, 6, 8, 10; 14:7; 15:1, 15, 22, 24; 16:8, 22; 17:10, 21; 18:10, 20, 24; 19:5, 20; 20:11; 21:25; 22:2, 10, 17, 22, 24; 23:17; 25:2, 10, 15; 26:2, 5, 22; 27:1, 3, 7, 21, 24; 28:6; 29:5; 30:3, 17; 31:11; 32:5, 16, 24; 33:10; 34:16, 18, 22; 35:9; 36:4, 16; 39:4, 14; 40:22; 41:20; 42:3, 21, 24; 43:14, 21, 23; 44:1, 3, 6, 10, 17, 25; 45:2, 8, 10, 13, 19, 23; 46:1, 3; 48:10, 17, 24; 49:2, 8, 11, 17, 19, 25; 50:3, 9, 17; 51:16; 52:7, 11, 14, 17, 24; 53:5, 9; 54:2, 19, 22; 55:8, 15; 56:1, 6, 11, 15, 19, 25; 57:2, 10, 16; 58:6, 19, 22; 59:21; 60:8, 11, 22, 24; 61:3, 14, 19, 22, 25; 62:8; 63:1, 9, 20, 25; 64:6, 12, 14, 20; 65:2; 66:5, 11, 16; 67:5, 8, 16; 68:4, 23; 69:7; 70:21; 71:5, 18, 21; 72:18; 73:4; 74:9, 21; 75:20, 25; 76:15, 18; 77:2, 4, 16, 22; 78:1, 5, 22; 79:6,``` |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |



| ```Willims[1] - 1:14 willing [3] - 19:15; 29:8; 31:8 win [2] - 6:4; 19:14 wished [1]-26:16 withdrawn [1] - 89:17 witness [2] - 18:18; 47:10 woefully [1] - 41:13 won [1] - 19:12 wondering[3] - 15:15, 25; 25:4 word [3] - 49:11; 51:19 words [2] - 5:19; 80:23 works [2] - 29:23; 81:24 wouldn't-have- bought-if-she-had- known-the-truth [1] - 55:25``` |
| :---: |
| Y |
| ```year [3] - 54:7; 56:21; 70:12 yesterday [1] - 23:22 yogurt [2] - 73:22; 74:1 York [1] - 21:17 young [2] - 29:18; 91:3 yourself [1] - 13:18``` |

