

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

HANK T. COLEMAN,

Plaintiff,
v.CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY; WARDEN JAMES OWENS;
DEPUTY WARDEN C. JOHNSON;
CAMDEN COUNTY BOARD OF
FREEHOLDERS,

Defendants.

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-06077 (JBS-AMD)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

Hank T. Coleman, Plaintiff Pro Se
1339 Thurman St.
Camden, NJ 08104

SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:

1. Plaintiff Hank T. Coleman seeks to bring a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden County Correctional Facility ("CCCF"), Warden James Owens ("Warden"), Deputy Warden C. Johnson ("Deputy Warden"), and the Camden County Board of Freeholders ("Freeholders"). Complaint, Docket Entry 1. Based on Plaintiff's affidavit of indigency, the application to proceed *in forma pauperis* is granted.

2. Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding *in forma pauperis*. The Court must *sua sponte* dismiss

any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to *sua sponte* screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding *in forma pauperis*.

3. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).

4. To survive *sua sponte* screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. *Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside*, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." *Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster*, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). "[A] pleading that offers 'labels or conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

5. Plaintiff alleges he experienced unconstitutional conditions of confinement while detained at the CCCF in or

"around 2009, 2010, 2012, [and] 2014." Complaint § III. The fact section of the complaint states: "I was picked up by the bounty hunter's [sic] and taken to the jail. I was on the floor because I was assigned to a 2 room cell at the time it was 4 [people] already in the [sic] I was urinated on by inmates and my food also." *Id.* Plaintiff further alleges: "I was injured when I had a seizure hit my head on bunk and toilet and went to medical for no treatment just to rest til I came through." *Id.* § IV. Even accepting the statement as true for screening purposes only, there is not enough factual support for the Court to infer a constitutional violation has occurred.

6. The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See *Rhodes v. Chapman*, 452 U.S. 337, 348-50 (1981) (holding double-celling by itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); *Carson v. Mulvihill*, 488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) ("[M]ere double-bunking does not constitute punishment, because there is no 'one man, one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.'" (quoting *Bell v. Wolfish*, 441 U.S. 520, 542 (1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and thus violates due process rights. See *Hubbard v. Taylor*, 538 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis

requires courts to consider whether the totality of the conditions "cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned to them."). Some relevant factors are the dates and length of the confinement(s), whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or convicted prisoner, etc.

7. In addition, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to allege a claim based on a violation of his right to adequate medical care, there are not enough facts to support an inference that Plaintiff's rights were violated in this regard. In order to set forth a cognizable claim for a violation of his right to adequate medical care, an inmate must allege: (1) a serious medical need; and (2) behavior on the part of prison officials that constitutes deliberate indifference to that need. See *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); *Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility*, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). Plaintiff's allegations regarding his seizure and that he "went to medical for no treatment just to rest til [he] came through" are insufficient to meet the pleading standard in the absence of additional facts. If he wishes to pursue this claim, Plaintiff should provide additional facts supporting both of the requirements in his amended complaint.

8. Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support an inference that the named Defendants are personally liable for the alleged constitutional violations.

9. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from CCCF for the allegedly unconstitutional conditions of his confinement. As the CCCF is not a "state actor" within the meaning of § 1983, the claims against it must be dismissed with prejudice. See *Crawford v. McMillian*, 660 F. App'x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2016) ("[T]he prison is not an entity subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.") (citing *Fischer v. Cahill*, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973)).

10. Moreover, Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts regarding the personal liability of the Freeholders. As the governing body of Camden County, the Freeholders cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely on a theory of *respondeat superior*. *Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Social Services*, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). Plaintiff must instead plead facts showing that the Freeholders are "responsible for either the affirmative proclamation of a policy or acquiescence in a well-settled custom." *Bielevicz v. Dubinon*, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990).¹

¹ "Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict. Government custom can be demonstrated by showing that a given course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually

In other words, Plaintiff must set forth facts supporting an inference that the Freeholders were the "moving force" behind the alleged constitutional violation. *Monell*, 436 U.S. at 689.

11. Similarly, Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to support an inference that the Warden and Deputy Warden were personally involved in either the creation of, or failure to address, the conditions of his confinement. State actors are liable only for their own unconstitutional conduct and may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of *respondeat superior*. *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009); *Bistrian v. Levi*, 696 F.3d 352, 366 (3d Cir. 2012). Plaintiff has made no allegations regarding the conduct or actions of either the Warden or Deputy Warden.

12. As Plaintiff may be able to amend his complaint to address the deficiencies noted by the Court,² the Court shall

to constitute law." *Kirkland v. DiLeo*, 581 F. App'x 111, 118 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alteration in original).

² To the extent the complaint seeks relief for conditions Plaintiff encountered during his confinements in 2009, 2010, and 2012, those claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Claims brought under § 1983 are governed by New Jersey's two-year limitations period for personal injury. See *Wilson v. Garcia*, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); *Dique v. N.J. State Police*, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). "Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which the action is based." *Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr.*, 773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). The allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement at CCCF would have been immediately apparent to Plaintiff at the time of his detention; therefore, the statute of limitations for these

grant Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.

13. Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and explicit. *Id.* To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an amended complaint that is complete in itself.³ *Id.*

14. For the reasons stated above, the complaint is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. The Court will reopen the matter in the event Plaintiff files an amended complaint within the time allotted by the Court.

claims expired in 2011, 2012, and 2014, respectively. In the event Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, he should focus on the facts of his 2014 confinement, provided that Plaintiff's confinement ended after September 29, 2014. Because Plaintiff filed his complaint on September 29, 2016, claims arising from confinements ending prior to September 29, 2014, are also barred by the statute of limitations.

³ The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to service.

15. An appropriate order follows.

March 8, 2017

Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle

JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Chief U.S. District Judge