

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ELSIE MORTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

NO DEFENDANT LISTED,

Defendant.

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Civil Action

No. 16-cv-06212 (JBS-AMD)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

Elsie Morton, Plaintiff Pro Se
812 North 8th Street
Camden, NJ 08102

SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:

1. Plaintiff Elsie Morton seeks to bring a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Complaint, Docket Entry 1.

2. Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding *in forma pauperis*. The Court must *sua sponte* dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to *sua sponte* screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding *in forma pauperis*.

3. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).

4. To survive *sua sponte* screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. *Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside*, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." *Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster*, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). "[A] pleading that offers 'labels or conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

5. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983¹ for alleged violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. In order to set forth a *prima facie* case under § 1983, a

¹ Section 1983 provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress" 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

plaintiff must show: "(1) a person deprived him of a federal right; and (2) the person who deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law." *Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan*, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing *Gomez v. Toledo*, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)).

6. Generally, for purposes of actions under § 1983, "[t]he term 'persons' includes local and state officers acting under color of state law." *Carver v. Foerster*, 102 F.3d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing *Hafer v. Melo*, 502 U.S. 21 (1991)).² To say that a person was "acting under color of state law" means that the defendant in a § 1983 action "exercised power [that the defendant] possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority of state law." *West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (citation omitted). Generally, then, "a public employee acts under color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law." *Id.* at 50.

7. Plaintiff has not named a defendant in his complaint. The complaint ordinarily would therefore be dismissed. Though

² "Person" is not strictly limited to individuals who are state and local government employees, however. For example, municipalities and other local government units, such as counties, also are considered "persons" for purposes of § 1983. See *Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Social Services*, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).

Plaintiff did not name a defendant, however, he has alleged that corrections officers, nurses, and the Warden "never tried to change the situation at hand." Complaint § III. Because *pro se* complaints must be liberally construed, *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), the Court will construe the complaint as seeking to state a claim against the as-yet unnamed corrections officers, nurses, and Warden.

8. Plaintiff alleges that he encountered unconstitutional conditions of confinement at the Camden County Correctional Facility in 2003, 2006, 2009, 2013, 2014, and 2015. Complaint § III. Plaintiff states: "Sleeping in overcrowded room which provide 2 bunks only and while sleeping on the floor near the toilet there were men who was detoxing and urinating all the time." *Id.* Even accepting the statement as true for screening purposes only, there is not enough factual support for the Court to infer a constitutional violation has occurred.

9. The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See *Rhodes v. Chapman*, 452 U.S. 337, 348-50 (1981) (holding double-celling by itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); *Carson v. Mulvihill*, 488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) ("[M]ere double-bunking does not constitute punishment, because there is no 'one man, one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the

Fifth Amendment.'" (quoting *Bell v. Wolfish*, 441 U.S. 520, 542 (1979)). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and thus violates due process rights. See *Hubbard v. Taylor*, 538 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis requires courts to consider whether the totality of the conditions "cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned to them."). Some relevant factors are the dates and length of the confinement(s), whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or convicted prisoner, etc.

10. As Plaintiff may be able to amend his complaint to address the deficiencies noted by the Court, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.³

³ However, to the extent the complaint seeks relief for conditions Plaintiff encountered during his confinements in 2003, 2006, 2009, and 2013, those claims are barred by the statute of limitations and will be dismissed with prejudice, meaning that Plaintiff cannot recover for those claims because they have been brought too late. Claims brought under § 1983 are governed by New Jersey's two-year limitations period for personal injury. See *Wilson v. Garcia*, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); *Dique v. N.J. State Police*, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). "Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which the action is based." *Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr.*, 773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). The allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement at CCJ would have been immediately apparent to

11. Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and explicit. *Id.* To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an amended complaint that is complete in itself.⁴ *Id.*

12. For the reasons stated above, the claims arising from Plaintiff's 2003, 2006, 2009, and 2013 confinements are barred by the statute of limitations and therefore dismissed with prejudice. The remainder of the complaint, insofar as it seeks relief for conditions of confinement Plaintiff encountered in

Plaintiff at the time of his detention; therefore, the statute of limitations for Plaintiff's 2003, 2006, 2009, and 2013 claims expired in 2005, 2008, 2011, and 2015, respectively. Plaintiff therefore may not raise these claims in the amended complaint. In the event Plaintiff does elect to file an amended complaint, he should focus only on the facts of his 2015 confinement and his 2014 confinement, provided that Plaintiff's confinement ended after September 30, 2014. Because Plaintiff filed his complaint on September 30, 2016, claims arising from confinements ending prior to September 30, 2014, are also barred by the statute of limitations and must be dismissed with prejudice.

⁴ The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to service.

2014 and 2015, is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. The Court will reopen the matter in the event Plaintiff files an amended complaint within the time allotted by the Court.

13. An appropriate order follows.

March 17, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge