

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

NAKEEMA Z. DAVIS,  
  
Plaintiff,  
  
v.  
  
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,  
  
Defendant.

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Civil Action  
No. 16-cv-06699 (JBS-AMD)

**OPINION**

APPEARANCES:

Nakeema Z. Davis, Plaintiff Pro Se  
293 Ablett Village  
Camden, NJ 08105

**SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:**

1. Plaintiff Nakeema Z. Davis seeks to bring a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State of New Jersey. Complaint, Docket Entry 1.

2. Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding *in forma pauperis*. The Court must *sua sponte* dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to *sua sponte* screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding *in forma pauperis*.

3. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).

4. To survive *sua sponte* screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. *Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside*, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." *Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster*, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). "[A] pleading that offers 'labels or conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

5. Plaintiff presumably seeks monetary damages<sup>1</sup> from the State of New Jersey for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by

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<sup>1</sup> Plaintiff has not stated specific requested relief in the complaint.

Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. Plaintiff may not bring a suit against the State in federal court unless Congress has expressly abrogated New Jersey's sovereign immunity or the State consents to being sued in federal court. *Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police*, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). Here, Congress did not expressly abrogate sovereign immunity when it passed § 1983, see *id.*, and there is no indication New Jersey has consented to Plaintiff's suit. The claims against the State of New Jersey therefore must be dismissed with prejudice.

6. Plaintiff may be able to amend the complaint to name state actors who were personally involved in the alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement, however. To that end, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.

7. Plaintiff is advised that the amended complaint must plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that a constitutional violation has occurred in order to survive this Court's review under § 1915. Plaintiff alleges she experienced unconstitutional conditions during "several" confinements at the Camden County Correctional Facility ("CCCF") between 2010 and 2016. Complaint § III. The fact section of the complaint states: "During the whole time of my stay I was sleeping on a thin mat on the floor. With two sheets, a half of towel and a thin wool

blanket near the toilet or under the bed by the door." *Id.* Even accepting the statement as true for screening purposes only, there is not enough factual support for the Court to infer a constitutional violation has occurred.

8. The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See *Rhodes v. Chapman*, 452 U.S. 337, 348-50 (1981) (holding double-celling by itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); *Carson v. Mulvihill*, 488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) ("[M]ere double-bunking does not constitute punishment, because there is no 'one man, one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.'" (quoting *Bell v. Wolfish*, 441 U.S. 520, 542 (1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and thus violates due process rights. See *Hubbard v. Taylor*, 538 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis requires courts to consider whether the totality of the conditions "cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned to them.>"). Some relevant factors are the dates and length of the confinement(s), whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or convicted prisoner, etc.

9. As Plaintiff may be able to amend her complaint to address the deficiencies noted by the Court,<sup>2</sup> the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.<sup>3</sup>

10. Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the

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<sup>2</sup> To the extent the complaint seeks relief for conditions Plaintiff encountered during confinements prior to October 7, 2014, those claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Claims brought under § 1983 are governed by New Jersey's two-year limitations period for personal injury. See *Wilson v. Garcia*, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); *Dique v. N.J. State Police*, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). "Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which the action is based." *Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr.*, 773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). Plaintiff was detained at the CCCF from March 7, 2011 to March 8, 2011; January 18, 2013 to February 8, 2013; March 25, 2013 to April 11, 2013; October 2, 2013 to October 11, 2013; December 19, 2013 to January 24, 2014; and September 24, 2016 to September 26, 2016. Complaint, Ex. 1. The allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement at CCCF would have been immediately apparent to Plaintiff at the time of her detention; therefore, the statute of limitations for some of Plaintiff's claims expired in 2013, 2015, and 2016, respectively. In the event Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, she should focus on facts of her September 24, 2016 confinement.

<sup>3</sup> The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to service.

