

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

OTTIS R. JACKSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAMDEN COUNTY
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,

Defendant.

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Civil Action

No. 16-cv-06761 (JBS-AMD)

OPINION

APPEARANCES

Ottis R. Jackson
Plaintiff Pro Se
212 Parker Avenue
Oaklyn, NJ 08107

SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Ottis R. Jackson seeks to bring a civil rights complaint against the Camden County Correctional Facility ("CCCF") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Complaint, Docket Entry 1.

28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding *in forma pauperis*. The Court must *sua sponte* dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to *sua*

sponte screening for dismissal under Section 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding *in forma pauperis*.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will: (1) dismiss the Complaint with prejudice as to claims made against the CCJ because defendant is not a "state actor" within the meaning of § 1983; and (2) dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's Complaint states: "Place[d] in over-crowded cells, confined spaces with sick, violent and angry individuals. Slept on floors because too many people were placed in the cell. I told them that I had a bad back, a heart condition, and PTSD. Correction officers failed to acknowledge my medical condition with my bad back, heart condition, and PTSD." Complaint § III(C).

Plaintiff alleges to have suffered "severe back injuries from sleeping on the floor, anxiety attacks, giving [*sic*] no medical attention. Denied medication I take [*sic*] before incarceration." *Id.* § IV.

With respect to the time of the alleged events giving rise to his claims, Plaintiff states: "Detain [*sic*] on more than one occasion[;] exact dates unknown[.] Anywhere from 2002-2015 on." *Id.* § III(B).

Plaintiff "would like the courts to compensate me for inhumane treatment, overcrowding, ignoring my pleas to seek medical attention, and the physical and mental anguish I suffered. Violation of my civil rights. No amount of money can account for my horrific experience. I'm seeking \$250,000." *Id.* § V.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive *sua sponte* screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim, a complaint must allege "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. *Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside*, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." *Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster*, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). "[A] pleading that offers 'labels or conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff asserts claims against CCCF for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement.

Primarily, the Complaint must be dismissed as the CCCF is not a "state actor" within the meaning of § 1983. See, e.g., *Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility*, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538-39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a "person" under § 1983). Accordingly, the claims against CCCF must be dismissed with prejudice.

Second, even accepting the statements as true for screening purposes only, there is not enough factual support for the Court to infer a constitutional violation has occurred. The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See *Rhodes v. Chapman*, 452 U.S. 337, 348-50 (1981) (holding double-celling by itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); *Carson v. Mulvihill*, 488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) ("[M]ere double-bunking does not constitute punishment, because there is no 'one man, one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.'" (quoting *Bell v. Wolfish*, 441 U.S. 520, 542 (1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and thus violates due process rights. See *Hubbard v. Taylor*, 538 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis requires courts to consider whether the totality of the conditions "cause inmates to endure such genuine privations and hardship over an extended

period of time, that the adverse conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned to them.”).

As Plaintiff may be able to amend the complaint to address the deficiencies noted by the Court, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.¹

In the event Plaintiff files an amended complaint, he should include specific facts, such as the dates and length of Plaintiff’s confinement(s), whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or convicted prisoner, any specific individuals who were involved in creating or failing to remedy the conditions of confinement, and any other relevant facts regarding the conditions of confinement. Conclusory statements are not enough.

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the allegations in the original complaint,² but the identification of

¹ The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to service.

² To the extent the complaint seeks relief for conditions Plaintiff encountered prior to October 5, 2014, those claims are

the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and explicit. *Id.* To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an amended complaint that is complete in itself. *Id.* The amended complaint may not adopt or repeat claims that have been dismissed with prejudice by the Court.

V. **CONCLUSION**

For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is: (a) dismissed with prejudice as to the CCCF; and (b) dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim.

An appropriate order follows.

February 2, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

barred by the statute of limitations. Claims brought under § 1983 are governed by New Jersey's two-year limitations period for personal injury. *See Wilson v. Garcia*, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); *Dique v. N.J. State Police*, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). "Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which the action is based." *Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr.*, 773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). The allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement would have been immediately apparent to Plaintiff; therefore, the statute of limitations on some of Plaintiff's claims expired two years after his release. In the event Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, he should limit his complaint to confinements in which he was released after October 5, 2014.