IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

PATRICK HAMMOND,

v.

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Plaintiff,

Civil Action
No. 16-7150 (JBS-AMD)

CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL; CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,

Defendants.

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

Patrick Hammond, Plaintiff Pro Se 1117 Magnolia Ave., Apt. H Camden, NJ 08103

SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Patrick Hammond seeks to bring a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden County Correctional Facility ("CCCF"). Complaint, Docket Entry 1.

At this time, the Court must review the complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks

¹ Plaintiff has named both the Camden County Jail and the Camden County Correctional Facility as separate defendants in his complaint. As the two are one and the same, the Court refers only to the Camden County Correctional Facility for purposes of this Opinion.

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that he was confined in the CCCF in 2005, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2013. Complaint § III. He states: "While being processed I was (held) in the holding cell with about (20) other (ppl) overnite to sleep on the floor without no mattres, only to be subjected to being finally moved to a place of disposition to sleep on the floor in a overcrowded 2 man cell that now holds four (ppl) with me in another on the floor for (months) at a time." Id.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.

To survive *sua sponte* screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege "sufficient factual matter" to

show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged." Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308

n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). "[A] pleading that offers 'labels or
conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from CCCF for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Primarily, the complaint must be dismissed as the CCCF is not a "state actor" within the meaning of § 1983. See Crawford v. McMillian, 660 F. App'x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2016) ("[T]he prison is not an entity subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.") (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973)). Accordingly, the claims against CCCF must be dismissed with prejudice.

Generally, "plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under [§ 1915] should receive leave to amend unless amendment would be inequitable or futile." Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). This Court denies

leave to amend at this time as Plaintiff's complaint is barred by the statute of limitations, which is governed by New Jersey's two-year limitations period for personal injury. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). The accrual date of a § 1983 action is determined by federal law, however. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014).

"Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which the action is based." Montanez, 773 F.3d at 480 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff states the events giving rise to his claims occurred in 2005, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2013. The allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement at CCCF would have been immediately apparent to Plaintiff at the time of his detention; therefore, the statute of limitations for Plaintiff's claims expired in 2007, 2009, 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2015, respectively. As there are no grounds for equitable

² "Although the running of the statute of limitations is ordinarily an affirmative defense, where that defense is obvious from the face of the complaint and no development of the record is necessary, a court may dismiss a time-barred complaint sua sponte under § 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim." Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F. App'x 110, 111-12 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).

tolling of the statute of limitations, 3 the complaint will be dismissed with prejudice. Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F. App'x 110, 112 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal with prejudice due to expiration of statute of limitations).

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the complaint is dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. An appropriate order follows.

February 24, 2017 Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Chief U.S. District Judge

³ Equitable tolling "is only appropriate '(1) where the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff's cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in some extraordinary way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights; or (3) where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights mistakenly in the wrong forum.'" Omar v. Blackman, 590 F. App'x 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Santos ex rel. Beato v. United States, 559 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009)).