# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

LEANDRA KING,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAMDEN COUNTY
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,

Defendant.

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-07403 (JBS-AMD)

OPINION

#### APPEARANCES:

Leandra King, Plaintiff Pro Se 1244 Kenwood Avenue Camden, NJ 08103

## SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:

# I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Leandra King seeks to bring a civil rights complaint against Camden County Correctional Facility ("CCCF") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Complaint, Docket Entry 1.

28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under Section 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).

#### II. BACKGROUND

With respect to factual allegations giving rise to

Plaintiff's claims, the Complaint states: "I was arrested Nov

2012 [and] was [a] victim of unsanitary area mats on floor."

Complaint § III(C).

Plaintiff alleges that these events occurred in November 2012. Id. § III(A).

Plaintiff does not identify or otherwise describe any injury from these events. *Id*. § IV.

Plaintiff does not identify or otherwise describe any relief requested in connection with her claims. Id. § V.

### III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive sua sponte screening under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim, a complaint must allege "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). "[A] pleading that offers

'labels or conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

#### IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff asserts claims against CCCF for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Even construing the Complaint as seeking to bring a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged prison overcrowding, any such purported claims must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

First, claims against CCCF must be dismissed with prejudice because defendant is not a "state actor" within the meaning of § 1983. See Crawford v. McMillian, 660 F. App'x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2016) ("[T]he prison is not an entity subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.") (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973)); Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538-39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a "person" under § 1983.

Second, "plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal should receive leave to amend unless amendment would be inequitable under [§ 1915] or futile." Grayson v. Mayview

State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). This Court denies leave to amend at this time as Plaintiff's Complaint is barred

by the statute of limitations, which is governed by New Jersey's two-year limitations period for personal injury. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). The accrual date of a § 1983 action is determined by federal law, however. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). "Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which the action is based." Montanez, 773 F.3d at 480 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff alleges that the events giving rise to the claims in the Complaint occurred in November 2012. Complaint §§ III(A), (C). The allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement at CCCF would have been immediately apparent to Plaintiff at the time of detention. Accordingly, the statute of limitations for Plaintiff's claims expired in November 2014. As there are no grounds for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, 2 the

<sup>&</sup>quot;Although the running of the statute of limitations is ordinarily an affirmative defense, where that defense is obvious from the face of the complaint and no development of the record is necessary, a court may dismiss a time-barred complaint sua sponte under § 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim." Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F. App'x 110, 111-12 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Equitable tolling "is only appropriate '(1) where the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff's cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in some extraordinary way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights; or (3) where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights

Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice. Ostuni v. Wa Wa's

Mart, 532 F. App'x 110, 112 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam)

(affirming dismissal with prejudice due to expiration of statute of limitations).

## V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. An appropriate order follows.

February 22, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle

JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Chief U.S. District Judge

mistakenly in the wrong forum." Omar v. Blackman, 590 F. App'x 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Santos ex rel. Beato v. United States, 559 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009)).