

be moot, the Supreme Court expressly rejected, as speculative, such arguments of collateral consequences as (1) revocation could be used against the petitioner in a future parole proceeding; (2) revocation could be used to increase a future sentence; (3) revocation could be used to impeach him as a witness or litigant in a future legal proceeding; and (4) dismissal of the habeas action would foreclose a damages claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because of *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). *Id.* at 14-17. Nothing in the instant Petition indicates that Petitioner's claims are distinguishable from those of *Spencer*.

As such, pursuant to the holdings of *Spencer*, the Court dismisses the Petition as moot. *Accord United States v. Robinson*, 39 F. App'x 723, 725 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that *Spencer* rendered moot a challenge to the revocation of supervised release once the sentence had expired). Furthermore, the Court denies a certificate of appealability because jurists of reason would not find it debatable that dismissal of the Petition is correct. *See Slack v. McDaniel*, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Likewise, Petitioner's motion for recusal, ECF No. 20, is also dismissed as moot.



Michael A. Shipp, U.S.D.J.

Date: 6/7/16