

by the transferee court would be prejudiced by pre-consolidation discovery. This is a compelling argument.

Given the substantial possibility of consolidation of these cases, it is important for me to preserve prerogatives of the transferee court, especially in light of defendants' anticipated motion to dismiss. I need not find that a stay of discovery pending defendants' motion is necessarily appropriate to justify a brief delay here, but only that it would be well within the discretion of the transferee court to think so. See, e.g., In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., No. 11-md-2262 (S.D.N.Y.), Dkt. 489.

With respect to the burden that production would create – not just to defendants, but to plaintiffs and to the Court – it must be borne in mind that production of these materials in the civil context will not necessarily be coextensive with the production that defendants have been compelled to make to the DOJ. See In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig., No. 06-cv-07417, 2007 WL 2127577, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2007) (In a situation like the one at bar, “there would be the issue of various objections . . . that might be assertable against plaintiffs that were unasserted against the government.”). Plaintiffs concede, in fact, that it is only a “likelihood” (and not a certainty) that the CID materials being produced to DOJ will be produced in this litigation.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, plaintiffs have presented no compelling explanation of the prejudice that they would suffer in the absence of pre-consolidation discovery.

Plaintiff's [43] letter motion for discovery prior to the decision of the JPML is denied.

SO ORDERED.

Digitally signed by Brian M.
Cogan

U.S.D.J.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York
September 4, 2015