

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SHANISE SHIDAGIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

3:23-CV-0031
(BKS/ML)

BROOME COUNTY D.S.S.; and JILL
DOMINGUEZ, Case Manager,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:

OF COUNSEL:

SHANISE SHIDAGIS
Plaintiff, *Pro Se*
202 Oak Hill Avenue
Endicott, New York 13760

MIROSLAV LOVRIC, United States Magistrate Judge

ORDER and REPORT-RECOMMENDATION

The Clerk has sent a *pro se* complaint in the above captioned action together with an application to proceed *in forma pauperis*, filed by Shanise Shidagis (“Plaintiff”) to the Court for review. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 2.) For the reasons discussed below, I grant Plaintiff’s *in forma pauperis* application, and recommend that Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed in its entirety without leave to amend. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 2.)

I. BACKGROUND

Construed as liberally¹ as possible, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that her rights were violated by defendants Broome County Department of Social Services and Jill Dominguez (collectively "Defendants"). (*See generally* Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff's Complaint is difficult to decipher but she appears to allege that Defendant Dominguez submitted documents—presumably to the state family court—titled "Permanency Hearing Report," which stated that Plaintiff threatened case planner John Zawiski via text message on October 20, 2022, stating "I will knock you out." (Dkt. No. 1 at 5; Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff alleges that this was incorrect information. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5.)

Based on these factual allegations, Plaintiff asserts the following two claims: (1) one claim for forgery, and (2) one claim for falsification of documents. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5.) As relief, Plaintiff requests that the "law [be] pressed to the fullest." (*Id.*)

II. PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION TO PROCEED *IN FORMA PAUPERIS*

"When a civil action is commenced in a federal district court, the statutory filing fee, currently set at \$402, must ordinarily be paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A court is authorized, however, to permit a litigant to proceed *in forma pauperis* status if a party "is unable to pay" the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).² After reviewing Plaintiff's *in*

¹ The court must interpret *pro se* complaints to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. *Soto v. Walker*, 44 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting *Burgos v. Hopkins*, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)).

² The language of that section is ambiguous because it suggests an intent to limit availability of *in forma pauperis* status to prison inmates. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (authorizing the commencement of an action without prepayment of fees "by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses"). The courts have construed that section, however, as making *in forma pauperis* status available to any litigant who can meet the governing financial criteria. *Hayes v. United States*, 71 Fed. Cl. 366, 367 (Fed. Cl. 2006); *Fridman v. City of N.Y.*, 195 F. Supp. 2d 534, 536 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).

forma pauperis application (Dkt. No. 2), the Court finds that Plaintiff meets this standard.

Therefore, Plaintiff's application to proceed *in forma pauperis* is granted.³

III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR INITIAL REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

In addition, the Court shall dismiss any action where the Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); *see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't*, 523 U.S. 83, 88-89 (1988) (holding that subject matter jurisdiction is a “threshold question that must be resolved . . . before proceeding to the merits.”); *Humphrey v. Syracuse Police Dep't*, 758 F. App'x 205, 205-06 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing *United States v. Bond*, 762 F.3d 255, 263 (2d Cir. 2014)) (“[b]efore deciding any case on the merits, a district court must determine that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the matter.”); *Koziel v. City of Yonkers*, 352 F. App'x 470, 471 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order) (affirming *sua sponte* dismissal of complaint on initial review for lack of subject matter); *Talley v. LoanCare Serv., Div. of FNF*, 15-CV-5017, 2018 WL 4185705, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2018) (dismissing on initial review, action challenging state court mortgage foreclosure judgment because the court lacked jurisdiction); *Eckert v. Schroeder, Joseph & Assoc.*, 364 F. Supp. 2d 326, 327 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing *Hughes v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n of the City of N.Y., Inc.*, 850 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1988), *cert. denied*, 488 U.S. 967 (1988)) (“[a] court shall, *sua sponte*, dismiss a complaint

³ Plaintiff is reminded that, although her application to proceed *in forma pauperis* has been granted, she is still required to pay fees that she may incur in this action, including copying and/or witness fees.

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as soon as it is apparent that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.”).

“In reviewing a complaint . . . the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” *Hernandez v. Coughlin*, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678.

Courts are “obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally.” *Harris v. Mills*, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009); *see also Nance v. Kelly*, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (reading the plaintiff’s *pro se* complaint “broadly, as we must” and holding that the complaint sufficiently raised a cognizable claim). “[E]xtreme caution should be exercised in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and [the] parties . . . have had an opportunity to respond.” *Anderson v. Coughlin*, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983).

IV. ANALYSIS

In addressing the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s complaint, the court must construe her pleadings liberally. *Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant*, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Having reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint with this principle in mind, I recommend that all causes of action be dismissed.

Plaintiff does not have standing to compel any law enforcement agency to prosecute suspected criminal acts because there is no private right of action to enforce state or federal criminal statutes. *See Linda R.S. v. Richard D.*, 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”); *see also*

Walker v. CIBC Ltd., 20-CV-1337, 2021 WL 3518439, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2021) (Hummel, M.J.) (“It appears plaintiff is either seeking the criminal prosecution of an individual or individuals or a law enforcement investigation, which is beyond this Court’s jurisdiction.”), *report-recommendation adopted by* 2021 WL 3204860 (N.D.N.Y. July 29, 2021) (McAvoy, J.); *McFadden v. Ortiz*, 12-CV-1244, 2013 WL 1789593, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2013) (D’Agostino, J.) (holding that “there is no private right of action to enforce either state or federal criminal statutes.”).

Moreover, this Court does not have authority to commence its own investigation, commence criminal prosecution, compel a law enforcement agency to investigate suspected criminal activity, or compel a prosecutor to prosecute. Prosecutors possess discretionary authority to bring criminal actions, and they are “immune from control or interference by citizen or court.” *Conn. Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co.*, 457 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1972).⁴

As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff’s claims be dismissed. *See Sentementes v. General Elec. Co.*, 14-CV-0131, 2014 WL 2881441, at *14 (D. Conn. June 25, 2014) (“The Court knows of no private action for ‘forgery’ or ‘fabrication of evidence.’”); *Reeves v. Wilkins*, 10-CV-2766, 2012 WL 3835902, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2012) (“New York does not provide a private cause of action for . . . forgery.”).⁵

⁴ Further, to the extent that Plaintiff’s claims were liberally construed seeking to overturn any state court finding based on the allegedly false information contained in the document submitted by Defendant Dominguez, I recommend that it be dismissed based on the doctrine of abstention set forth in *Younger v. Harris*, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). *See Walker v. Family Court Judge Catherine Cholakis*, 19-CV-1288, 2020 WL 3503158, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. June 29, 2020) (Kahn, J.) (where the plaintiff challenged a temporary order in an ongoing child custody dispute, alleging that the temporary custody order was gained under “lies and false pretenses and therefore should be considered invalid,” the court found that application of *Younger* abstention barred the plaintiff’s federal claims for injunctive relief).

⁵ The Court also notes that “[a]lthough a municipality is subject to suit pursuant to section 1983, *see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.*, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), a municipal . . . department

V. OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND

Generally, a court should not dismiss claims contained in a complaint filed by a *pro se* litigant without granting leave to amend at least once “when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” *Branum v. Clark*, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991); *see also* Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”). An opportunity to amend is not required, however, where “the problem with [the plaintiff’s] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” *Cuoco v. Moritsugu*, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); *see also Cortec Indus. Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P.*, 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Of course, where a plaintiff is unable to allege any fact sufficient to support its claim, a complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.”). Stated differently, “[w]here it appears that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be productive, . . . it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.” *Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co.*, 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993); *accord, Brown v. Peters*, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.).⁶

does not have the capacity to be sued as an entity separate from the municipality in which it is located.” *White v. Syracuse Police Dep’t*, 18-CV-1471, 2019 WL 981850, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2019) (Peebles, M.J.) (citing *Krug v. Cnty. of Rensselaer*, 559 F. Supp. 2d 223, 247 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (McAvoy, J.); *Turczyn ex rel. McGregor v. City of Utica*, 13-CV-1357, 2014 WL 6685476, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2014) (Sharpe, J.); *Hoisington v. Cnty. of Sullivan*, 55 F. Supp. 2d 212, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“Under New York law, a department of a municipal entity is merely a subdivision of the municipality and has no separate legal existence. Therefore, municipal departments like the Department of Social Services are not amenable to suit and no claims lie directly against the Department.”)), *report and recommendation adopted by*, 2019 WL 974824 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2019) (Suddaby, C.J.). Thus, Defendant Broome County D.S.S. is not a proper party amenable to suit.

⁶ *See also Carris v. First Student, Inc.*, 132 F. Supp. 3d 321, 340-41 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (Suddaby, C.J.) (explaining that the standard set forth in *Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank*, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999)—that the Court should grant leave to amend “unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would be

Here, leave to amend would be futile because there is no private cause of action to enforce criminal violations. As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff's claims be dismissed without leave to amend. See *McFadden v. Ortiz*, 12-CV-1244, 2013 WL 1789593, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2013) (D'Agostino, J.) (dismissing without leave to amend the plaintiff's claims seeking to enforce New York State criminal statutes).

ACCORDINGLY, it is

ORDERED that Plaintiff's application to proceed *in forma pauperis* (Dkt. No. 2) is **GRANTED only for purposes of filing and any appeal unless the trial court certifies in writing that the appeal is not taken in good faith**; and it is further respectfully

RECOMMENDED that the Court **DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE BUT WITHOUT LEAVE TO REPLEAD** Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall file a copy of this order, report, and recommendation on the docket of this case and serve a copy upon the parties in accordance with the local rules.⁷

NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report.⁸ Such objections shall be filed with the

successful in stating a claim"—is likely not an accurate recitation of the governing law after *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)), *rev'd on other grounds*, 682 F. App'x 30.

⁷ The Clerk shall also provide Plaintiff with copies of all unreported decisions cited herein in accordance with *Lebron v. Sanders*, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

⁸ If you are proceeding *pro se* and served with this report, recommendation, and order by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date that the report, recommendation, and order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a

Clerk of the Court. **FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW.** 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(d), 72; *Roldan v. Racette*, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing *Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.*, 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)).⁹

Dated: January 17, 2023
Binghamton, New York


Miroslav Lovric
U.S. Magistrate Judge

Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C).

⁹ Plaintiff is reminded that she must immediately notify the Court of any change of address consistent with N.D.N.Y. L.R. 10.1(c)(2), and that her failure to notify the Court of a change of address could result in the involuntary dismissal of her cases for failure to prosecute pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and N.D.N.Y. L.R. 41.2(b).