

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

RUSSELL D. PALMER,

Petitioner,

v.

9:18-CV-1133
(GTS/TWD)

BELL,

Respondent.

APPEARANCES:

OF COUNSEL:

RUSSELL D. PALMER, 15-A-2758

Petitioner, *Pro Se*
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GLENN T. SUDDABY, Chief United States District Judge

DECISION and ORDER

Currently before the Court, in this habeas corpus proceeding brought by Russell D. Palmer (“Petitioner”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, is the Report-Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Thérèse Wiley Dancks, recommending that Petitioner’s Petition be denied and dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and that a certificate of appealability not issue. (Dkt. No. 48.) On November 4, 2021, Petitioner filed an Objection to the Report-Recommendation, and on November 16, 2021, Respondent filed a letter opposing Petitioner’s

Objection and supporting the Report-Recommendation. (Dkt. Nos. 49, 51.) In addition, after the expiration of the deadline for Objections to the Report-Recommendation, Petitioner filed five letters further objecting to the Report-Recommendation, indicating that he intends to file another habeas corpus petition based on new evidence in the matter, and requesting that he be provided with transcripts of the state court proceedings and other documents. (Dkt. Nos. 50, 52, 53, 54, and 55.) For the reasons set forth below, Magistrate Judge Dancks' Report-Recommendation is accepted and adopted in its entirety, and Petitioner's letter-requests for transcripts and other documents are denied as procedurally improper, unsupported by a showing of cause, and/or moot.

Generally, when a *specific* objection is made to a portion of a magistrate judge's report-recommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to a *de novo* review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). To be "specific," the objection must, with particularity, "identify [1] the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations, or report to which it has an objection and [2] the basis for the objection." N.D.N.Y. L.R. 72.1(c).¹ When performing such a *de novo* review, "[t]he judge may . . . receive further evidence. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, a district court will ordinarily refuse to consider evidentiary material that

¹ See also *Mario v. P&C Food Markets, Inc.*, 313 F.3d 758, 766 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Although Mario filed objections to the magistrate's report and recommendation, the statement with respect to his Title VII claim was not specific enough to preserve this claim for review. The only reference made to the Title VII claim was one sentence on the last page of his objections, where he stated that it was error to deny his motion on the Title VII claim '[f]or the reasons set forth in Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.' This bare statement, devoid of any reference to specific findings or recommendations to which he objected and why, and unsupported by legal authority, was not sufficient to preserve the Title VII claim.").

could have been, but was not, presented to the magistrate judge in the first instance.² Similarly, a district court will ordinarily refuse to consider argument that could have been, but was not, presented to the magistrate judge in the first instance. *See Zhao v. State Univ. of N.Y.*, 04-CV-0210, 2011 WL 3610717, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2011) (“[I]t is established law that a district judge will not consider new arguments raised in objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation that could have been raised before the magistrate but were not.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); *Hubbard v. Kelley*, 752 F. Supp.2d 311, 312-13 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (“In this circuit, it is established law that a district judge will not consider new arguments raised in objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation that could have been raised before the magistrate but were not.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

When only a *general* objection is made to a portion of a magistrate judge's report-recommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to only a *clear error* review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2),(3); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes: 1983 Addition; *see also Brown v. Peters*, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.) [collecting cases], *aff'd without opinion*, 175 F.3d 1007

² *See Paddington Partners v. Bouchard*, 34 F.3d 1132, 1137-38 (2d Cir. 1994) (“In objecting to a magistrate's report before the district court, a party has no right to present further testimony when it offers no justification for not offering the testimony at the hearing before the magistrate.”) [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; *Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters*, 894 F.2d 36, 40, n.3 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's request to present additional testimony where plaintiff “offered no justification for not offering the testimony at the hearing before the magistrate”); *cf. U. S. v. Raddatz*, 447 U.S. 667, 676, n.3 (1980) (“We conclude that to construe § 636(b)(1) to require the district court to conduct a second hearing whenever either party objected to the magistrate's credibility findings would largely frustrate the plain objective of Congress to alleviate the increasing congestion of litigation in the district courts.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes: 1983 Addition (“The term ‘de novo’ does not indicate that a secondary evidentiary hearing is required.”).

(2d Cir. 1999). Similarly, when an objection merely reiterates the *same arguments* made by the objecting party in its original papers submitted to the magistrate judge, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation challenged by those arguments to only a *clear error* review.³ Finally, when *no* objection is made to a portion of a report-recommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to only a *clear error* review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes: 1983 Addition. When performing such a “clear error” review, “the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” *Id.*⁴

After conducting the appropriate review, the Court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

Here, after carefully reviewing Petitioner’s timely Objections, the Court finds that they are repetitive of arguments previously submitted to Magistrate Judge Dancks. (*Compare* Dkt. No. 49 [Objections] *with* Dkt. No. 1 [Petition] *and* Dkt. No. 31 [Traverse] *and* Dkt. No. 32

³ See *Mario*, 313 F.3d at 766 (“Merely referring the court to previously filed papers or arguments does not constitute an adequate objection under either Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) or Local Civil Rule 72.3(a)(3).”); *Camardo v. Gen. Motors Hourly-Rate Emp. Pension Plan*, 806 F. Supp. 380, 382 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (explaining that court need not consider objections that merely constitute a “rehashing” of the same arguments and positions taken in original papers submitted to the magistrate judge); *accord, Praileau v. Cnty. of Schenectady*, 09-CV-0924, 2010 WL 3761902, at *1, n.1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2010) (McAvoy, J.); *Hickman ex rel. M.A.H. v. Astrue*, 07-CV-1077, 2010 WL 2985968, at *3 & n.3 (N.D.N.Y. July 27, 2010) (Mordue, C.J.); *Almonte v. N.Y.S. Div. of Parole*, 04-CV-0484, 2006 WL 149049, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2006) (Sharpe, J.).

⁴ See also *Batista v. Walker*, 94-CV-2826, 1995 WL 453299, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1995) (Sotomayor, J.) (“I am permitted to adopt those sections of [a magistrate judge's] report to which no specific objection is made, so long as those sections are not facially erroneous.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

[Supplemental Traverse] *and* Dkt. No. 36 [Second Supplemental Traverse].) As a result, the Court reviews the Report-Recommendation for only clear error.

Having done so, the Court finds no such clear error: Magistrate Judge Dancks employed the proper legal standards, accurately recited the facts, and correctly applied the law to those facts. (Dkt. No. 48, Parts I-II.) As a result, the Court accepts and adopts Magistrate Judge Dancks' Report-Recommendation in its entirety for the reasons stated therein. The Court notes that it would reach the same conclusion regardless of whether it considered Petitioner's untimely objections, and whether it review the Report-Recommendation de novo.

ACCORDINGLY, it is


ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Dancks' Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 48) is **ACCEPTED** and **ADOPTED** in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that Petitioner's Petition (Dkt. No. 1) is **DENIED** and **DISMISSED**; and it is further

ORDERED that Petitioner's letter-requests for transcripts and other documents (Dkt. Nos. 50, 52, 53, 54, and 55) are **DENIED**.

A certificate of appealability shall not issue with respect to any of the claims set forth in the Petition, because Petitioner has not made a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

Dated: February 18, 2022
Syracuse, New York


Hon. Glenn T. Suddaby
Chief U.S. District Judge