Will&Emery

MEMO ENDORSED

Boston Brussels Chicago Dusseldorf London Los Angeles Miami Munich

New York Orange County Rome San Diego Silicon Valley Weshington, D.C.

Lauren E. Handel Attorney at Law Ihandel@mwe.com 212.547.5831

August 7, 2009

BY FACSIMILE (212-805-7930)

The Honorable James C. Francis IV United States Magistrate Judge Southern District of New York Daniel Patrick Moynihan Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, New York 10007-1312

USDS SDNY	
DOCUMENT	
ELECTRONICALLY FILED	
DOC #:	
DATE FILED: 8/10/09	
ALSO DOCKET IN	IASTER FILE
00CIV1898 & 1	U 04CIV 3417

Re: City of New York v. Amerada Hess Corp, et al., Case No. 04-Civ. 3417
In re: MTBE Products Liability Litigation, MDL 1358

Dear Judge Francis:

We write on behalf of Exxon Mobil Corporation ("ExxonMobil") to seek clarification of the Court's rulings of August 4, 2009, on the objections to Plaintiff's designations from the October 2001 trial testimony of Curtis Stanley. It appears that no ruling was made on ExxonMobil's general objection that all testimony Plaintiff has designated from the trial in South Tahoe Public Utility District v. Atlantic Richfield ("South Tahoe") is inadmissible hearsay not permitted by Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(2).

In Re: Methyl Tertiary Export Mode (MTRE) hollowise the biliar kit patient exposed on hearsay grounds to Plaintiff's designations of deposition testimony of witnesses not affiliated with ExxonMobil from prior cases because Case Management Orders 4 and 6 permitted Plaintiff to use at trial in this matter certain deposition testimony taken in "Prior MTBE Litigations," including the South Tahoe case. However, Judge Scheindlin ruled that those Case Management Orders did not apply to Plaintiff's designations of prior trial testimony and, therefore, the admissibility of such prior trial testimony is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Case Management Order 52 ¶ 4 (attached as Exhibit A). As stated in ExxonMobil's general objections to Plaintiff's designations from the South Tahoe trial testimony of Mr. Stanley and other witnesses, such testimony is inadmissible because ExxonMobil was not a party to that case at the time of trial and neither ExxonMobil nor a predecessor in interest had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross or redirect examination.

We respectfully request that the Court issue a ruling on ExxonMobil's general hearsay objection to all of Plaintiff's designations of prior trial testimony. If additional information is

Doc. 2730

U.S. practice conducted through McDermott Will & Emery LLP.

needed, we are available for a telephonic or in-person conference at the Court's convenience or can provide briefing, if that is desired.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Respectfully submitted,

Sugar Dando V

Lauren E. Handel

cc: The Honorable Henry Pitman (by e-mail to Daniel Ortiz)

Nicholas Campins, Esq.

Application for reconsideration granted and prior decision adhered to. The interests Jan. 21, 1998); construction v. Cybernation, Duc., No. 91 Civ. 7474, 1996 WL 374601 (5. D.N.Y.