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                              Speakerphone Conference
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     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
     SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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                                            00 MDL 1358
                                            00-cv-01898 (SAS)
     IN RE: METHYL TERTIARY BUTYL
     ETHER ("MTBE") PRODUCTS
                                            04-cv-04968 (SAS)
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     LIABILITY LITIGATION
                                            07-cv-10470 (SAS)
                                             14-cv-06228 (SAS)
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       ----x
                                             December 9, 2015
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                                             4:31 p.m.
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     Before:
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                        HON. SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN,
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                                             District Judge
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                       APPEARANCES VIA SPEAKERPHONE
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     BY: JAMES B. HARRIS
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1	(In chambers; speakerphone call connected)
2	THE COURT: Good afternoon.
3	Mr. Gilmour.
4	MR. GILMOUR: Good afternoon, your Honor.
5	THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Pardo.
6	MR. PARDO: Good afternoon, your Honor.
7	THE COURT: And is Ms. Gerson on the phone also?
8	MS. GERSON: I am, your Honor. Good afternoon.
9	THE COURT: Is anybody else on the call?
10	No.
11	MR. HARRIS: Your Honor, this is Jim Harris, with
12	Thompson & Knight, on behalf of Petrobras. I do not intend to
13	participate but would like to be able to listen in.
14	THE COURT: What is your last name again?
15	MR. HARRIS: Harris, H-a-r-r-i-s.
16	THE COURT: Oh, OK. Yes.
17	MS. SHAH: And, your Honor, this is Meghana Shah from
18	Sutherland. I represent Vitol. I also just want to listen in.
19	THE COURT: You represent who?
20	MS. SHAH: The Vitol defendant.
21	THE COURT: OK. All right. In any event, the reason
22	I called this telephone conference is because of a pending
23	motion for reconsideration of this Court's October 1, 2015
24	decision denying summary judgment for the defendants on the
25	statute of limitations grounds, in particular the SOC 0242

trial site. The defendants say that I applied the law incorrectly because there was this report that indicated the presence of MTBE, and the Commonwealth raised a disputed issue of fact by saying, yes, we got the report but, no, it didn't really indicate in the body of the report that MTBE was present, so we were not aware as of the date of the report of the presence of MTBE at that site. You know, if we had been, we would have been time barred because those reports were received in October -- I'm sorry, in 2004 and October 2005, respectively, and any knowledge before June 12, '06 would make the claim time barred.

But in reviewing the briefs on reconsideration, I am no longer confident that merely raising an issue of fact as to whether the report put the Commonwealth on notice is enough. I think that is a disputed issue of fact. Yes, the report was received, but whether or not it provided notice is a fact question.

But the law seems to be that the Commonwealth would have to not only prove a lack of knowledge but has to show the date when it did become aware of the damage, and that's in a couple of the cases that were cited in the briefs — Rivera, a 1982 District of Puerto Rico case, and Davis Davis v. Colon Rivera, another case, not the district court, but in any event, another Puerto Rico case.

So the question is whether the Commonwealth can

proffer the date when it did become aware of the damage, because in its responsive papers on the summary judgment motion it didn't. It just contested that the reports put it on notice but it didn't offer the date on which it learned. And even in the reconsideration briefing it still relies on the fact that the Court found that that was a disputed issue of fact that would require that the summary judgment motion be denied. But now I think that they have to come up and tell me what is the date on which the Commonwealth claims it did become aware. And I would allow a supplemental submission on that point if the Commonwealth had the dating, can show how it has the date.

So, Mr. Gilmour, the call is really directed at you.

MR. GILMOUR: Yes, your Honor. And to be clear, for the purposes of the record, the Commonwealth -- and I believe we have to send in our response in opposition to the motion for reconsideration -- disagrees necessarily that the case law requires us to provide a date in this instance, but I understand that is not the question you have pending with me now. So if you will allow us argument on that --

THE COURT: It is not a matter of argument. The defendants have provided Puerto Rican cases that say the Commonwealth has to not only prove a lack of knowledge but has to affirmatively -- and I quote from the Rivera decision -- "show the date when it became aware of the damage." So it's not a matter of an argument; you need to submit a fact-type

affidavit from somebody to say this is when we learned. I mean, you know, you brought suit so you had to have learned at some point, so the question is when and how did you learn.

It is not a matter of supplementing your argument. I don't want further argument as to what the law requires. I have had that basically twice now. I had it in the summary judgment motion and I have it on the reconsideration. I can decide for myself what the law requires. I want to know if you can proffer that date.

MR. GILMOUR: Yes, your Honor, and I will momentarily.

I would also say that those cases provide after the defendant identifies the date, if the plaintiff disagrees with that date, it is typically on issues of latent damages where they admit now we will have the date of the surgery but the damage does not become aware until later --

THE COURT: OK. But our case here is the defendants do say you knew when we sent that report, or those reports, in '04 and '05. You've contested that and say those reports did not put us on notice, and I ruled in your favor and I said that's a disputed issue of fact that those reports put you on notice. But I now think you have to go further than that and say we didn't know then because we want you to agree with us that either that is a disputed issue of fact or you should just accept that you didn't put us on notice but here's when did learn it, and I am looking for that other half.

MR. GILMOUR: Yes, your Honor, and I will give you that date now.

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And just because of the nature of how it was derived,

I state that the Commonwealth would respond without waiving any
privileges or protections, including the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine, and that date is

August 26, 2011.

THE COURT: Yes. It is not enough I think to give me the date. What happened on August 26, 2011 that puts the Commonwealth on notice?

MR. GILMOUR: Yes, your Honor. Again, without waiving any privileges, a nontestifying consulting expert provided the Commonwealth with materials identifying the presence of MTBE at that site, at the SOC 42 site.

THE COURT: OK. Can you put the representation you just made -- although it is on the record, I do have a court reporter here -- in an affidavit format?

MR. GILMOUR: I can, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK. Would you submit that promptly?

MR. GILMOUR: I will, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. GILMOUR: I will do it as quickly as possible.

THE COURT: OK. Now, Mr. Pardo or Ms. Gerson, do you want to add anything?

MR. PARDO: Your Honor, it's Jim Pardo. Good

afternoon and thank you.

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I would, if I could, just for a few moments.

THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

MR. PARDO: I understand that you are allowing plaintiffs to supplement the record in this instance, and I appreciate that. I think that is a courtesy and that you've shown them to us in the past. I would just like to know for the record -- I always hate to do this, but our client does object to that because we believe that the standard, the legal standard, the legal burden of proof that plaintiff has to meet, including the cases that are cited in our brief and that you have referred to, were known or should have been known to the plaintiff, and they should have come forward with this date beforehand. It should have been part of the four corners of the briefing or the Rule 56.1 statements that were submitted by them on this motion. They didn't do that and for that reason I think they failed to meet their burden of proof here, and on that grounds alone I think we're entitled to summary judgment.

THE COURT: Right. I understand your point, but the way I look at it is because of your motion to reconsider, in fact, the ruling is not a final ruling and it's subject to change under Rule 60. The Court really has the right to correct it at any time before final judgment.

So the bottom line is that having now accepted, so to speak, your interpretation of the case law, I feel that it is

fair to expand the record in order to justly decide the motion. It was decided, of course, in plaintiff's favor in the first place, but it's reopened by virtue of your motion for reconsideration, which kept it from being final anyway, and at this point I think it is fair to expand the record or to allow the record to be supplemented. So I take your point but this is where I come out. So —

MS. GERSON: Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes, Ms. Gerson.

MS. GERSON: Yes. Would the defendants have an opportunity to respond --

THE COURT: I don't think it requires a response. I mean, they are just going to put in a fact affidavit that says this is when we learned, this is how we learned. There is really not much more to say.

MS. GERSON: So, your Honor, if I could just say that I believe that they -- Mr. Gilmour gave us August 2011.

THE COURT: Yes, August 26th.

MS. GERSON: But this site was already selected by plaintiffs as a focus site in March 2011. Again, it is also four years after the complaint was filed. So I think defendants may have information after seeing the declaration that would be relevant.

MR. PARDO: I would add, your Honor -- Jim Pardo -- that the site was on a site list that plaintiffs provided to

us -- I don't have the exact date but it was in 2010. So they had to have known.

THE COURT: Yeah, that is odd, come to think about it.

Mr. Gilmour, that is odd. I thought you were going to select any date after June 12, '06 so it would be timely. But realizing the date you have stated, that is odd because you named this site much earlier and in fact selected it as a focus site. So now I am confused.

MR. GILMOUR: Yes, your Honor. You may recall that this case was filed in 2007 originally as an island-wide case without identifying sites.

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. GILMOUR: Thereafter --

THE COURT: But when was it selected as the focus site?

MR. GILMOUR: I'm sorry, your Honor.

THE COURT: When was it selected as a focus site?

MR. GILMOUR: I'll explain, your Honor.

We developed a list of sites that was overinclusive in 2010, as Mr. Pardo just stated. We then, based upon certain information, reduced that down to focus sites, which, as Ms. Gerson identified, was March 1, 2011. We continued to revise and analyze those sites to determine which would be the best sites and develop further evidence on this to identify the trial sites, which happened much later, and that's how we

related to the SOC 0242 site. We made our final determination and identified MTBE as a contaminant there on August 26, 2011 --

THE COURT: You mean up to that time, with this so-called overinclusive list, you didn't know whether it even had MTBE or not, you just knew it was a Hess station site in Puerto Rico?

MR. GILMOUR: We knew that it was a gas station site that was on the LUST list and that there was BTEX contamination.

THE COURT: I see. On the what list? I missed the word.

MR. GILMOUR: The LUST, the leaking underground storage tank, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK. The LUST list and it had BTEX at the site?

MR. GILMOUR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: I see. OK. But it is going to be your statement that you didn't know of the MTBE contamination until 2011.

All right. Look, I think let's just get back to

Ms. Gerson. I mean, you can put in something but it's going to

be argument, I think, not fact-based since now both sides have

explained the history of these dates, but I won't stop you from

responding. I think it's not a useful effort, but if that's

what you want to do to complete the record, I won't stop you.

So when are you going to have yours in, Mr. Gilmour?

MR. GILMOUR: Your Honor, I need to contact the client again, and right now I am in Washington, D.C. I will be returning to the office tomorrow. If I could have until early next week, I would appreciate it?

THE COURT: Let's make it, please, the close of business on Tuesday, the 15th, please.

MR. GILMOUR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And, Ms. Gerson, if you really think that some kind of a response could be helpful to the Court, I assume you can have it by Friday, the 18th.

MS. GERSON: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. OK.

MR. GILMOUR: Your Honor -- this is Mr. Gilmour -- may I raise one more issue that I think the Court should be aware of?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GILMOUR: In reviewing Esso's responses to interrogatories in preparation for this hearing, in response to interrogatory number 15, the Commonwealth requested the date that MTBE was first detected in soil and groundwater at the Esso 242 site. Esso responded that they objected, and I quote, to the reliability of chromatograms to determine a detection and/or level of an analyte such as MTBE when MTBE was not a

specifically targeted chemical for the purpose of these prior analyses.

THE COURT: I understand. I'm really not interested any longer in the reports of 2004 and 2005 for the purpose of deciding this motion to reconsider because I've already held — and I have no need to change that holding — that it raises a disputed issue of fact.

MR. GILMOUR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Right. You say it didn't put you on notice, they say it did; that is already a fact dispute. I wouldn't grant them summary judgment or there is no inverse to that. I wouldn't grant them summary judgment on that argument.

The better argument now is that that's not enough. You have to show when you did know. I'm allowing the supplementing of the record. They object to my allowing it at this time. I've explained why I'm allowing it, and that's where we are at this point in time. So your statement, again, is preserved because there is a record being made today, but it doesn't -- I don't need to go into that further.

MR. GILMOUR: Yes, your Honor.

MR. PARDO: Your Honor, it is Jim Pardo. I'm sorry to keep you on the phone. But just so I understand, the affidavit that we will be getting will not just state the date but will explain, understanding there are privilege issues and whatnot --

THE COURT: Yes, the source of the information, right. Yes, which he disclosed on this call. A nontestifying expert learned the information through I don't know what, testing or records or both, and produced it to the Commonwealth, but you'll hear it in writing. That's what he said. MR. PARDO: OK. Thank you. THE COURT: OK. Thank you, folks. Bye-bye. MR. GILMOUR: Thank you, your Honor. (Call disconnected)