



class notice.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly, there is no valid agreement. *Scheck v. Francis*, 26 N.Y.2d 466, 469-70 (1970) (“It is well settled that, if the parties to an agreement do not intend it to be binding upon them until it is reduced to writing and signed by both of them, they are not bound and may not be held liable until it has been written out and signed.”); NY Gen. Obligations Law § 5-701(a)(1); see Doc. No. 1533, ¶ 46 (New York law governs agreement). Moreover, because the agreement contemplates PwCIL’s waiver of any contribution and indemnification claims against GS and GSP (Doc. No. 1533, at 20, ¶ 4; see *id.* at 13, ¶ (o)), PwCIL’s failure to sign the agreement prejudices the Trustee<sup>4</sup> -- even if the agreement were otherwise enforceable against the remaining PwC Defendants.

Second, the [Proposed] Final Judgment and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice (“Judgment”) contains “offset” language that PwC might contend reflects this Court’s determination that PwC has colorable rights to offset the Trustee’s claims due to the settlement. Specifically, the Judgment states, in pertinent part: “Nothing in this paragraph precludes the PwC Defendants from arguing that the settlement proceeds in this case are an offset against claims that may be made against them in other proceedings.” Doc. No. 1533 Ex. 5, ¶ 19.<sup>5</sup> Any offset, however, would be improper, and flies in the face of PwC’s statement that the Trustee is not seeking recovery on account of “the same injury” as that alleged by plaintiffs. See Doc. No. 1470, at 3 (citation omitted). At the very least, the Judgment should be modified to clarify that the Court expresses no view on the merits of any offset.

Third, the settlement improperly establishes a *single fund* to be shared (after payment of attorney fees and expenses) among all class members, the great majority of whom never invested in GS or GSP.<sup>6</sup> Any settlement should establish a *separate* settlement amount for class members who invested in the other Fairfield funds, and the class notice should disclose the various settlement amounts. This would ensure that the Trustee’s claims are not offset by settlement

---

<sup>3</sup> Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP represented PwCIL, but did not sign the stipulation. Although the PwC Defendants may regard themselves as one firm, the stipulation contemplates a separate signature by PwCIL’s counsel.

<sup>4</sup> It also prejudices class members, who are supposed to receive releases from PwCIL. See *id.* at 25, ¶ 17; 16, ¶ (bb).

<sup>5</sup> The Trustee raised a similar point in connection with its application to intervene in connection with the Citco settlement, but the Court ruled that the Trustee had not shown prejudice. Doc. No. 1413. Here, however, the other objections described above, without more, establish prejudice.


<sup>6</sup> See Order dated Dec. 23, 2009, Doc. No. 372, at 11 (referencing 29 limited partners of GSP); Doc. No. 1205, ¶¶ 4, 6, 8 (Lead Counsel identified approximately 55 class members who invested in GS or GSP from October 31, 2003 to September 1, 2006); Doc. No. 1423, ¶¶ 4-5, 70 (Citco settlement notice sent to over 4000 potential class members who invested in the various Fairfield funds, including Fairfield Sentry Ltd.).



amounts allocated to class members who invested in Fairfield Sentry Ltd. (by far the largest fund by reported value) and other off-shore funds.<sup>7</sup> It also would ensure that class members are notified of the amount of any potential offset that PwC might claim in the Trustee's cases. See generally *In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig.*, 671 F. Supp. 2d 467, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (approving class action settlements involving multiple IPOs, where separate settlement amount was designated for each IPO).

Nonetheless, if a single settlement fund is permitted, each PwC Defendant should be required to disclose the maximum amount it would claim as an offset against the Trustee's claims. Such disclosure is important for class notice and clearly implicates the adequacy of the settlement. For example, if GS and GSP investors collectively stood to receive, say, \$5 million of the \$55 million settlement fund, but PwC seeks to offset the Trustee's claims by \$55 million, the settlement obviously is unfair and prejudicial to the Trustee. See generally *Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG*, 443 F.3d 253, 275-76 (2d Cir. 2006).

Respectfully,



Robert A. Wallner

cc (via email):

David A. Barrett, Esq.  
Sarah L. Cave, Esq.  
Timothy A. Duffy, Esq.  
Robert C. Finkel, Esq.  
Fraser L. Hunter, Jr., Esq.  
Victor E. Stewart, Esq.

Plaintiffs and the PwC Defendants  
herewith are directed to respond  
by 1-28-16, jointly by letter  
not to exceed five (5) pages, to  
the matters set forth above by  
non-party New Onenwch Litigation  
SO ORDERED: Trustee.  
1-25-16  
DATE VICTOR MARRERO, U.S.D.J.

<sup>7</sup> See Doc. No. 1205, ¶ 35 n.5 (Lead Counsel's statement: "Whereas the purported asset balances of the Domestic Funds [i.e., GS and GSP] approximated \$140 million as of August 2006, the reported assets of the off-shore funds at times exceeded \$7 billion.").

