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NITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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CHRISTIAN LOUBOUTIN,
    Plaintiff,
    v.
YVES SAINT LAURENT,
    Defendant.
---------------------------------x
                                    July 27, 2011
                                    11:00 a.m.
Before:
                HON. VICTOR MARRERO,
                                    District Judge
                                    APPEARANCES (Via telephone)
MCCARTER & ENGLISH
    Attorneys for Plaintiff
BY: HARLEY LEWIN
    LEE BROMBERG
DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON
    Attorneys for Defendant
BY: DAVID BERNSTEIN
    JILL VAN BERG
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THE COURT: Good morning, this is Judge Marrero.
MR. LEWIN: Good morning, your Honor, this is Harley Lewin, and I have Lee Bromberg on the phone with me for plaintiffs.

MR. BERNSTEIN: Your Honor, it's David Bernstein at Debevoise \& Plimpton. I'm with Jill Van Berg, and of course we represent Yves Saint Laurent.

THE COURT: All right, thank you for responding on short notice by this means.

I scheduled a conference, in part, in response to Mr. Lewin's letter of July 25, asking whether there would be any interest on the part of the Court for the parties to address some of the questions that came up at the hearing last week.

Mr. Bernstein, did you receive this letter?
MR. BERNSTEIN: We did, and we're prepared to address those same points as well, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Now before we get there, I had a couple of questions that I wanted to pose that did not come out clearly at the conference.

Mr. Lewin, the plaintiff's allegations here are that Louboutin has been using the red sole on these women's shoes since roughly 1992, and it registered the mark in the United States in 2007. One question is, when the use of this red sole mark commenced in 1992, was it the same shade of red that was
involved in the case that went to the European Court; has Louboutin, in other words, used that same exact shade uniformly and consistently throughout its entire claim to that particular mark?

MR. LEWIN: The answer to that is yes, your Honor.
MR. BERNSTEIN: Although, your Honor, if I may, there's a very interesting anomaly that only came to our attention when Mr. Lewin focused us on the trademark registration through his letter. And that is that Louboutin has two trademark registrations. The one that Mr. Lewin showed you on the big board in court is a U.S. registration 3361597, and you saw that that had the dotted line of a high heel shoe with a particular red sole.

But in preparing for this morning's call, and after reading Mr. Lewin's letter, we went and we looked at the second trademark registration that Louboutin has in the United States, and it's based on the French registration that was at issue in the Paciotti case, and the U.S. registration is 3376197. And that's based on their international registration, which is number 0902955.

What was very interesting to me when I looked at that is that it's a different shade of red, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Bernstein, you have anticipated the question that $I$ had, which is exactly where you're driving. My question was what was the registration, the color
shade of the registration that Louboutin obtained in the United States in 2008? Is it exactly the same as the other color that it has been using since 1992, and which was the subject of the French or the European application, and whether Louboutin has been using that color consistently in all of its products as sold in the United States, or has there ever been any variation of the color to some other shade of red during the course of its claim to that mark?

MR. LEWIN: Your Honor --
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. LEWIN -- this is Mr. Lewin again. I think there is a little bit of a misdirection here, but let me answer your question directly.

Mr. Louboutin was asked and answered a question in his deposition and I have -- I can tell you that I've confirmed it, that the shade of red he used on the shoes since 1992 has not varied from the red selected by Mr. Louboutin when he first printed the shoe -- red nail polish. That red has been consistently used by Mr. Louboutin on virtually every single shoe that's been produced, period.

THE COURT: Both here and in Europe?
MR. LEWIN: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: All right. And is that shade the same shade that is the subject of the U.S. application? And now this is another variation, Mr. Lewin. You recall that when we
discussed the matter at the hearing, you, yourself, acknowledged that sometimes shades on paper don't come out exactly the way they should because it depends on absorption by the fabric and all kinds of other factors, so that what's on paper may not necessarily be the same shade that you may find on a shoe. And to that extent, the question is, how does a follow-up competitor be able to determine which red it is, since the paper itself is not the indicator of what the mark is?

MR. LEWIN: Well, let me answer that as well. In the first, in the first instance, of course, you're right, your Honor. I think both sides I think acknowledge that regardless of whether a particular shade one may select, may indeed print differently on paper versus leather versus cloth.

The TMEP, and when you apply for a color mark, specifically requires that the digital image that is submitted as the drawing in connection with a color, has to be an accurate representation of the mark as applied for, meaning that the mark that's used on footwear. So while there is perhaps some difference between the mark that may appear on the footwear and the mark that's registered, the fact in terms of infringement or the judgment of the infringement is the mark that's registered governs. There is very very specific language. In fact, your Honor, in the TMEP that specifically says under Section 807.07C, when the color is shown on a
drawing page and paper or digitized image is inconsistent with the color claimed in a written application, the drawing controls, meaning that the drawing is what is supposed to give notice of your color to a second color that is being registered or in fact has been registered.

In terms of the second part of your question, your Honor, which is, how does a second comer know what to do. The second comer is I think held to the standard that -- the same standard that Judge Sweet enunciated in the Olay case in 1983 which is, essentially, a judgment that is made to stay far enough away from that particular color. If somebody applies, for example, a red to the outsole of a shoe, the issue becomes that whether that red infringes upon the red that's registered, which is a legal judgment of likelihood of confusion. If somebody in an industrial format, such as the designer Russo or others in the design group of YSL were to select a red, they know well enough to know that the way you avoid the problem is to stay far enough away.

That question, your Honor, is one that we did address a little bit. And I used an example of a ward mark that -- or the point is that the obligation is not on us to tell them nor is it upon a court necessarily. The obligation is on the second comer to avoid the confusion. And that -- even if the Olay case, where it was the so-called Ryan extension, Judge Sweet held the second comer not to be able to use the
particular color scheme that was used in that case by the first registrant. So it's a judgment call. There's no bright line.

THE COURT: All right, thank you. And I acknowledge that you did address -- you did address at least the latter portion of this discussion at the hearing last week.

All right, Mr. Bernstein.
MR. BERNSTEIN: Thank you, your Honor. I would make two points in response to what Mr. Lewin just mentioned. The first is that, again, if you look at the two trademark registrations, they are two different shades. And so it may very well be, as Mr. Lewin has stated, that Mr. Louboutin had used the same color throughout. I don't, I don't doubt that. You know, we don't know, we haven't taken historical discovery, but I'll accept that.

But from the perspective of what is a competitor supposed to do, it's actually quite interesting to look at these two different trade registrations, which clearly are different shades of red, and that's -- that is unexplained. Now --

THE COURT: All right, let me -- Mr. Bernstein, are you suggesting, based on this line of argument, that in fact Louboutin has now registered two entirely different shades of red for its hue here?

MR. BERNSTEIN: Yes, your Honor, that is the case.
The two numbers I gave you -- and your Clerk could look this up
on USPTO website or we could send you printouts of the two trademark registrations -- are clearly different shades of red. The one that Mr . Lewin showed in court I would say is a brighter red, and the second registration, which was -- which was filed in August 2006, and it was registered in January 2008, is a different shade. But the significance of that is that it really goes to --

THE COURT: Let me -- sorry to interrupt, but I want to make sure we get the whole thing on the record.

We have a Reporter, by the way, taking a transcript. Mr. Bernstein, what is your view as to these two U.S. registrations in relation to the French pantone that ends in 663 that was the subject of the European application; is that a different shade of red or is it the same as one of the two U.S. registrations?

MR. BERNSTEIN: Because the two U.S. registrations don't indicate what their pantone is, $I$ just don't know the answer to that.

THE COURT: Is it conceivable, then, that could be three shades of red?

MR. LEWIN: I'm sorry, this is Mr. Lewin. I can answer that question for you.

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. LEWIN: It is the second, the one you saw in the courtroom with the large dotted line high heeled shoe is in
fact the same rendition that was used in the color -- in the application that has now been approved by EU.

THE COURT: Except that the EU, essentially, if I may say, it adjusted the application at the stage of those proceedings in order to give a number to the shade. There was no shade when the proceedings began, is that correct?

MR. LEWIN: May I respond to that, your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. LEWIN: Your Honor, again, the TMEP specifically requires that a generic word be used, and the option in its latest variation, that is to say version seven of the TMEP, the brand new one, that you can use -- where it says very specifically, it says under 807078i, if the color is ambiguous, you got to -- examiner has to require clarification. Apparently, this did not occur. And it goes on to say the following, sir. It says, the color claim must include the generic name and the color claimed. The color claimed may also include a reference to a commercial identification system. The USPTO does not endorse or recommend any one commercial color identification system. And then it goes on to say, sir, it is usually not necessary to indicate shades of a color, but the examining attorney has the discretion to require that the applicant indicate shades of a color, if necessary, to accurately describe the mark. In simple terms, the reason the United States -- the reason the European Union uses a pantone
system or pantone number -- and so a number of the individual countries of the Union -- is that that's their law.

In our case what guides the second comer or what guides anybody is a comparison between the color as registered, right, and the color used on the outside of a shoe that they intend to market, and then the judgment then becomes one of likelihood of confusion.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. LEWIN: And we ought not lose sight of that.
MR. BERNSTEIN: And the point I wanted to make with respect to Mr. Lewin's last point, your Honor, is the following: When we're dealing with word in trademarks, and everybody knows it's a trademark; you know, Exxon, we all know Exxon or Esson is meant to be a trademark that indicates the brand of the gas station that you're going to, for example. And so it does make sense for courts in that circumstance to look at the trademark Exxon and say, has a second comer come too close, because the second comer is also using it as a trademark for their own.

But the situation is very different here, your Honor.
Because when Yves Saint Laurent sells shoes, the trademark that
they put on it very very prominently is there YSL signature trademark.

When they choose the color of the shoe, they don't think of that in any way as a trademark. All they think
they're doing at that point is designing a color to coordinate with the rest of the clothing collection of the season. And they're making those color choices not to indicate source or brand; not to say we're going to choose a particular shade of red or blue or green because we want people to know it comes from Yves Saint Laurent. They're choosing that shade of color because it's an ornamental element of the product of the shoe. And so I don't disagree with Mr. Lewin about how courts normally go about thinking of infringement when we're thinking of traditional trademarks, that people understand they're meant to be trademarks. But in this circumstance when there's two registrations that have different shades, when we showed Mr. Louboutin and Mr. Mourot, who is the CEO of his company, the pantone books and said, you know, which shades are we allowed to do. And they said, I don't know, you'd have to show it to me on a sole. When we showed them some of the shoes, like the shoe Mr. Lewin showed you in court, which ended up on your desk, your Honor, the Granad, very high pump, and Mr. Louboutin specifically said, you know, I don't know, I would need to go back to my office and think about it. I think I mistakenly referred to the Gypsy shoe in court when I read that part of the transcript. All of this shows that it's highly indefinite, and that this trademark, whether it's limited to one color, one particular shade reference or whether it's just more generally red, which is the position that the
plaintiffs have taken in this case up until the point of their reply, it shows you how indefinite it is and how very difficult it is for any competitor to do what Mr. Lewin just said, which is stay far enough away. If stay far enough away means that we can use a whole bunch of different shades of red in designing our shoes, that is exactly the very anti-competitive concerns that we would have about trademark that's being enforced in this case.

THE COURT: All right, let me then come back --
MR. LEWIN: Your Honor, may I reply to that, since Mr. Bernstein has somewhat side stepped what you were just talking about. If you don't mind?

THE COURT: Just briefly.
MR. LEWIN: It is not germane, it's simply irrelevant. In fact, I think the second thing is whether or not their use ultimately serves as a source indicator in a post sale context, the answer to that is yes. Regardless of what Mr. Bernstein says their intent is, the intent ultimately is not relevant. It's the fact of use, and you can't get around it if you have a second comer under the law.

The second -- the third thing is I think the idea that pantone number is a red herring, your Honor. Because even if you looked up a pantone number on a piece of paper and you said, which neither Mr. Louboutin as a designer who specifically said he doesn't use it, he said magic markers --
he doesn't use it when he talks to factories, and Mr. Mourot doesn't know, who is a managing party, they don't do business in pantone colors. So I think we're listening to bit of a red herring there.

But the fact of the matter is even if you have the pantone color, what somebody would do is open it up in the book, look at the pantone color, look at the shades that might be covered on either side of that pantone cover, and make this very same business judgment that everybody does day in and day out, what would avoid confusion. That's their duty.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Lewin, your position, your client's position is that we should follow Judge Sweet's edict and say draw a swath 40 percent above and 40 percent below the 663 pantone, and that's what Yves Saint Laurent should then abide by?

MR. LEWIN: I can't say the answer to that, your Honor, without, without at the end of the day -- it's certainly the prerogative of the court to issue an injunction that it's comfortable with that would guide the actions of YSL. I think that there's a -- Judge Sweet was under somewhat different constraints when he came up with that remedy, because the particular colors that they were dealing with were not clearly defined as they are in this case. It was, that was a trade dress matter, and because of that there was no registration to guide him, so I think he got a bit clever.

But if the Court were to do that then, you know, whether we were satisfied or not, we'd have to live with it. It's not necessarily my position, no, sir.

My position is that there are a whole lot of reds that have been used just like the one that was put up on your desk in that -- and we said pointedly that would not bother us. Pink wouldn't bother us, red orange wouldn't bother us. What we are concerned about is a very simple measurement, is the likelihood of confusion between use of the red sole on a competitor shoe that's a high profile competitor in a luxury footwear business, that in the post sale context jumps out just the same way Louboutin sole does. If it's far enough away from that, however it's defined, we'd live with it.

MR. BERNSTEIN: And I just have to -- I just make one point. The very shoe that Mr. Lewin showed you in court and handed to you, your Honor, that ended up on your desk that Mr. Lewin now tells you they're fine with, that exact sole we showed to Mr. Louboutin at page 60 of the transcript. And he said he didn't know whether he objects to it; he'd have to think about it back at the office.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. BERNSTEIN: And that's the exact same sole that Mr. Lewin is now telling you is fine. This shows you the shifting target nature of the trademark.

THE COURT: All right, let's bring this to a close and
come back to where we started, which is Mr. Lewin's letter of July 25 and his proposal for the parties to address some of these issues further. The question is by when and by how much. I don't need to have any extensive memoranda of law here. What I suggest you do is to summarize whatever additional positions you think we should take into account in brief letters of three to four pages at most, and we'll take them into consideration. Question --

MR. LEWIN: Thank you, your Honor. That's perfect with us.

THE COURT: By when would you need to have that?
MR. LEWIN: We can have it to you on the close of business Friday, sir, if that's sufficiently fast.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Bernstein?
MR. BERNSTEIN: Your Honor, I'm in court with a mediation next week, and then have to go to Washington for a meeting at the MTC. Would the Court allow us till the end of next week to reply?

MR. LEWIN: Your Honor, we think it ought to come in simultaneously. I don't think there should be a reply. If we get it in fast, so can they.

THE COURT: All right, I agree. I don't need to have replies. Just submit your respective positions by the end of the week. And, Mr. Bernstein, if you need an additional day, you could submit it on Monday.

MR. BERNSTEIN: I appreciate that, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. LEWIN: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: All right, thank you.
MR. BERNSTEIN: Thank you, your Honor.
MR. LEWIN: Thank you for your time, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right, you're very welcome.
(Adjourned)

