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      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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      CAPITOL RECORDS, LLC,
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                     Plaintiff,
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                                                12 Civ. 95 (RJS)
                 V.
      REDIGI, INC.; JOHN
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      OSSENMACHER; and LARRY
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      RUDOLPH, also known as
      Lawrence S. Rogel,
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                     Defendants.
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                                                New York, N.Y.
                                                December 2, 2013
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                                                6:10 p.m.
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      Before:
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                         HON. RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
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                                                District Judge
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                                 APPEARANCES
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      COWAN LIEBOWITZ & LATMAN
           Attorneys for Plaintiff
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      BY: RICHARD S. MANDEL
           JONATHAN Z. KING
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      ADELMAN MATZ
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           Attorneys for Defendant Redigi, Inc.
      BY: GARY P. ADELMAN
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           SARAH M. MATZ
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      HAUSFELD, LLP
           Attorneys for Defendants John Ossenmacher
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           and Larry Rudolph
      BY: JAMES J. PIZZIRUSSO
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(Case called) MR. MANDEL: Richard Mandel, Cowan Liebowitz & Latman. 2 3 MR. KING: Jonathan King, also from Cowan Liebowitz & 4 Latman.

THE COURT: Mr. King good afternoon to you. For the defendants.

MS. MATZ: Sarah Matz for Redigi.

MR. ADELMAN: Gary Adelman also for Redigi.

MR. PIZZIRUSSO: Your Honor, James Pizzirusso for the individual defendants, John Ossenmacher and Larry Rudolph.

THE COURT: You are for both of them. I thought we were waiting on someone else.

MR. PIZZIRUSSO: Just me, your Honor. I was in your other courtroom. This is my first time I've been here.

THE COURT: You were in 318 where I had the trial. That's because the marshals told you to go there.

MR. PIZZIRUSSO: They did.

THE COURT: Sorry for all that.

Thank you all for your patience.

As Mr. Pizzirusso knows, I've got a criminal trial going. It's an insider trading case. It's interesting, but it's been time consuming. So whenever I let the jury go we seem to have half a dozen things we need to talk about, which is what happened today. My apologies to you. Thank you for your patience.

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I asked you to come in because there is sort of a barrage of letters going back and forth on a variety of issues, including discovery issues. But it seems to me we should talk about where we have been and where we are now. This is a case, obviously, that has a fair amount of history. We also have a situation where several months ago plaintiffs asked to amend and that would have been up to me as to whether I would allow an amendment and it is up to me. I allowed it.

But in part I allowed it because of the representations made by Mr. Adelman. I'm not suggesting he was making false statements, but they turn out not to be accurate statements, not to have been accurate statements.

So my principal question was whether amending was going to require additional discovery and a lot of additional time and effort on a case where I had already ruled on a motion for summary judgment on what are important issues and legal issues that were well briefed and well argued.

And when I asked that question Mr. Adelman certainly didn't think there was going to be any need for additional discovery. Mr. Mandel agreed. And so on the basis of those representations I allowed the amendment.

We have the amendment and it turns out that Mr.

Adelman and Ms. Matz are not representing the individual defendants, so they have new counsel. And the individual defendants are pursuing some of the same defenses and some new

defenses and also are seeking discovery that is above and beyond what was the subject up until the first summary judgment motion. So that sort of prompts me to say, is this worth it. The plaintiffs have wanted to amend had they known we were going to go down this road.

Mr. Mandel.

MR. MANDEL: Yes. We do want to amend and we think we have valid claims against the individuals. But unfortunately what we think has happened is, new counsel has come into the case and is using it as an opportunity to try and just invent anything under the sun that they can unearth defenses out of, many of which I think have already been ruled upon.

THE COURT: Some of which have been ruled upon. Fair use is one I ruled upon.

MR. MANDEL: The first sale doctrine.

THE COURT: First sale doctrine. Those are the two principal ones, right?

MR. MANDEL: Correct.

THE COURT: There are some additional defenses that plaintiffs argue Redigi could have raised earlier and did not and that the individual defendants should be foreclosed from bringing those. And you cite cases from the Second Circuit and elsewhere, principally the Second Circuit, In Re Teltronics and Kreager.

I think the posture in those cases was a little

different in that there was already was a judgment in those cases as opposed to here where we don't have a final judgment. We are doing discovery now on damages. And the thought was we could do that pretty quickly and then tee this whole thing up for the circuit sooner rather than later.

I think those cases are different. I think that the reasoning might apply, but those are cases which involve collateral estoppel where there has been a judgment. So that's my reason for suggesting that probably had I started from scratch and known this is where we are going, I would have denied the motion to amend. You could have then filed against the individual defendants, and we would have then gone forward on two tracks. But I think the track against Redigi would be almost done by now as opposed to us being kind of mired in discovery disputes and motions practice.

MR. MANDEL: No. I understand. But I do think, your Honor, that there is law that has applied collateral estoppel to partial summary judgments. And I believe even if you look beyond, even if you assume that these defenses are eligible to be asserted, on the factual record that exists already, it seems very plain that there is actually no possible basis for any of them in terms of just what's already been found.

In terms of the DMCA defense, I think there is a reason Redigi asserted that in the answer. We moved in our partial summary judgment motion, actually addressed it in our

moving papers. They didn't even see fit to address it in response. That's how little they thought of that defense.

THE COURT: The fact that one defendant thinks little of a defense and another thinks better of it is not dispositive. I think if it's a frivolous motion, then I guess there are repercussions that flow from that. At this point I am not sure I'm prepared to say that.

And I am not supposed to be delving into the record with respect to the motions to dismiss. You are talking about a record with respect to Redigi which has already passed stage 1 of motions for summary motion. There is a contemplation of additional summary judgment on the remaining issues, including damages. But we are kind of moving on a different tract at this point.

MR. MANDEL: I guess so. I guess what confusing me is the factual record really is the same. These individuals, the only question that's really left in terms of their individual liability is whether they participated in this conduct that's been found to be infringing.

THE COURT: That's what I thought the use was going to be for purposes of the amended complaint against the individuals and that's certainly what was represented to me.

And I can quote from the transcript if necessary.

The only defense that could potentially be available

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is somehow they didn't have enough personal involvement to be individually liable. That's Mr. Mandel. I think Mr. Adelman basically agreed with that, that that would be the issue. And so that certainly I think would be relevant when we get to summary judgment. Right now we are not at summary judgment. We are at a motion to dismiss for the individual defendants. They are seeking discovery with respect to other issues that were not contested by Redigi, but I don't know, are they estopped? I think part of it is a factual issue as to how much of the individual defendants were involved in running the Redigi litigation, right?

MR. MANDEL: I don't think there is much of a dispute about that.

THE COURT: I don't know.

MR. MANDEL: They are the only witnesses who were identified in initial disclosures. They are the people who showed up at the preliminary injunction hearing, at every deposition, at every mediation. When we asked to even identify other shareholders, they objected and said it was irrelevant. If there is anybody else who controlled this litigation, I don't know who they are or where they were.

We certainly haven't heard anything but these two people who founded this business. This was their brainchild. They thought it was legal. They came in from the outset of the case and submitted declarations explaining why a preliminary

injunction shouldn't be issued. The company was found liable on the basis of their testimony and only their testimony.

This, to me, is really a classic case of people who participated actively. They are the only people who participated on behalf of Redigi with the defense. There is literally no other person I can think of who had any involvement whatsoever.

THE COURT: That may be true. I don't know the answer to that. But I'm talking about the specific issue under Teltronics as to whether or not the individual defendants should be estopped. You wouldn't take the position that a 30(b)(6) witness can then be added in a case and they are estopped from asserting any defenses because having been designated as a 30(b)(6) witness they are involved in the litigation.

MR. MANDEL: Not entirely. I think if you look at the couple of cases we cited, in both of them the courts talked about the fact that they were the principal witness, that they were there at the trial, that they had submitted declarations. These are the kind of facts that the Court looked at in those cases. If you look at our situation, these really were the only two individuals who have been there from the outset.

THE COURT: It's not clear to me how the courts in the cases you've cited were in the position to make those pronouncements about the state of the record because the

posture of the case wasn't such that I think it was in the record. They kind of cherrypicked the circuit data and looked at what some of the district court submissions and filings were, but I don't know that that's dispositive on the issues.

MR. MANDEL: I think in this case I would like to hear if there is somebody else who effectively controlled or participated. They have never been identified.

THE COURT: I've got a lawyer for the individuals and I've got a lawyer for the corporate defendant here, somebody else who is running this company.

Who retained you, Mr. Adelman?

MR. ADELMAN: John Ossenmacher.

THE COURT: And who gives you direction now as to how the corporate defendant should be pursuing this case? Don't tell me the substance of communications, but the individual who --

MR. ADELMAN: Primarily, we talked to John Ossenmacher and Larry Rudolph.

THE COURT: Mr. Pizzirusso, what is the defense here with respect to those individuals not joined at the hip with the corporate defendant?

MR. PIZZIRUSSO: Certainly, your Honor. I understand there is a history here and I have not been involved in that history. I'm coming in as an outsider at the end of case when Capital decided on the eve of trial that they wanted to name my

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clients.

THE COURT: I don't know if it was the eve of trial.

MR. PIZZIRUSSO: It was near the end of discovery and the case was pretty much — partial summary judgment obviously had been granted. And then they decided that they didn't think Redigi had enough money, so they wanted to name the individual defendants, too. And they dropped in one conclusory paragraph, paragraph 37 in the amended complaint, that says: And John Ossenmacher and Larry Rudolph controlled the company and, therefore, they are liable, too. And then this did a find all defendant and changed it to defendants.

And so then they said, well, this was the complaint against your clients. We have these partial summary judgment order. Your clients are also liable. They basically tried to hold my clients responsible based on one conclusory paragraph because they say there is this entire record where they submitted declarations and did all these other things, but I have to go by the complaint that's in front of me. I have to go by what's been pled against my clients. And that's why we filed a motion to dismiss because we think it is wholly conclusory under Twombly and under Iqbal and don't really understand the allegations made against my client. A lot of them don't make any sense.

When they say defendants, defendants users did this and this and this. Obviously, my clients don't have users.

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Redigi does, but the individuals don't. If it were the case that you could merely name individuals in a copyright case, every copyright case the executives of the company would be liable, but that's not the law. That's not what the law says. So we are kind of floundering. We are left with this very conclusory complaint that pleads very little against our clients and have to assert at the same time discovery defenses and potential summary judgment motions that we want to file. But we still aren't even sure what they are alleging against our client.

What's the direct financial interest that my clients have? What are the acts that each one of them individually did that contributed or that caused the copyright infringement of this case? They can't just say, well, you're in charge of the company and that's it. That's not what the law says. So we have said we might have defenses. We don't know yet because we have not seen a real complaint. We don't think that adequately alleges information against our client. So we have had to sort of alert, what are all of the possible defenses that we could have based on what we think the allegations are probably trying to say against us?

THE COURT: Including whether there is copyright in the songs at issue?

MR. PIZZIRUSSO: Yes. Because, your Honor, interestingly enough, we went through every single copyright

registration they produced, and we made a chart and we said, which songs have they asserted copyright claims against and which songs have they provided actual copyright registrations. And it was probably less than 20 percent that they actually provided registrations for. We said, well, that's a summary judgment issue. They have not proved their case.

So even though Mr. Mandel asserts discovery is over, in the last week we have received over 3,000 pages of additional discovery, approximately 3,000 pages of additional discovery from his client after we said we are going to file summary judgment on this and after he has said, no more discovery.

So we have got thousands of pages of additional documents that were just sprung on us over the Thanksgiving holiday that we have not even had a chance to review yet while he is asserting that we don't get any discovery against his client. But here are the documents, you just have to accept them for what they are.

THE COURT: Here is the question I have in connection with the motion to amend. If amending to add them, your clients, is not going to require any additional discovery, then I think I will probably allow it. But if it's going to require additional discovery then I am not so sure. I asked Mr. Mandel, he didn't think there would be any additional discovery, and Mr. Adelman agreed.

So why would your clients not be bound by that?

MR. PIZZIRUSSO: Mr. Adelman didn't represent my clients at the time. They weren't named as defendants in the litigation. Now that the Court has allowed an amendment and they have brought in new counsel, may have new ideas or may want to do things differently, I don't know why Redigi did the things that they did. I don't know their strategy.

But my clients are now being asked to be joint and severally liable for potentially millions of dollars. And they have a due process right to take discovery, to find out what the claims are being asserted against them and don't think that they are bound by representations on behalf of people who did not represent them personally, that no discovery is needed here.

THE COURT: There is case law, slightly different procedural context, though, that basically bars the principals of a corporate defendant from asserting claims and making arguments that were or could have been made by the corporate defendant. You're familiar with those cases. You've seen them, right?

MR. PIZZIRUSSO: I have seen the cases that Mr. Mandel cited, and I agreed with your Honor's initial assessment that they took place in generally different contexts than what we have here.

THE COURT: They are different contexts, but it's not

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clear to me why the rationale would be any different at this stage of this proceeding.

You are not asserting that somebody else is who ran the litigation and somebody else is who is responsible for the corporate defendant defending himself, right? Is there somebody else?

MR. PIZZIRUSSO: There are other shareholders of the company, your Honor. There is inside counsel. There aren't just these two individuals. If Mr. Mandel wants to have some additional discovery after he is saying that no additional discovery is needed, we can go into that. I think we have got to take the complaint that we have against us and respond to that. He hasn't asserted any of these facts that he claims he has that talk about how my clients have run the show from day one and are really responsible here, and he has got this great discovery record. I think it should have been in the complaint. It wasn't. So now here we are on the, quote unquote, eve of trial, the 11th hour, the close of discovery and he is saying, you don't get any more discovery, you're essentially liable. And we think that's prejudicial and we think the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice, but, at the very least, if not, he should have to replead and allow us to answer.

But I do agree that the cases should be severed. We could proceed right now against Redigi and go to trial and let

him proceed separately against my clients so they can assert what they believe are their rights to take discovery on issues that were never raised. Most of the issues that we are talking about, your Honor, are not issues that were asserted by Redigi.

THE COURT: That's the whole point, though. I guess the initial issue then is whether your client should be barred from asserting defenses and arguments that could have been asserted previously by the corporate defendant.

MR. PIZZIRUSSO: They have defenses that are solely applicable to them, like laches. Like them only being named here at the end of the case. That clearly wouldn't apply to Redigi. That's a different as to Redigi.

Your Honor, in your opinion itself, said that fair use is really a case-by-case equitable doctrine. You've got to look at the specific instances of the case at hand and there may be, again, particular fair use issues as to the individual defendants that weren't applicable to Redigi.

THE COURT: Like what?

MR. PIZZIRUSSO: I have not seen a complaint that I could fairly respond to yet, so I don't know, but there may be.

THE COURT: I am not sure why that the answer to that question turns on the complaint. I mean, fair use is obviously a defense. I addressed it in the summary judgment motion, cross motions, I guess, by Redigi and by the plaintiffs.

And so in what way would your fair use and first sale

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defense be different from what was asserted previously by the corporate defendant?

MR. PIZZIRUSSO: The first sale defense, your Honor, I think your Honor pretty clearly covered. Obviously, my clients would disagree, respectfully, with the opinion.

But with regard to fair use, to the extent that they are being deemed individually liable, I think the equities might weigh more in their favor on a fair use defense just because these are individuals who had meetings with Capital, who encouraged their use of this technology, who, you know, we think, gave implied consent to it. There were people who were supportive of them. So we think when you weigh the equities of the fair use defense, it may weigh more in their favor because of the individual liability trying to be imposed on them by Capital.

THE COURT: I would love to see some authority for that proposition. It doesn't sound right to me.

(Continued on next page)

THE COURT: So, you're not looking then to dismiss the complaint or sever the defendants.

MR. MANDEL: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: You're not looking to sever the defendants or dismiss the amended complaint and go forward on the old one.

MR. MANDEL: No. And I don't think we should have to. I really believe, with all due respect, that this is a bit of a smoke screen. I mean the idea that these two individuals who founded this company came in arguing vociferously that what they were doing was legal, don't know what they are charged with, it's ridiculous. I mean of course they know. They founded a company, they founded a business model, they developed the technology, they did all of the acts that were found to be infringing. It's not like somebody else did it. They did it. This was their brainchild, and they are the people who put it into motion, who completed the business modeled and who did all of the acts at issue.

Now, the idea that they would somehow have a different fair use defense makes no sense under the four factors we are looking at. We are looking at the same exact things. We are looking at the exact same analysis. Of course their fair use defense is no different.

There is also just no factual basis for any of these defenses. They are so far afield from anything that I honestly don't think they could be asserted consistent with Rule 11.

For example, unclean hands, they are asking questions about the mechanical royalties that Capitol pays to its artists with whom it has contracts, and their theory is that maybe Capitol has somehow underpaid these artists, then that would create an unclean hands defense for them. They have nothing to do with these artists. They have no contractual relationship. They are not in a position to assert anything. And they want to turn it into a trial about whether we paid the right royalties, what audits have been done, whether these audits have been properly paid? They are just outside infringers who have nothing to do with this. This has nothing to do with them. And our business relationship with our artists has nothing to do with this case. It can't possibly set the grounds for an unclean hands defense.

They also talk about latches. Mr. Ossenmacher's own deposition testimony -- and I would ask Mr. Pizzirusso to read it at pages 104 to 110 in his deposition -- he basically says that he couldn't get a meeting with Capitol; capitol wouldn't meet with him. "They took an uneducated view. Unlike the other record labels, they refused to hear what I had to say. They were too busy to meet with me, and then after the RA sent a claim letter I got to meet with every other label but Capitol refused." How is that possibly under any factual scenario going to give rise to laches, where you have to have reasonable prejudicial reliance on what the plaintiff did?

The plaintiff made clear, they sued Redigi within three months of its launch, and they want to say that they somehow reasonably relied that it was OK for them to go forward in the face of Capitol having filed a suit against their company for infringement, that somehow they thought they had assurances that what they were doing was legal or Capitol approved of it? There is no possible basis to assert any of these things.

THE COURT: That's a Rule 11 point, and we're not there yet. Right?

MR. MANDEL: I guess the question is in terms of discovery, it's not true -- we're willing to be reasonable about discovery. The reason we thought, both Mr. Adelman and I thought that no real discovery was necessary, was because all of the issues relate to the defendant's own conduct. It was solely within their knowledge. And we didn't understand what discovery they could really want from Capitol on whether they personally participated, what they did. I think that it's clear what they did, and they know what they did.

THE COURT: So, you are not seeking additional discovery to establish the point whether they controlled the company.

MR. MANDEL: No. We think the record is clear, as it is now, as to their participation in the acts. Whether they are collaterally estopped, or whether you want to relook at it,

the record is such that we have no doubt that we can establish as a matter of law that they are personally liable.

Now, it's true if they want to take discovery into ownership -- because that was something that Mr. Adelman didn't want to pursue; we talked about it during the second discovery period after the summary judgment opinion -- look, that's fair game. I think that's a legitimate point, and if that's something they want to pursue, you know, we just identified the universe of songs at the end of discovery. It was somewhat complicated because they had to run a program to figure out which ones had been uploaded through Redigi 1.0.

THE COURT: You're talking about ownership of --

MR. MANDEL: -- our copyrights in the universe of recordings that we were able to finally figure out through the discovery process and isolate those recordings at the end of discovery. So, it wasn't really until August, when we came before your Honor, that we had fully through getting the charts that Redigi compiled, through the program that Mr. Rudolph ran, where we were able to say these are the recordings that went up through Redigi 1.0. And we eliminated some recordings, and we changed the universe. You know, there are 500 some odd recordings, and so obviously if you want to start digging into the record of contracts on every one of those, that's fine. I mean we're not saying that they shouldn't be allowed to do that. Mr. Adelman wasn't interested in doing that, but we

understand that they are entitled to take discovery on that. So, we are now producing that voluminous record because they asked for it, and we're putting it together.

Frankly, there probably are a couple of recordings that we would even drop, and we might even need to add some subsidiaries, because as we are going through the chain of title, if you really are going to dig into it and take that discovery, some of these copyrights are owned by wholly owned subsidiaries of Capitol. It doesn't change anything in terms of the analysis. It would be the same witness —

THE COURT: Would it require an amended pleading?

MR. MANDEL: It might, actually. But we had always said from the outset of the case management schedule that the universe of recordings was dynamic, and it was going to take a little bit of work to figure that out, and to hone in on what they are, to isolate them, and also because of a lot of change that is going on at our client with changes in corporations because they have now been merged together with the Universal Music Group, there are company names that are changing, there are things that have changed even since July, you know, I think it's a technical point. If it turns out that it's now Capitol Christian Music Group that owns the copyright, that's a wholly owned subsidiary of Capitol Records, we would like to clear that up.

We would certainly be willing to work with defendants

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to make sure they get anything they need if they really do want to mount a challenge to whether we own each of those recordings.

THE COURT: That's with respect to the individual defendants only, in your opinion.

MR. MANDEL: Or Redigi. If Redigi is now interested in doing that, I think that's sort of related to damages, and they are all jointly and severally liable. I am not standing on trying to say that that's not fair game in terms of determining the full scope of recordings that we can collect a damage award for.

The problem that Capitol has is to be hit with massive discovery requests, that ask about things that are completely tangential to any issue in the case, that have nothing to do with the underlying causes of action, that are being offered in front of defenses that even counsel didn't think enough to assert because there wasn't a basis for them, there really wasn't.

THE COURT: I think he's complimenting you, Mr. Adelman.

MR. ADELMAN: Excuse me?

THE COURT: I think he's complimenting you.

MR. ADELMAN: I think he is, but I still would like to address it.

THE COURT: I will give you a chance.

MR. ADELMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. MANDEL: So, that's really where we are. The problem is that if it's going to be turned into an accounting about how we pay royalties to our artists on every one of these 500 recordings, how we digitally exploit them all, every piece of correspondence we have had with anybody, I mean that is not reasonably related to any issue that remains in the case at this point, in our view.

THE COURT: And the discovery with respect to damages, what we launched on before the amended complaint, or I guess contemporaneous with the contemplation of the amended complaint, where are you with that?

MR. MANDEL: Well, from our perspective we are done with discovery. I mean Capitol doesn't need anymore discovery. If the individuals defendant and/or Redigi wants to take a deposition of our 30(b)(6) witness and go through the chain of title and talk about ownership, we don't have a problem with that; we are prepared to produce somebody. We are producing the documents. We have been producing the documents. Since they say they want that, that's fine.

Beyond that, I mean if they want us to answer some interrogatories that explain to them why they are individually liable, I mean we think it's pretty obvious from the opinion and from their deposition testimony, but obviously we can answer that. The real problem is if they want to turn it into

a fishing expedition, to look for defenses that the record absolutely clearly establishes have no possible basis — I mean in terms of the DMCA defense, they are not even registered as an agent as required by the statute. As a matter of law they could not assert a DMCA defense, you know, separate and apart from anything else.

And the court's opinion found that they had a financial interest, that Redigi had a financial interest, that the elements of control and financial benefit were both satisfied, so that would also defeat the defense under 512.

So, a lot of these defenses, honestly, you know, it's going to end up being very expensive, wasting a lot of time and effort, and, you know, if we have to pursue this, we are going to hear about it at the end of the day when there is an attorney fee motion, because there is no way these defenses can stand, and they really shouldn't be asserted.

THE COURT: All right. But, so what you are seeking then is this: Rule on the motion to dismiss, basically stay discovery until I rule on that, and then allow for I guess what would be styled as a motion for summary judgment with respect to the Teltronics issue? Is that right?

MR. MANDEL: Well, I think what I would propose is not staying discovery, because regardless of what the issue is on the motion to dismiss -- I mean obviously if your Honor grants the motion to dismiss and that's the end of it, then of course

that's one thing. But we're pretty confident that that's not something that's going to happen.

We think that if they want to pursue discovery, we certainly think ownership discovery we should go forward with; we should do everything that needs to be done. We would probably ask permission to maybe amend at the end of that so that we all are operating on a clear understandings of what the recordings are, who the plaintiffs are, so there can be no dispute about that.

But I think that this other discovery, in terms of the issues that we complained about in our letter, we would be fighting about that, and I don't even know how we could comply with that. If we are going to have to start producing, you know, every accounting and every deal that we've done for every one of these recording artists, it's going to be a massive undertaking and I think toward no end.

THE COURT: I understand that, but certain defenses would be off the table, depending on how I resolve the issue of what we will call the Teltronics issue, right?

MR. MANDEL: So, your Honor is proposing having a separate briefing on the Teltronics issue.

THE COURT: Well, I think that depending on how that gets resolved, then the defendants basically are stripped down to the same defenses that are asserted by the corporate defendant.

MR. MANDEL: I suppose we could do that. I mean I guess the issue I have is I'm still assuming that if the motion to dismiss is denied, and they have to come in with an answer, they have an extensive factual record, they have deposition testimony that I have just cited them to, I assume they will look at that before they sign a pleading that asserts some of these defenses separate and apart from Teltronics.

THE COURT: Right. Well, that's the reason for my suggestion, that I rule on the motion to dismiss first, and then they have to answer, and depending on what they answer, then there are certain defenses that would require additional discovery and others that wouldn't.

MR. MANDEL: Right. And that's fine. I think the point I was making is regardless of what happens, I think the one thing is if they are intent on pursuing chain of title and delving into ownership, then that's going to have to take place, and there is no reason to hold off on that; we are prepared to allow that and to cooperate with that.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know if it prevents additional discovery, but I may otherwise not require the parties to produce discovery where there is a dispute as to whether such discovery should be had at all. That seems to be what you are really arguing, right?

MR. MANDEL: Yes, I think so. If we stayed discovery on the issues that we are fighting about, went forward on the

ownership interests, that would be fine.

THE COURT: Mr. Adelman, you have been waiting patiently.

MR. ADELMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

And notwithstanding Mr. Mr. Mandel's compliment to me, there is one thing I take issue with, and that is that we were not interested in the ownership issue. It's not that we were not interested. In fact, in our initial demands in March of 2012 we asked all contracts, agreements, assignments, any documents evidencing or concerning —

THE COURT: OK. But then we went to summary judgment without that being disputed, right?

MR. ADELMAN: No, for the purposes of that motion.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, wait a minute. The purpose of that motion was that you folks were teeing it up for me, but it wasn't like if you lose you get to make repeated additional motions, right?

MR. ADELMAN: No, but they certainly still have to prove in damages that ownership of copyright.

THE COURT: We are in damages discovery now; I get that.

MR. ADELMAN: That's all I'm talking about. But this is a continuing demand, which means they have to provide the ownership materials continuing. And, as far as I'm concerned, discovery ended August 8, and they've had the lists. The last

list was generated in early June of 2013. The first list was generated in June of 2012.

THE COURT: I ruled on the summary judgment. I granted it. Then we said we are going to have damages discovery.

MR. ADELMAN: That's what I am talking about, your Honor. Damages discovery for Redigi corporate closed on August 8, yet what we maintained in our letter is that they have not proved ownership in many of their copyrights, and all of a sudden in the last four or five days we get 3,000 pages of ownership.

We maintain that they're precluded, and that certainly goes to the issue of damages, because any copyright that they cannot prove reduces any potential damage to us. So, I would take issue that we don't care about it. Our position is that any ownership documents that were not produced by the end of disclosure for Redigi corporate are precluded at this point.

THE COURT: All right. So you want to take back all the nice things you said about him?

MR. MANDEL: No. I mean I think his choice of what defenses to assert was proper and reasonable, and is what I would have done, so I stand by that.

THE COURT: No, the issue is he is saying that you're out of time on discovery. He asked for these things before he decided to concede them for purposes of a summary judgment

motion.

MR. MANDEL: No, but here is the thing. We all understood on summary judgment that the actual universe of what recordings were going to end up being claimed on was something that we were going to have to figure out. We didn't have that.

Now, what happened is Redigi on summary judgment did not challenge ownership. When we talked about what discovery they wanted during Redigi post-summary judgment discovery,

Mr. Adelman didn't want to take a deposition, didn't seem to be pursuing wanting to challenge ownership, which he hadn't challenged on summary judgment. So, my assumption was that they recognized that it wasn't going to be a very fruitful area to see that Capitol didn't own the recordings it says it owns. And that was my assumption. Most of the effort during that discovery was really focused on figuring out which of the recordings that actually —

THE COURT: Look --

MR. ADELMAN: Your Honor, one thing. Remember they amended the complaint and added copyrights. That was not part of the complaint during the summary judgment motion. There were only about 111 tracks at issue during the summary judgment motion, and all of those were purchased by the investigator. So, there is an amended complaint, we have actually answered, and we have affirmative defenses as far as ownership is concerned. I don't think we ever conceded ownership as to the

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tracks that they are alleging in the complaint. I think what we are arguing was whether there was an infringement or not. And for the basis of the summary judgment motion, they certainly owned at least one of the tracks, and I think that we have stated that; but, nevertheless, my position on discovery is solely as to the copyright issue.

THE COURT: But you are suggesting that Mr. Mandel basically did and should have understood that you wanted all of this discovery with respect to ownership. And the date of that is when in relation to my summary judgment ruling, in relation to the conference we had on the motion to amend? What's the date of your demand?

MR. ADELMAN: The date of the demand is March.

THE COURT: March of 2013.

MR. ADELMAN: 2012.

THE COURT: 2012, OK. So, I ruled.

MR. ADELMAN: So, the question you asked me at the conference is as it related to the individuals, who as Mr. Pizzirusso suggested — I did not represent at the time — but you asked me what I thought was an off-the-cuff request, and at the time off the top of my head, as far as the individuals are concerned, no, I could not think of any discovery. But going forward discovery had already closed after we had that conference. August 8 was the close of discovery.

THE COURT: Damages discovery. We all contemplated that.

MR. ADELMAN: No, not before that conference, your Honor. Damages discovery was closed prior to that conference. We had that conference after the close of damages discovery.

MR. MANDEL: Your Honor, if I could. What happened is it wasn't really until the end of that damage discovery period — we were racing to figure out which were the recordings that actually had been uploaded through Redigi 1.0. We then did a quick search of our computer systems to identify which recordings we could claim on, and we came up with an amended complaint.

It would not have been possible in that couple of weeks between the time, less than two weeks really between when we finalized the information to know what the recordings were, to have produced contracts covering all 500 of those recordings. And it wasn't my understanding that Mr. Adelman was contesting that. But, you know, obviously --

THE COURT: Look, I have to say, to the extent that Mr. Mandel was wrong in what he assumed, I assumed the same thing. So, I did not anticipate that the document request made a year before my summary judgment ruling was still alive and that you were going to say they haven't produced.

MR. ADELMAN: Well, your Honor, the fact is that damages discovery had closed before that conference.

THE COURT: Before the conference on the motion to amend, you mean, in August?

MR. ADELMAN: Yes.

MR. MANDEL: But it's not --

MR. ADELMAN: So, my assumption was that discovery was closed and Mr. Mandel had provided me with all the discovery that he wished to.

And to the extent that Mr. Mandel knows that it's his burden of ownership in a copyright case on damages, he should have provided all the documentation. To the extent he wanted to provide more documentation after that, the close of damages, at the conference, he should have brought up the fact that damages discovery needs to continue because we haven't provided all the ownership documents, which is our burden to prove at trial.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MANDEL: Well, your Honor, we did produce all the registrations during the discovery period, which satisfies as our burden of prima facie proof.

I didn't understand that Mr. Adelman -- because he had didn't served new requests. And we asked are you going to want a deposition of our witness, and the answer was, no, I don't want to take another deposition. And he asked barely any questions about ownership at the first deposition. And we had produced some ownership documents relating to the original

universe of recordings.

So, it was not my understanding that this was a topic that they were actually pursuing. And I thought the registrations were going to provide sufficient proof.

If they want to pursue it, if the individual defendants want to pursue it, that's fine, we don't object to that. That I think is fair game, although --

THE COURT: Well, he's saying it's too late for that. So, the fact that you are not objecting, of course you are not objecting. He's not asking for it now; he says you are precluded from producing any.

MR. MANDEL: That I guess I have a problem with under the circumstances of how this developed. And the individual defendants asked for it.

We made very clear from the outset -- even though we were objecting to a lot of the discovery that the individual defendants were serving -- that we were absolutely going to produce. If they wanted the chain of title documentation, we would produce that, and we would certainly produce a witness to testify to that. That's never been something that we have sought to block. The whole reason we got derailed with discovery disputes with the individual defendants is because of all these other issues that they were seeking.

MR. ADELMAN: Your Honor, notwithstanding that, in order to proceed with this case, he has to have ownership

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documents. He has to prove the copyright. He has to prove that they own the copyright. We have never conceded that as to the individual tracks.

And during discovery there was also conversations between Ms. Matz and Mr. King, which I'd like her to express, if you would, your Honor.

THE COURT: Look, I don't know that I'm going to need to sort of peel this onion, because I don't think there is a satisfactory way to do it.

So, what I'm prepared to do is stay all discovery now, rule on the motion to dismiss — which I will do very shortly — and then once I have done that, then we will have an answer, we will have defenses that are asserted, and then you can make your motion for summary judgment against the individual defendants, arguing at least in part that they are precluded from certain defenses, and we can I guess coordinate whatever additional discovery is necessary to wrap this up. And then I guess we would have additional summary judgment motions on damages.

That's what you are contemplating, right, Mr. Mandel?

MR. MANDEL: We are only contemplating summary
judgment motion on the individual defendants' liability.

THE COURT: So, damages would be at trial?

MR. MANDEL: Well, we are going to move for summary judgment on the innocent infringement defense that would open

up a lower category of damages.

THE COURT: So, anyway, I think all of that happens after I rule on the motion to dismiss.

So, to the extent you want to do informal discovery between now and then, you can. If Mr. Adelman is of the view that discover is closed, and he is not so accepting or asking for anything more, then he can take that position. But I am very likely to reopen discovery for a limited time for the purpose of wrapping this up, so we can get to the finish line.

So, I think to the extent there has been confusion and that there has been misunderstandings -- I'm not accusing anybody of anything -- I'm just saying that certainly at the time we had our conference in August, I anticipated a very different way this would unfold.

So, I think it's not fair to Mr. Pizzirusso to be asserting defenses until he knows what he's shooting at, so I think I have to rule on that motion. But discovery I'm going to hold off.

You see the way this wind is blowing, right, Mr. Pizzirusso? You're a smart guy.

MR. PIZZIRUSSO: I do. That was going to be my next question, which was: I hear the court is inclined perhaps probably to deny the motion to seek an answer. And if that's going to happen, we might be more inclined, my clients, to go ahead with some informal discovery if that appears to be the

way the wind is blowing.

THE COURT: Nobody is precluded from informal discovery, but I'm certainly stopping the requirement of reciprocal discovery at this point.

Discovery is stopped unless you folks can agree. But once I rule, and assuming this thing is back on a litigation track, then I will almost certainly reopen discovery for a limited range of issues. What those are exactly, I'm not sure yet, and I think that will turn on what the pleadings, what the answer says.

So, I'm not sure that's satisfactory to everybody, but I think it's the best we can do at this hour. So, anything else I have overlooked, or anything else you think I should at least keep in my brain?

MR. ADELMAN: Only that we also have a letter for summary judgment as well.

THE COURT: Right. Well, there certainly was talk about summary judgment, and I think we should hold off on summary judgment until we have concluded all discovery.

MR. ADELMAN: I agree.

THE COURT: So, no prejudice to your motion, but I think we should -

MR. ADELMAN: No. I was just making sure that it was in the mix. But I think your plan is a good one.

THE COURT: And you don't always think that.

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1	MR. ADELMAN: No, you're right. And you know I'm ver
2	vocal as far as whether I agree or disagree. But I think it's
3	a rational one, because I think there has been some confusion
4	as to where everyone is going, and I am going to say on the
5	record that I am open to discussing it with Mr. Mandel.
6	THE COURT: Good. Look, that's the goal, of course.
7	You obviously have very different positions on the law,
8	interesting case, clients who feel the importance of this.
9	It's not lost on me, but there is no reason why the lawyers
10	have to be acrimonious with each other. And I am not
11	suggesting they are necessarily. So, do sit down and see where
12	you can reach agreement, but right now the ball is in my court
13	to resolve a couple of things and get you on track.
14	MR. ADELMAN: We're actually quite unacrimonious. We
15	all get along, so it's been helpful. Even Mr. Pizzirusso.

But I appreciate your help on this one, your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm not sure how much I've helped, but anyway.

So, let's adjourn. Let me thank the court reporter for his time and his predecessor's time. If anybody needs a copy of the transcript, you can take that up with the court reporter, but I will be in touch with you very shortly. OK?

Mr. Pizzirusso, thanks for coming up.