## **EXHIBIT D**

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and collateral estoppel applies here, and we think we can reach that issue without ever having to get to the privity issue.

That may be. If I rule on the legal issue THE COURT: in your favor, then I guess you're right. I think I'm likely to rule the other way on this. The letters that I received from the parties somewhat cursorily lay out the positions. not criticizing. You had a limited amount of space. I think, basically, your argument is that the Teltronics case and other cases that have been discussed in this context were sort of in a procedurally different posture and, therefore, are wholly inapplicable. I think I would concede, I don't think Mr. Mandel has any choice but to concede that there is a procedural difference between where those cases were and where this case is. But his point is -- and I think I'm inclined to agree -- that's a distinction that doesn't make any difference for purposes of the legal analysis. I think I'm likely to agree with that. If you want to have a chance to develop this more fully, I guess I would give you a chance to do that.

MR. GIDDINGS: Absolutely, your Honor.

THE COURT: I wouldn't bet the house on changing my view on that, just because I think there is not a ton of case law, and I think there is only so many ways to slice this.

MR. GIDDINGS: Absolutely, your Honor. Just to clarify, Teltronics was a res judicata case, not a collateral estoppel case.

Are you inclined to say that res judicata would apply here?

THE COURT: I'm inclined to say that the principles articulated in Teltronics would apply here, as well --

MR. GIDDINGS: Okay.

THE COURT: -- if, in fact, it is true and undisputed that the individual defendants were running this defense for the corporate client, the corporate defendant, and knew full well what they were doing when they decided to not challenge certain things, stipulate to certain things, not assert certain defenses. It would seem to me that the rationale in Teltronics is equally applicable here. I can't think of a reason that it wouldn't be applied here.

MR. GIDDINGS: Your Honor, Teltronics laid out a four-part test for res judicata. It laid out four factors, and that was: First, the final judgment on the merits; second, that judgment must be by a court of competent jurisdiction; third, the same party for privity; and fourth, the same cause of action.

Now, I think we can let two and three go for right now. Really, what the question is, your Honor, is whether or not there has been a final judgment in the merits. I think it is pretty well accepted that res judicata, that means it has to be in a prior proceeding, a prior action, right?

What we have here is the same action, so that

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res judicata would not apply. For instance, in Marine Midland Bank, the Court said, quote, defenses that could have been raised by a corporation in a prior action were barred by res judicata.

THE COURT: That's what it said. It didn't say in a situation like this one that the individual defendants could then raise everything anew, right?

I see the language you're seizing upon, but I don't think that was the holding of the case; right?

MR. GIDDINGS: I would have to go back and look at that. It is something we would be happy to brief in greater detail, your Honor.

THE COURT: I will give you a chance to brief it. I think, clearly, the language of Teltronics, at pages 190 and 191, principally those pages, would seem to have equal force here as to what went on. If there is a factual dispute as to whether or not the individual defendants really were running the litigation, well, then I guess we would have to nail that down.

MR. GIDDINGS: Right.

THE COURT: I think that would be easily done by putting them on the stand in front of me and then I could assess and make a finding.

MR. GIDDINGS: Your Honor, Teltronics also said, quote, res judicata applies to repetitious suits involving the

same cause of action. Right? Again, we don't have repetitious suits here.

THE COURT: So your view is that had the suit that I granted summary judgment on, if that went to final judgment and then they filed a separate action against your clients, then of course they would be stuck with what they did here; but because it was an amended complaint with the same docket number, that makes all the difference in the world?

MR. GIDDINGS: Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I think that is the kind of formalism that I don't find persuasive. I think I will give you a chance to brief it, certainly, but it doesn't strike me as that persuasive. Certainly, there are cases in which partial summary judgments are entitled to conclusive effect.

MR. GIDDINGS: Your Honor, to be clear about the partial summary judgment point, the cases that Capitol cites, those are all partial summary judgment orders from a prior proceeding, a different action, right. Hudson involved an order from a district court judge in another district.

THE COURT: I get all that, but your view is that the entire issue turns on whether or not there was an amended complaint or whether there was a new complaint with a different docket number.

MR. GIDDINGS: Correct. That's what the cases say, your Honor.

THE COURT: But they don't say that. They don't address this issue squarely and say that you have to bring a new case; that in a situation in which there's an amended complaint, bringing the same cause of action against two new defendants, that the result is totally different. I haven't found a case that says that. Are you aware of one?

MR. GIDDINGS: I am not, but I'm not aware of a case where res judicata and collateral estoppel have been applied in the same proceeding, to preclude that defendant from raising those defenses. Right? Capitol hasn't pointed to one in their letter, either. Again, maybe something better suited for further briefing and further explanation, but Capitol has not pointed to a single case in which this has been done before.

THE COURT: This is the language from Teltronics: "In light of the individual defendant's continuous and active non-party participation and his apparent day-to-day leadership role in the prior litigation, we hold that he was in privity with Teltronics and is bound by the result in Teltronics' litigation arising from this cause of action."

So you're hanging your hat on the fact that prior litigation was at issue in that case.

MR. GIDDINGS: Correct, your Honor. Actually,
Teltronics, my reading of the case, is there are three or four
different subsequent actions prior to the Second Circuit
decision. It depends on how you count them. Three or four is

1	a fair assessment at the very beginning of the opinion.
2	THE COURT: The other quote at page 191: "If a
3	stockholder, officer, or director of a corporation controls an
4	action brought on its behalf in furtherance of his own
5	interests, he is bound by the result of that action."
6	I think the issues are pretty clear. If there is
7	additional authority, I would love to see it. I haven't found
8	any.
9	How long do you think you need to brief it?
10	MR. GIDDINGS: To submit a brief on it?
11	THE COURT: A fuller brief than what you have given
12	me.
13	MR. GIDDINGS: From our perspective, we probably need
14	until the first or second week in December, your Honor.
15	Thanksgiving is coming up, and I am going to be out of the
16	country for a different matter for eight days, six to eight
17	days.
18	THE COURT: Let me hear what Mr. Mandel has to say on
19	scheduling and anything else. You want to submit a brief, I
20	guess, in response, right?
21	MR. MANDEL: I suppose so, if your Honor wants
22	briefing.
23	THE COURT: I'm going to give them an opportunity to
24	brief it more fully than a three-page letter.
25	MR. MANDEL: That's fine. Obviously, we would like

its copyrights as to other start-ups, as to other users, which goes, we think, into the damage calculation or the damage -"computation" is not the correct word -- but the equation, if you will.

THE COURT: I guess I would want to see some authority for the proposition that you're entitled to know the settlement terms of every infringement case they have ever settled to assess the damages.

MR. GIDDINGS: To be clear, your Honor, we weren't asking for settlement terms. I believe the request asks for a list of all their prior enforcement actions or their copyright actions as to these asserted claims.

THE COURT: What would that be relevant to in this case? A list of other enforcement actions that they have brought to protect their copyrights?

MR. GIDDINGS: It does also ask for the outcome of the claim.

THE COURT: Look, I think I'm not likely to allow that. I think the legal question may resolve it without me having to do this piecemeal, but I do think at some point we may get to the merits of these, and whether this is just designed to inflict pain on the other side or whether it is just a fishing expedition or a desire to delay further the litigation, so I guess I'm not going to resolve that now, but I'm skeptical.