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                              Motion
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     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
     SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     EDWARD WHITE,
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                    Plaintiff,
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                                             12 CV 1340 (JSR)
                v.
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     WEST PUBLISHING,
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                    Defendants.
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                                              May 16, 2012
                                              4:10 p.m.
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     Before:
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                           HON. JED S. RAKOFF,
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                                              District Judge
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                               APPEARANCES
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     GREGORY A. BLUE
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          Attorney for Plaintiff
     BRAGAR, WEXLER, EAGEL LLC
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          Attorneys for Plaintiff
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     BY: RAYMOND A. BRAGAR
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     WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP
          Attorneys for Defendant West Publishing
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     BY: BRUCE RICH
          BENJAMIN MARKS
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     MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
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          Attorneys for Defendant Lexis Nexis
     BY: JAMES E. HOUGH
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          JAMES McCABE
          CRAIG B. WHITNEY
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1 (Case called) 2 MR. BLUE: Good afternoon, Greg Blue for the 3 plaintiffs. 4 MR. BRAGAR: Good afternoon, your Honor, Raymond 5 Bragar also for plaintiffs. THE COURT: Good afternoon. 6 7 MR. RICH: Good afternoon, your Honor, Bruce Rich from Weil Gotshal for West Publishing. 8 9 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 10 MR. MARKS: Good afternoon, your Honor, Benjamin Marks 11 also of Weil Gotshal also for West Publishing. 12 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 13 MR. HOUGH: Good afternoon, your Honor, James Hough 14 from Morrison & Foerster for Lexis Nexis. 15 THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. McCABE: Good afternoon, your Honor, James McCabe 16 17 also from Morrison & Foerster, also for Lexis Nexis THE COURT: Good afternoon. 18 19 MR. WHITNEY: Good afternoon, your Honor, Craig 20 Whitney, Morrison & Foerster for Lexis Nexis. 21 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 22 Clearly counsel in this case are not strong believers 23 in gender diversity, but that's neither here nor there. 24 So we're here on the motion to dismiss the sub class

of attorneys of plaintiffs and prospective plaintiffs who have

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not registered their copyrights, as opposed to other class of those who have.

After reviewing the papers, I am, frankly, leaning strongly towards granting the motion.

So let's start with plaintiff's counsel, because maybe you can convince me otherwise.

MR. BLUE: Thank you, your Honor. Since you've indicated your leaning in this, I'd be happy to take questions from you to start off, but --

THE COURT: Well, I mean the place obviously to start is with 17 U.S.C. Section 411(a); "No civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title." By definition, the sub class that's at issue here today have not complied with that. So how can they bring a civil action?

MR. BLUE: Your Honor, obviously in our papers the position we've taken is that Mr. Elan, who is not registered, as well as the class that he represents, are entitled to two forms of relief even without registration. And that would be an injunction and the declaratory judgment.

THE COURT: Yes. Now these, of course, are remedies. They are not, themselves, a form of action. But even assuming they were, the statute is unequivocal; that compliance with registration or preregistration is a precondition of filing a

claim.

MR. BLUE: Your Honor --

THE COURT: For example, in a case that you make reference to, Reed Elsevier versus Muchnick, 130 S.Ct., Supreme Court, 1237, a 2010 decision of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court held that, "A failure to meet that registration requirement did not deprive a district court of subject matter jurisdiction."

But, of course, the motion here is not to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. It's a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. And as to that, Muchnick expressly stated that compliance with Section 411 and 412 was a precondition of filing a claim.

MR. BLUE: Yes, your Honor.

Turning to section 502, the section that deals with the remedies that you talked about, the injunction, I think it's important that the section says that a court with jurisdiction -- and this Court clearly has jurisdiction -- may issue an injunction as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.

We have here an ideal situation where an injunction would be necessary to prevent an infringement in the future.

As the complaint has alleged, both the defendants are engaged in an ongoing course of business in which they copy these materials and make them available for sale soon after they're

filed with the courts.

What Mr. Elan brings to the table here is a claim for people whose works aren't even in existence yet. They may be getting drafted right now or around town and around the country and to be filed next week and next month. By definition, we can't possibly have obtained a registration for those works because they're not in existence yet.

THE COURT: Well, the only case that I know of that arguably would support that position is, which you cite, is Olan Mills, Inc. versus Linn Photo Company, 23 F.3d, 1345, 8th Circuit, 1994.

Now, putting aside the fact that that decision is obviously not binding on this Court, it really stands for a very different kind of proposition. Where you have a defendant who has consistently infringed a party's registered copyrights --

MR. BLUE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- an injunction can issue because there's the risk of future, clearly demonstrated risk of future such violations against the same defendant. And I -- against the same plaintiff -- I'm sorry -- and, therefore, a narrow exception is carved out. Because otherwise you'd have the sort of absurd situation which they keep infringing the plaintiff's registered copyrights, but every time they have a new copyright at work, they have to bring a new cause of action rather than

getting an injunction. That's not this situation, at all. By definition, your class has never registered their copyrights and, therefore, it presents a totally different equitable situation from that presented in a case like Olan.

MR. BLUE: Well, what we do have here is a situation where we have Mr. White, the first named plaintiff, who has registered his copyright.

THE COURT: Yes. We're not dealing with that claim today. I don't think you can just willy-nilly glom your whole huge class into a -- it would be a huge class of attorneys who never registered their briefs. I think that is likely to be the vast majority of attorneys from time in memorial to the present. Because you've got the much smaller class, represented by Mr. White, that have actually registered their copyrights. That's not -- that's, what is it, the camel's nose under the tent or one some such cliche. I don't think that does it.

What else?

MR. BLUE: Well, your Honor, if I could turn for a moment to declaratory judgment action here. And declaratory judgment, as we've described in the brief, and professor said, getting a declaratory judgment in this situation is not an action for infringement at all. What you're looking to do is declare the parties' rights. Now this isn't trying to make an end run around and get damages for past infringements. What

we're looking for is a declaratory judgment saying that what the defendants are doing is unlawful. Of course as your Honor well knows, all of these works are protected by the copyright law from the moment of their creation, and getting a declaratory judgment isn't an action for infringement.

THE COURT: This, of course, the logic of what you're saying would mean that any time you had a requirement that before you can bring a lawsuit in a case where there was an actual potential controversy, you had to comply with some statutory requirement. Your logic would say, you could always get around that by asking for a declaratory judgment. That makes no sense at all. Declaratory judgment is a remedy that's available when you have a valid cause of action and you can bring, but there are reasons why it makes more sense to deal with the controversy before it becomes fully and totally ripe.

In addition, the declaratory judgment is a highly discretionary remedy that the court need not take cognizance of. So while I don't think you have a lawful basis for asking for a declaratory judgment without compliance with the requirements for filing a cause of action, I also think that assuming arguendo you did, I would exercise my discretion to deny it.

Anything else?

MR. BLUE: Your Honor, as we asked for at the end of your papers, it's our belief, and I understand your Honor's

comments about whether or not White could bring in the rest of the class here, that White can go forward with his claims and White can go forward with his claims as a registered member.

And then what we would want to do is address the scope of the relief Mr. White could get, including an injunction and scope of that relief, later on. For that reason we would ask for the Court's permission to amend the complaint to make White a representative of the class.

THE COURT: This would just undercut everything I've just said, so that request is denied.

Well, you are a brave soul --

MR. BLUE: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- to have made such a valiant stab at what I think is a creative, but perhaps too creative attempt to glom the unregistered folks onto the much more colorable claims of the registered folks.

So, I will grant the motion and dismiss the claim so far as the unregistered attorneys are concerned.

Anything else we need to take up today?

MR. BLUE: I don't believe so, your Honor.

MR. RICH: No, your Honor 33.

THE COURT: Thanks very much.

(Adjourned)