

Exhibit J

The Bromwich Group

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November 22, 2013

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Genentech, Inc.
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Mr. Albert Gore, Jr.
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President and Chief Executive Officer
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Mr. Millard Drexler
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Mr. Ronald Sugar
Former Chairman and CEO
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Re: Relationship between External Compliance Monitor and Apple

Dear Members of the Apple Inc. Board of Directors:

As you know, on September 5, 2013, the Honorable Denise L. Cote, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, issued a Final Judgment in *United States of America v. Apple, Inc., et al.*, Civil Action No. 1:12-CV-2826 and Order Entering

Permanent Injunction in *The State of Texas, et al., v. Penguin Group (USA), Inc., et al.*, Civil Action No. 1:12-CV-3394 (collectively, the "Final Judgment").

Section VI of the Final Judgment established the position of External Compliance Monitor ("monitor") with "the power and authority to review and evaluate Apple's existing internal antitrust compliance policies and procedures," as well as the training program required by the Final Judgment. In addition, the monitor has the power and authority to recommend changes to "address any perceived deficiencies in those policies, procedures, and training." Section VI.B.

More specifically, the Final Judgment requires the monitor to "conduct a review to assess whether Apple's internal antitrust compliance policies and procedures, as they exist 90 days after his or her appointment, are reasonably designed to detect and prevent violations of the antitrust laws" and to "conduct a review to assess whether Apple's training program, required by the [Final Judgment], as it exists 90 days after his or her appointment, is sufficiently comprehensive and effective." Section VI.C. The monitor is required to provide an initial written report summarizing his findings, conclusions, and recommendations no later than April 14, 2014, and additional written reports at six-month intervals for a period of two years. The Court may extend the duration of the monitor's appointment beyond two years, and the monitor, at his discretion or at the request of the Department of Justice, State Attorneys General, or the Court, may file additional reports.

Consistent with a selection process set forth in the Final Judgment, I was selected by the Court, on October 16, 2013, to serve as the monitor. I have assembled a small team to work with me, led by Barry Nigro, the chair of the Antitrust Department at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP.

I have been doing oversight and monitoring work of various kinds for the past twenty years - first, as the Inspector General for the Department of Justice during the Clinton Administration, and subsequently as a monitor of public agencies and private companies. This is the fourth time in the last eleven years I have been selected to serve as a monitor. I am familiar with the challenges and opportunities presented by serving as a monitor or otherwise engaging in oversight work. I have developed an approach of openness, engagement, and collaboration that has been successful for me and the organizations - both public and private - that I have monitored.

I regret to report that in the month since my appointment, I have experienced a surprising and disappointing lack of cooperation from Apple and its executives that is rare in my oversight experience. Within a week of my appointment, on October 22, Mr. Nigro and I met in New York with a senior lawyer for the company and three of the company's outside lawyers to discuss the monitor's role and my approach to the

responsibilities created by the Court's Final Judgment. I outlined my expectations for the relationship. As reflected in Judge Cote's observations during the trial, and in the post-trial conferences focused on appropriate remedies, senior executives and the Board have an important role to play in the fulfillment of Apple's obligations. At the October 22 meeting, I explained that, in my experience, the monitor and the company benefit from the monitor's direct and regular access to senior management of the company.

In that connection, I advised the company that I felt it was important to conduct a set of initial meetings and interviews with company executives and members of the Board to introduce myself, lay the foundation for our relationship, and learn some basic facts about the company's compliance framework. At the October 22 meeting, I proposed that my first visit to Cupertino for those initial meetings and interviews take place the week of November 18, a full month after my appointment. I expressed my willingness to advance the meetings by a week if that was more convenient for the company and its executives. I should note that the initial meetings for my other monitoring assignments generally occurred within two weeks of my appointment.

Apparently, my requests were inconsistent with the desires, and perhaps the expectations, of the company. Since the October 22 initial meeting until today, the company has not been responsive to our efforts to discharge the obligations the Court assigned to us. The company consistently opposed our requests to conduct interviews during the week of November 18. It originally took the position that we were not to begin our work until 90 days after my appointment, and later opposed the request on grounds that providing senior executive and Board member interviews was overly burdensome, and that *all* of the individuals with whom we had asked to meet were unavailable during the entire week of November 18.

When we made it clear that we intended to travel to California during the week of November 18 and expected to meet with as many of the fifteen individuals we had requested as possible, the company agreed to schedule interviews with only two individuals. We were told that the others were "unavailable," with a specific reason given only for Bruce Sewell. Despite repeated promises, we received not a single document from the company in advance of our trip to California in response to requests we initially made on October 22, and repeated thereafter.¹ Once we arrived in California, the company provided interviews only with the two individuals who had been identified in advance, but with no one else. The company gave no explanation for failing to be more responsive to our requests for other interviews, other than "unavailability."

¹ After our November 18 trip to California, counsel for the company provided its first set of documents in response to our requests.

In addition to requests for interviews with relevant executives, we also asked to meet with Board members who work and reside in and around Northern California. We repeated our request upon our arrival on Monday, November 18 but we never received a response. It is unclear to me whether these requests have been communicated to you, although they certainly should have been.

Our requests to meet with key Apple personnel have been largely ignored, and when not ignored the responses have been extremely slow in coming. The company has spent far more time challenging the terms of our compensation and raising other objections related to administrative matters, even though the Court's Order provided no role for Apple in setting the monitor's compensation.² Apple has sought for the past month to manage our relationship as though we are its outside counsel or consultant, to whom it can dictate terms and conditions, and whose approval is required before we can undertake our work. Despite Apple's failure to respond adequately to our reasonable requests, we will continue to "proceed with all reasonable diligence" in our duties, as instructed by Judge Cote's November 21, 2013 Order proposing an amendment to her original September 5 Order.

The company's approach to date is antithetical to the type of relationship that is required for the monitor and the company to work together in a constructive and collaborative manner. This approach has the potential to create a relationship fraught with friction and tension rather than the positive, collaborative relationship we can - and should - have.

We understand that Apple is appealing the antitrust verdict the Court rendered against the company. We further understand that the company strongly opposed the appointment of an external antitrust compliance monitor, and that Apple has never had a monitor of any kind. That may explain why, over the past month, Apple has taken an unfortunate and unproductive approach. But understanding the company's perspective does not excuse Apple's continuing failure to cooperate.

We are off to a slow, difficult, and unfortunate start, but I have no doubt that we can get our relationship back on track. It is very early in a long-term relationship. I have several suggestions for you as members of the Board in the exercise of your oversight responsibilities, which I believe could help the Company fulfill its obligations under the Final Judgment:

- Ensure that Apple personnel appointed to serve as liaisons to me and the other members of the monitoring team understand that a relationship


² The latest of these challenges was in the form of a letter from Noreen Krall on November 21, 2013, demanding documentation and support for compensation.

with a court-appointed monitor is different from a relationship with counsel to the company, an adversary in litigation, or an outside counsel or consultant.

- Promote a positive, direct relationship between the company liaisons and the monitoring team that is unfiltered through outside counsel.
- Encourage senior management of the company to work with us to build a constructive relationship with a shared goal of creating a world-class antitrust compliance program at Apple. That can happen only if the company substitutes a new approach, based on collaboration and engagement, for the confrontational and obstructionist approach it has adopted in the first month of our relationship.

I very much regret that my first encounter with you has been under these circumstances. I look forward to meeting with you in the near future and working with you to ensure that Apple fully complies with the Court's Final Judgment in this matter and builds an antitrust compliance program that can serve as an industry leader.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Michael R. Bromwich".

Michael R. Bromwich