



1 16 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). The parties conducted extensive document discovery, and in August 2019,  
2 Lead Plaintiff moved for class certification, (ECF No. 99). After engaging in mediation, the  
3 parties reached an agreement to resolve this litigation. (ECF No. 122.) On June 17, 2020, this  
4 Court preliminarily approved the settlement and permitted notice to the class. (ECF No. 126.)  
5 The settlement funds were deposited into a Court Registry Investment System (“CRIS”) account.  
6 (ECF No. 128.)

7 The Proposed Settlement resolves the entire litigation for a cash payment of \$12  
8 million. (ECF No. 122.) No objections have been lodged. (ECF No. 147.) In addition, Lead  
9 Counsel seeks attorneys’ fees in the amount of 25% of the settlement fund (\$3 million), plus  
10 \$201,357.78 in litigation expenses, as well as a \$2,500 reimbursement to Lead Plaintiff as class  
11 representative. (ECF No. 139.)

## 12 DISCUSSION

### 13 I. Settlement Approval

14 There is a “strong judicial policy in favor of settlements, particularly in the class  
15 action context.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 116 (2d Cir. 2005)  
16 (quotation marks omitted). However, a court must “carefully scrutinize the settlement to ensure  
17 its fairness, adequacy and reasonableness, and that it was not the product of collusion.”  
18 D’Amato v. Deutsche Bank, 236 F.3d 78, 85 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Under this two-  
19 part inquiry, a court “must determine whether both the negotiating process leading to a  
20 settlement and the settlement itself are fair, adequate, and reasonable.” In re Currency  
21 Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 263 F.R.D. 110, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). In other words, the  
22 settlement must be both procedurally and substantively fair. In re Virtus Inv. Partners, Inc. Sec.  
23 Litig., 2018 WL 6333657, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2018).

1 With respect to procedural fairness, the “[n]egotiation of a settlement is presumed  
2 fair when the settlement is ‘reached in arm’s length negotiations conducted by experienced,  
3 capable counsel after meaningful discovery.’” Dial Corp. v. News Corp., 317 F.R.D. 426, 430  
4 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Wal-Mart, 396 F.3d at 116). Indeed, “‘great weight’ is accorded to the  
5 recommendations of counsel, who are most closely acquainted with the facts of the underlying  
6 litigation.” In re PaineWebber Ltd. P’ships Litig., 171 F.R.D. 104, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); accord  
7 City of Providence v. Aeropostale, Inc., 2014 WL 1883494, at \*5 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2014).  
8 Moreover, where a settlement is reached “under the supervision and with the endorsement of a  
9 sophisticated institutional investor,” it “is entitled to an even greater presumption of  
10 reasonableness.” In re Hi-Crush Partners L.P. Sec. Litig., 2014 WL 7323417, at \*5 (S.D.N.Y.  
11 Dec. 19, 2014) (quotation marks omitted). Given that the Proposed Settlement was the product  
12 of arm’s length negotiations between experienced counsel and created under the supervision of a  
13 sophisticated investor, the Proposed Settlement is procedurally fair.

14 To determine substantive fairness, courts consider the factors set forth in City of  
15 Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.:

16 (1) the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation; (2)  
17 the reaction of the class to the settlement; (3) the stage of the  
18 proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the risks of  
19 establishing liability; (5) the risks of establishing damages; (6) the  
20 risks of maintaining the class action through trial; (7) the ability of  
21 the defendants to withstand greater judgment; (8) the range of  
22 reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best possible  
23 recovery; and (9) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund  
24 to a possible recovery in light of all the attendant risks of the  
25 litigation.

26  
27 Pa. Pub. Sch. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 318 F.R.D. 19, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing  
28 City of Detroit v. Grinnell, 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974), abrogated on other grounds by  
29 Golberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2000)); accord Wal-Mart, 396 F.3d at

1 117. “[N]ot every factor must weigh in favor of settlement, rather the court should consider the  
2 totality of these factors in light of the particular circumstances.” Dial Corp., 317 F.R.D. at 431  
3 (quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).

4 A. Complexity, Expense, and Likely Duration of the Litigation

5 “As a general rule, securities class actions are notably difficult and notoriously  
6 uncertain to litigate.” In re Facebook, Inc. IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig., 2015 WL 6971424, at  
7 \*3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2015); see also Bank of Am. Corp., 318 F.R.D. at 24. Such is the case  
8 here, where expert testimony would have been required with respect to falsity, materiality,  
9 scienter, loss causation, and damages. As such, this factor strongly counsels in favor of  
10 approval.

11 B. Reaction of the Class to the Settlement

12 It is well settled that “the reaction of the class to the settlement is perhaps the  
13 most significant factor to be weighed in considering its adequacy.” In re Facebook, Inc., IPO Sec.  
14 & Derivative Litig., 343 F. Supp. 3d 394, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quotation marks omitted). And  
15 “the absence of objections by the class is extraordinarily positive and weighs in favor of  
16 settlement.” Dial Corp., 317 F.R.D. at 431 (quotation marks omitted); accord Bank of Am. Corp.,  
17 318 F.R.D. at 24. Here, no class members objected or opted out, which strongly favors approval.

18 C. Stage of the Proceedings and the Amount of Discovery Completed

19 The parties briefed—and this Court decided—a motion to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 66,  
20 71, 78.) They also completed document discovery, and Plaintiff moved for class certification,  
21 (ECF No. 99.). Thus, “a substantial amount of work had been completed” prior to settlement  
22 negotiations. Wal-Mart, 396 F.3d at 118. The significant litigation prior to the proposed  
23 settlement favors approval.

1 D. Risks of Establishing Liability and Damages and of Maintaining the Class  
2 Through Trial  
3

4 “Courts generally consider the fourth, fifth, and sixth Grinnell factors together.”

5 Dial Corp., 317 F.R.D. at 432. With respect to establishing liability, there was a substantial  
6 question regarding whether Plaintiffs could prove misrepresentation, loss causation, and scienter.

7 While Lead Plaintiff submitted a damages expert report on its motion for class certification,  
8 (ECF No. 100, Ex. C), Defendants would have likely offered an expert of their own.

9 Accordingly, the risk in establishing damages was real and counsels in favor of approving the  
10 settlement. See Dial Corp., 317 F.R.D. at 432 (“Plaintiffs would have encountered additional  
11 challenges to proving damages given the parties’ dueling expert reports.”). Moreover, “[a]s with  
12 any complicated securities action, the class faced the very real risk that a jury could be swayed  
13 by experts . . . who could minimize or eliminate the amount of Plaintiffs’ losses.” Bank of Am.  
14 Corp., 318 F.R.D. at 24 (quotation marks omitted). Finally, the fact that Lead Plaintiff’s motion  
15 for class certification had not been fully briefed—let alone decided—presented additional risks  
16 to Lead Plaintiff and the proposed class. Overall, these factors counsel in favor of approving the  
17 settlement.

18 E. Ability of Defendants to Withstand a Greater Judgment

19 Lead Plaintiff concedes that Defendants can withstand a greater judgment in  
20 excess of the settlement amount. (ECF No. 137, at 14.) However, Lead Plaintiff also avers that  
21 Defendant’s liability insurance policy was diminishing throughout the course of the litigation.  
22 (ECF No. 137, at 14–15.) Defendants have not confirmed this fact and, at this stage, have no  
23 incentive to deny it. See Hart v. BHH, LLC, 2020 WL 5645984, at \*4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22,  
24 2020).

25 Nevertheless, “while relevant to settlement approval, the ability of defendants to

1 withstand greater judgment does not alone suggest the settlement is unfair or unreasonable.” In  
2 re Facebook, 2015 WL 6971424, at \*5; see also D’Amato, 236 F.3d at 86 (“[T]his factor,  
3 standing alone, does not suggest that the settlement is unfair.”).

4 F. The Range of Reasonableness of the Settlement Fund in Light of the Best  
5 Possible Recovery and All the Attendant Risks of the Litigation  
6

7 “The final two Grinnell factors are typically considered together.” Dial Corp.,  
8 317 F.R.D. at 432. Here, the \$12 million settlement is approximately 10% of \$116.8 million,  
9 which is Lead Plaintiff’s estimated damages consistent with the Plan of Allocation. Moreover, if  
10 this Court were to credit Defendants’ anticipated attempt to reduce the class period by moving  
11 the start date from August 1, 2014 to June 16, 2015, the maximum potential recovery would be  
12 \$31.5 million. Under this formulation, \$12 million would be approximately 38% of the potential  
13 recovery. But “[t]he fact that the settlement amount may equal but a fraction of potential  
14 recovery does not render the settlement inadequate. Dollar amounts are judged not in  
15 comparison with the possible recovery in the best of all possible worlds, but rather in light of the  
16 strengths and weaknesses of plaintiffs’ case.” In re Facebook, 2015 WL 6971424, at \*6. Given  
17 the risks of proving loss causation, the recoverable damages were unlikely to be anywhere close  
18 to \$116.8 million. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 339 (2005).

19 While this settlement is hardly a windfall for Plaintiffs, it is within the range  
20 previously approved by judges in this District. See, e.g., In re Bear Stearns Cos. Sec.,  
21 Derivative, & ERISA Litig., 909 F. Supp. 2d 259, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (approving settlement  
22 amounting to 11% of estimated damages); In re Canadian Superior Sec. Litig., 2011 WL  
23 5830110, at \*4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2011) (approving settlement worth 8.5% of maximum  
24 amount of estimated damages); In re Merrill Lynch Tyco Research Sec. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 124,  
25 135 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (approving settlement worth approximately 3% of total estimated

1 damages). Ultimately, there is no indication that the Proposed Settlement is anything but the  
2 result of an arm's length negotiation. In view of the risk of litigation and the estimated recovery,  
3 the \$12 million settlement fund is reasonable.

4 G. Aggregation of All Factors

5 Overall, the Grinnell factors counsel in favor of approving the Proposed  
6 Settlement. No one has objected or opted out, and this action was contested at each stage of the  
7 litigation. And Plaintiffs faced substantial risk in proving misrepresentation, scienter, and loss  
8 causation. Accordingly, this Court approves the Proposed Settlement.

9 II. Plan of Allocation

10 “The standard for approval of a plan of allocation is the same as the standard for  
11 approving a settlement: namely, it must be fair and adequate.” In re Top Tankers, Inc. Sec.  
12 Litig., 2008 WL 2944620, at \*11 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2008) (quotation marks omitted). “[I]n  
13 determining whether a plan of allocation is fair, courts look primarily to the opinion of counsel.”  
14 In re Giant Interactive Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 279 F.R.D. 151, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quotation  
15 marks omitted); see also In re Top Tankers, 2008 WL 2944620, at \*11 (“If the plan of allocation  
16 is formulated by competent and experienced class counsel, an allocation plan need only have a  
17 reasonable, rational basis.” (quotation marks omitted)). Here, the Plan of Allocation—which  
18 was developed by Lead Counsel—is based on the level of artificial inflation in Lexmark’s  
19 common stock price during the Class Period. Moreover, the Plan of Allocation apportions the  
20 net settlement fund among Authorized claimants based on the claims alleged. Because the Plan  
21 of Allocation appears fair and adequate and comes by the recommendation of experienced Class  
22 Counsel, it is approved.

23

1 III. Notice

2 “The standard for the adequacy of a settlement notice in a class action under  
3 either the Due Process Clause or the Federal Rules is measured by reasonableness.” Wal-Mart,  
4 396 F.3d at 113. The Second Circuit explains that:

5 There are no rigid rules to determine whether a settlement notice to  
6 the class satisfies constitutional or Rule 23(e) requirements; the  
7 settlement notice must fairly apprise the prospective members of the  
8 class of the terms of the proposed settlement and of the options that  
9 are open to them in connection with the proceedings. Notice is  
10 adequate if it may be understood by the average class member.

11  
12 Wal-Mart, 396 F.3d at 114 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

13 The Settlement Notice is reasonable. The Court preliminarily approved the notice  
14 plan. (ECF No. 126, at 4.) As of December 5, 2020, more than 32,500 copies of the Notice  
15 Packet were mailed to all class members who could be identified with reasonable effort. (Decl.  
16 of Eric Nordskog in Supp. Of Mot. for Attorneys’ Fees, ECF No. 142 (“Nordskog Decl.”), at 3.)  
17 Additionally, Summary Notice was published in The Wall Street Journal and over PR Newswire  
18 on July 13, 2020. (Nordskog Decl., at 3.) Finally, the Notice Packet and other important  
19 documents were posted on the website maintained for the Settlement:

20 www.LexmarkSecuritiesSettlement.com. (Nordskog Decl., at 3.) The Settlement Notice also set  
21 forth the amount of settlement, maximum amount of attorneys’ fees and expenses sought, rights  
22 to object, dates and deadlines, and the Plan of Allocation. (Nordskog Decl., Exhibit A, at 3.)

23 This Court approves the Settlement Notice.

24 IV. Attorneys’ Fees

25 In a class action settlement, courts must carefully scrutinize lead counsel’s  
26 application for attorneys’ fees to “ensure that the interests of the class members are not  
27 subordinated to the interests of . . . class counsel.” Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co.,

1 67 F.3d 1072, 1078 (2d Cir. 1995). A court’s role in this context is “to act as a fiduciary who  
2 must serve as a guardian of the rights of absent class members.” McDaniel v. Cty. Of  
3 Schenectady, 595 F.3d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 2010). The trend in the Second Circuit is to assess a fee  
4 application using the “percentage of the fund” approach, which “assigns a proportion of the  
5 common settlement fund toward payment of attorneys’ fees.” Dial Corp., 317 F.R.D. at 433. As  
6 a “cross-check on the reasonableness of the requested percentage,” however, courts also look to  
7 the lodestar multiplier, which should be a reasonable multiple of the total number of hours billed  
8 at a standard hourly rate. Goldberger, 209 F.3d at 53. And regardless of which method is used,  
9 courts rely on the factors set forth in Goldberger to determine whether fees are reasonable. Wal-  
10 Mart, 396 F.3d at 121.

11 A. Percentage of the Fund

12 Here, Class Counsel seeks 25% of the settlement fund (\$12 million) in attorneys’  
13 fees. In assessing reasonable percentages of settlement funds, courts have “cabined awards to  
14 between 12% and 28%” for “class action settlements ranging from \$15 million to \$336 million.”  
15 Dial Corp. 317 F.R.D. at 436, 438 (awarding fees representing 20% of a \$244 million settlement  
16 fund); see also In re Facebook, 343 F. Supp. 3d at 418 (approving 25% of a \$35 million  
17 settlement fund); Bank of Am. Corp., 318 F.R.D. at 27 (allowing fees representing 12% of a  
18 \$335 million settlement fund); In re Platinum & Palladium Commodities Litig., 2015 WL  
19 4560206, at \*5 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2015) (awarding fees representing 22.5% of the \$72.5 million  
20 fund); In re Bayer AG Sec. Litig., 2008 WL 5336691, at \*2, \*6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2008)  
21 (approving 12% of an \$18.5 million settlement fund); In re Polaroid ERISA Litig., 2007 WL  
22 2116398, at \*3 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2007) (approving 28% of a \$15 million settlement fund).  
23 While a fee award of 25% of the settlement fund is within the range of awards previously

1 approved by courts in this District, it is on the higher end.

2 B. Lodestar Cross Check

3 The lodestar is “the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable  
4 number of hours required by the case.” Millea v. Metro-North. R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d  
5 Cir. 2011). Here, Lead Counsel spent about 4,581 attorney and professional support hours on  
6 this litigation, leading to a lodestar of \$3,011,766.00. (Decl. of Robert Robbins in Supp. of Mot.  
7 for Attorneys’ Fees, ECF No. 143 (“Robbins Decl.”), Ex. A; Decl. of Christine Fox in Supp. of  
8 Mot. for Attorneys’ Fees, ECF. No. 144 (“Fox Decl.”), Ex. A.) This amounts to a lodestar  
9 multiplier of 0.996, which is below multipliers previously approved by this Court. See Bank of  
10 Am. Corp., 318 F.R.D. at 27 (1.2 lodestar multiplier); Dial Corp., 317 F.R.D. at 437 (1.75  
11 lodestar multiplier); In re Platinum & Palladium, 2015 WL 4560206, at \*3 (1.4 lodestar  
12 multiplier).

13 However, Lead Counsel’s lodestar raises several issues. First, the allocation of  
14 time is heavily weighted toward partners. Of the 32 attorneys who billed, 16 were partners.  
15 (Robbins Decl., Ex. A; Fox Decl., Ex. A.) Those 16 partners accounted for nearly 47% of the  
16 hours billed by Lead Counsel. (Robbins Decl., Ex. A; Fox Decl., Ex. A.) Moreover, the hourly  
17 rates for some partners were higher than any hourly rates this Court has previously seen.  
18 Specifically, 5 of the 16 partners who billed had hourly rates exceeding \$1,000, and the rate for  
19 two of them exceeded \$1,300 per hour. (Robbins Decl., Ex. A; Fox Decl., Ex. A.) Lead Counsel  
20 asserts that the more expensive partners were used primarily in an advisory role, but this  
21 explanation is insufficient.<sup>1</sup> (Tr. of Fairness Hearing, ECF No. 156, at 8–9.) Further, the hourly

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<sup>1</sup> It is generally helpful for counsel to submit contemporaneous, detailed time records as part of their initial motion for attorneys’ fees. See William B. Rubenstein, 5 Newberg on Class Actions § 15:6 (5th ed. 2020). A court should not have to request billing records.

1 rates for Lead Counsel’s associates were high, and the rates for 5 associates exceeded \$600 per  
2 hour. (Robbins Dec., Ex. A; Fox Decl., Ex. A.) Finally, Lead Counsel billed a summer associate  
3 on the litigation, which is a practice this Court has never seen. (Robbins Decl., Ex. A.)

4           Given the partner-heavy billing, the high rates for several partners and associates,  
5 and the billing of a summer associate, a modest reduction of Lead Counsel’s requested attorneys’  
6 fee is warranted. See In re Platinum & Palladium Commodities Litig., 2015 WL 4560202, at \*4  
7 (“Courts have reduced the fee percentage requested where, as here, the lodestar value reflects an  
8 over-allocation of work to more expensive partners.”).

### 9           C. Goldberger Test

10           Regardless of which method is used, courts rely on the factors set forth in  
11 Goldberger to determine whether fees are reasonable: (1) the time and labor expended by  
12 counsel; (2) the magnitude and complexities of the litigation; (3) the risk of the litigation; (4) the  
13 quality of representation; (5) the requested fee in relation to the settlement; and (6) public policy  
14 considerations. Wal-Mart, 396 F.3d at 121 (citing Goldberger, 209 F.3d at 50). There is no  
15 “one-size-fits-all ‘benchmark’ in determining the appropriate fee”—in fact, courts should avoid  
16 that practice because it “could easily lead to routine windfall where the recovered fund runs into  
17 the multi-millions.” In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503, 521  
18 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).

#### 19           i. Time and Labor Expanded by Counsel

20           While many class actions are filed on the heels of a government investigation, the  
21 claims in this case were formulated entirely from the findings of a private investigation. See In  
22 re Gulf Oil/Cities Serv. Tender Offer Litig., 142 F.R.D. 588, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“[T]his is not  
23 a case where plaintiffs’ counsel can be cast as jackals to the government’s lion, arriving on the

1 scene after some enforcement or administrative agency has made the kill. They did all the work  
2 on their own.”). Here, Lead Counsel worked through a motion to dismiss, document discovery, a  
3 motion for certification, mediation, and settlement negotiations.

4           However, as discussed previously, Lead Counsel’s time charges were partner-  
5 heavy and at the top of hourly rates charged in securities actions in this District. Accordingly,  
6 this factor militates in favor of some reduction of the requested award.

7           ii. Magnitude and Complexities of the Litigation

8           Courts have recognized that shareholder actions are notoriously complex and  
9 difficult to prove. See Mathes v. Roberts, 85 F.R.D. 710, 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). This action  
10 involved a number of difficult and complex questions concerning loss causation and damages.

11           iii. Risk of Litigation

12           “Perhaps the foremost . . . factor[] is the attorney’s risk of litigation, i.e., the fact  
13 that, despite the most vigorous and competent of efforts, success is never guaranteed.” Grinnell  
14 Corp., 495 F.2d at 471 (quotation marks omitted). Courts in this district have noted that  
15 significant litigation risks, including the difficulty of establishing loss causation in light of the  
16 Supreme Court’s decision in Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005), and the  
17 difficulty in proving that Defendants acted with scienter, militate in favor of fee awards. See In  
18 re Veeco Instruments Inc. Sec. Litig., 2007 WL 4115808, at \*6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2007).

19 Although Lead Counsel withstood a motion to dismiss, it faced substantial risk in establishing  
20 scienter, as well as proving causation and damages at trial.

21           iv. Quality of Representation

22           The results achieved through the efforts of Lead Counsel are a “critical element in  
23 determining the appropriate fee to be awarded,” and the settlement here will undoubtedly have

1 widespread benefits to the class. Maley v. Del Global Techs. Corp., 186 F. Supp. 2d 358, 373  
2 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Lead Counsel provided high-quality representation in securing an  
3 advantageous settlement for the class.

4 v. Requested Fee in Relation to Settlement

5 As discussed previously, the proposed fee of 25% of the Settlement, while within  
6 the wide range of fee awards in this District, is on the higher end. See, e.g., Sakiko Fujiwara v.  
7 Sushi Yasuda Ltd., 48 F. Supp. 3d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (awarding 20% of \$2.4 million  
8 settlement as fees); McGreevy v. Life Alert Emergency Response, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 3d 380  
9 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (awarding 21.5% of a \$3.3 million settlement fund); In re Platinum &  
10 Palladium Commodities Litig., 2015 WL 4560206 (awarding 22.5% of a \$72.5 million fund).

11 vi. Public Policy Considerations

12 While public policy favors “the award of reasonable attorney’s fees,” courts must  
13 also “guard against providing a monetary windfall to class counsel to the detriment of the  
14 plaintiff class.” In re NTL Inc. Sec. Litig., 2007 WL 1294377, at \*8 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2007)  
15 (quotation marks omitted).

16 Applying the Goldberger factors and recognizing that a modest adjustment is  
17 appropriate, this Court awards a total attorneys’ fee of \$2,880,000, which represents 24% of the  
18 Settlement Fund. These attorneys’ fees may be disbursed from the CRIS account once 75% of  
19 the net settlement fund<sup>2</sup> has been distributed. See Bank of Am., 318 F.R.D. at 28; Beane v. Bank  
20 of N.Y. Mellon, 2009 WL 874046, at \*9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009).

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<sup>2</sup> The estimated net settlement fund is \$8,743,641.22, which represents the remainder after attorneys’ fees of \$2,880,000, litigation expenses of \$201,358.78, reimbursement award of \$2,500, 2020 tax filing fee of \$2,500, and the Claims Administrator’s estimated fees and expenses of approximately \$170,000.

1 V. Litigation Expenses

2 “In class action settlements, [a]ttorneys may be compensated for reasonable out-  
3 of-pocket expenses incurred and customarily charged to their clients. When the ‘lion’s share’ of  
4 expenses reflects the typical costs of complex litigation such as experts and consultants, trial  
5 consultants, litigation and trial support services, document imaging and copying, deposition  
6 costs, online legal research, and travel expenses, courts should not depart from the common  
7 practice in this Circuit of granting expense requests.” Bank of Am. Corp., 318 F.R.D. at 27  
8 (quotation marks omitted).

9 Here, Lead Counsel seeks \$201,358.78 in litigation expenses, which is below the  
10 \$300,000 Lead Counsel informed the class they might apply for in the Settlement Notice.  
11 (Nordskog Decl., Ex. A, at 3.) The bulk of expenses were for Plaintiffs’ damage expert,  
12 accounting for over \$126,000. (Robbins Decl., Ex. B.) This Court finds Lead Counsel’s  
13 expense request reasonable and approves it.

14 VI. Reimbursement for Class Representative

15 Under 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(4), a class representative may be reimbursed for  
16 “reasonable costs and expenses (including lost wages) directly relating to the representation of  
17 the class.” “These awards compensate lead plaintiffs for the substantial time and effort the class  
18 representatives incurred, including written discovery, being disposed, reviewing and editing  
19 submissions, and attending hearings.” Bank of Am. Corp., 318 F.R.D. at 27 (quotation marks  
20 omitted). Courts typically require an affidavit demonstrating a “thorough accounting of hours  
21 dedicated to the litigation and a statement that these hours constituted lost work time.” In re  
22 Bank of Am. Corp. Sec., Derivative, & Emp. Ret. Income Sec. Act (ERISA) Litig., 772 F.3d  
23 125, 133 (2d Cir. 2014).

