## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA ASHEVILLE DIVISION CIVIL CASE NO. 1:16-CV-00192-MR CRIMINAL CASE NO. 1:02-CR-00004-MR-4

HARRY NOLAN MOODY,	
Petitioner,	
vs.	<u>ORDER</u>
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	
Respondent.	

**THIS MATTER** is before the Court on the motion of the United States requesting that the Court enter an order again holding this action in abeyance. [CV Doc. 6].<sup>1</sup> According to the government's motion, defense counsel does not object to its request. [Id.].

Petitioner was convicted of conspiracy to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. [CR Doc. 208]. The presentence report noted that Petitioner had prior qualifying convictions – specifically, two 1987 North Carolina convictions for assault

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Citations to the record herein contain the relevant document number referenced preceded by either the letters "CV" denoting the document is listed on the docket in the civil case file number 1:16-cv-00192-MR, or the letters "CR" denoting the document is listed on the docket in the criminal case file number 1:02-cr-00004-MR-4.

inflicting serious injury and a 1987 North Carolina conviction for assault on a law officer -- that triggered the Career Offender enhancement under section 4B1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines. The Court sentenced Petitioner as a Career Offender to a total term of imprisonment of 360 months. [Id.].

On June 21, 2016, Petitioner commenced this action by filing a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. [CV Doc. 1]. In his petition, Petitioner contends that, in light of <u>Johnson v. United States</u>, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), his prior North Carolina convictions for assault no longer qualify as "crimes of violence" under the Guidelines. [<u>Id.</u> at 3-4]. Consequently, Petitioner argues his Career Offender designation is improper and thus his sentence is unlawful. [Id.].

In response to the petition, the government filed a motion to hold this proceeding in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's decision in <u>Beckles v. United States</u>, 616 Fed. Appx. 415 (11th Cir.), <u>cert. granted</u>, 2016 WL 1029080 (U.S. June 27, 2016) (No. 15-8544). [CV Doc. 3]. One of the questions presented in <u>Beckles</u> was whether <u>Johnson</u> applies retroactively to cases collaterally challenging federal sentences enhanced under the residual clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). The residual clause invalidated in <u>Johnson</u> is identical to the residual clause in the Career Offender provision of the Guidelines, § 4B1.2(a)(2) (defining "crime of violence"). This Court

granted the government's motion and held this matter in abeyance pending the <u>Beckles</u> decision. The government was granted sixty (60) days after the <u>Beckles</u> decision to file a response to Petitioner's motion to vacate. [CV Doc. 4].

On March 6, 2017, the Supreme Court issued its decision in <u>Beckles</u>, holding that "the advisory [Sentencing] Guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges under the Due Process Clause" and that <u>Johnson</u>, therefore, does not apply to invalidate the residual clause of the career-offender Guideline. 137 S. Ct. 886, 890, 895 (2017). In the wake of <u>Beckles</u>, Petitioner filed a supplemental brief in support of his motion to vacate, in which he argues that <u>Beckles</u> does not resolve his claim for relief because he was sentenced when the Sentencing Guidelines were mandatory, rather than advisory. [CV Doc. 5 at 1].

The government contends that the Fourth Circuit will soon hear oral argument in <u>United States v. Brown</u>, No. 16-7056 (4th Cir.), in which the defendant has argued that his career-offender sentence should be vacated under <u>Johnson</u> because he was classified as a career offender based on the residual clause of the career-offender guideline when the Guidelines were mandatory. The government argues that the Fourth Circuit's decision in <u>Brown</u> may be dispositive of Petitioner's claim for relief under <u>Johnson</u>. Even

if not dispositive of Petitioner's entire claim, the government argues, the <a href="Brown">Brown</a> decision will be dispositive of certain of the legal issues posed by Petitioner's motion to vacate.

Based upon the reasons given by the government, and without objection by Petitioner, the Court concludes that the government's motion should be granted.

## **ORDER**

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the government's motion to place this case in abeyance [CV Doc. 6], is hereby GRANTED and this matter is hereby held in abeyance pending the Fourth Circuit's decision in <u>United States v. Brown</u>, No. 16-7056 (4th Cir.). Thereafter, the government shall have 45 days from the date the Fourth Circuit decides <u>Brown</u> within which to file its response in this matter.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: May 9, 2017

Martin Reidinger

United States District Judge