

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO  
EASTERN DIVISION

LORENZO J. THIGPEN	)	CASE NO. 1:10CV2660
	)	
Plaintiff ,	)	
	)	JUDGE CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO
v.	)	
	)	
BILL MASON	)	<u>MEMORANDUM OF OPINION</u>
	)	<u>AND ORDER</u>
Defendant.	)	

Plaintiff *pro se* Lorenzo J. Thigpen filed this action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Cuyahoga County, Ohio Prosecutor Bill Mason. At the time this action was filed, Plaintiff was confined in the Cuyahoga County Jail. He alleges that the prosecutor is continuing prosecution of aggravated burglary, abduction, assault and criminal damaging even though the victim does not want to proceed with the charges. Plaintiff asserts that he has been over-indicted, constituting malicious prosecution. He requests damages in the amount of \$2,000,000.00.

A district court is expressly authorized to dismiss any civil action filed by a prisoner seeking relief from a governmental entity, as soon as possible after docketing, if the court concludes that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if the plaintiff seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; *Siller v. Dean*, 2000 WL 145167 \* 2 (6th Cir. Feb. 1, 2000); *see Hagans v. Lavine*, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (citing numerous Supreme Court cases for the proposition that attenuated or unsubstantial claims divest the district court of jurisdiction); *In re Bendectin Litig.*, 857 F.2d 290, 300 (6th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that federal question jurisdiction is divested by unsubstantial claims).

The Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Docket shows that on November 17, 2010,

Plaintiff pled guilty to abduction and was later sentenced to a 6 month term of imprisonment. *State of Ohio v. Thigpen*, Case No. CR-09-532314. United States District Courts do not have jurisdiction over challenges to state court decisions even if those challenges allege that the state court's action was unconstitutional. *See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman*, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n. 16 (1983); *Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.*, 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). Federal appellate review of state court judgments can only occur in the United States Supreme Court by appeal or by writ of certiorari. *Id.* Under this principle, generally referred to as the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, a party losing his case in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States District Court based on the party's claim that the state judgment itself violates his or her federal rights. *Johnson v. DeGrandy*, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994). Federal jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely by couching the claims in terms of a civil rights action. *Lavrack v. City of Oak Park*, 1999 WL 801562 \* 2 (6th Cir. Sept. 28, 1999); *see also, Valenti v. Mitchell*, 962 F.2d 288, 296 (3d Cir.1992).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit uses a two-pronged inquiry when assessing whether Rooker-Feldman bars a particular claim or cause of action. First, in order for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply to a claim presented in federal district court, the issue before the court must be inextricably intertwined with the claim asserted in the state court proceeding. *Catz v. Chalker*, 142 F.3d 279, 293 (6th Cir. 1998); *see Tropf v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co.*, 289 F.3d 929, 937 (6th Cir. 2002). "Where federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong, it is difficult to conceive the federal proceeding as, in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal of the state court judgment." *Catz*, 142 F.3d at 293. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies when the party losing his case in state court files suit in federal

district court seeking redress for an injury allegedly caused by the state court's decision itself. *Coles v. Granville*, 448 F.3d 853, 857-59 (6th Cir. 2006). Second, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a district court from exercising jurisdiction where the claim is a specific grievance that the law was invalidly or unconstitutionally applied in plaintiff's particular case rather than a general constitutional challenge to the governing state law. *Id.*; *Tropf*, 289 F.3d at 937.

Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim relates to the conduct of his criminal case and should have been raised with the state court in the first instance. This Federal Court cannot act as a court of appeals as to state court decisions, even if Plaintiff alleges that state court proceedings were improper or unconstitutional.

Further, prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for their conduct as long as that conduct is intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. *Imbler v. Pachtman*, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). "The analytical key to prosecutorial immunity ... is advocacy-whether the actions in question are those of an advocate." *Skinner v. Govorchin*, 463 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). There is no indication in the Complaint that Prosecutor Bill Mason acted outside of the scope of his responsibilities.

Accordingly, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: January 21, 2011

-

**S/Christopher A. Boyko**  
JUDGE CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE