Freeman v. United States Doc. 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

MARIO FREEMAN,) Case No. 1:11 CV 1788	
Plaintiff,)) JUDGE DAN AARON POLSTE	ER
v.)) MEMORANDUM OF ORBINO	т
UNITED STATES, et al.,) <u>MEMORANDUM OF OPINION</u>) <u>AND ORDER</u>	<u> </u>
Defendants.)	

On August 25, 2011, plaintiff *pro se* Mario Freeman filed this *in forma pauperis* action against the United States, Yum Brands, Inc., National Basketball Association, Inc., NFL Properties LLC., Dave's Market, CBS Corporation, the Walt Disney Company, and Family Dollar. For the reasons stated below, this case is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

Plaintiff alleges that for at least three years the United States, National Basketball Association, NFL Properties, CBS, and Walt Disney Company have invaded his privacy. It is further alleged these defendants and Yum Brands, as well as Chancellor University, have harassed plaintiff. Plaintiff's food "was poisoned at facilities owned by Yum Brands and Dave's Market." Complaint, p.2. For at least the last three years, plaintiff "was assaulted by agents acting on behalf of the United States government." Complaint, p.3. Finally, plaintiff's "rights to life, liberty, and due process as guaranteed to him by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, have been violated by defendant United States." *Id*.

Although *pro se* pleadings are liberally construed, *Boag v. MacDougall*, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is required to dismiss an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.¹ *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); *Lawler v. Marshall*, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); *Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville*, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require "detailed factual allegations," but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Id. A pleading that offers "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement. Id. It must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" Id. Even liberally construed, the complaint does not contain allegations reasonably suggesting plaintiff might have a valid claim. See, Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ, 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 1996)(court not required to accept summary allegations or unwarranted legal conclusions in determining whether complaint states a claim for relief).

Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted and this action is

A claim may be dismissed *sua sponte*, without prior notice to the plaintiff and without service of process on the defendant, if the court explicitly states that it is invoking section 1915(e) [formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)] and is dismissing the claim for one of the reasons set forth in the statute. *McGore v. Wrigglesworth*, 114 F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 1997); *Spruytte v. Walters*, 753 F.2d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 1985), *cert. denied*, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986); *Harris v. Johnson*, 784 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1986); *Brooks v. Seiter*, 779 F.2d 1177, 1179 (6th Cir. 1985).

dismissed under section 1915(e). Further, the court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/Dan Aaron Polster 10/31/11
DAN AARON POLSTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE