

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLIE CARLISLE, III,)	Case No.: 1:13 CV 2144
)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	JUDGE SOLOMON OLIVER, JR.
v.)	
)	
S.A. THOMPSON, <i>et al.</i> ,)	<u>MEMORANDUM OF OPINION</u>
)	<u>AND ORDER</u>
Defendants.)	

Pro se Plaintiff Charlie Carlisle filed this action against Mansfield Correctional Institution (“MANCI”) Contract Nurse S. A. Thompson, MANCI Correctional Officer Russell Slanczka, MANCI Correctional Officer Homer, and MANCI Correctional Officer Bryan. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges he was inadvertently given another inmate’s medication and experienced dizziness. He asserts the Defendants were negligent and seeks monetary damages.

Background

On January 17, 2013, Nurse Thompson was dispensing medication on “pill call” in the segregation unit of MANCI. Officer Homer accompanied her on her rounds. Plaintiff contends he was locked in his cell and attempted to get the nurse’s attention to request an aspirin for a headache. He claims Officer Homer heard his request and told him to place his hand under the cell door to receive the pill. Nurse Thompson continued on with her duties and called out to Plaintiff’s cellmate to dispense his cellmate’s prescription medication. Plaintiff placed his hand under the cell door and

Nurse Thompson, believing the hand belonged to Plaintiff's cellmate, dispensed three green pills and a one red and white pill to Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges the light was off in his cell, so he believed the pills to be the requested aspirin and took the medication. He indicates that he later discovered the green pills were each 10 mg of Risperdal. He cannot recall the second medication or the dosage. Plaintiff states he discovered the error when Officer Homer came back to his cell a few minutes later and asked Plaintiff to return the medication. He states he began to feel dizzy and fell inside of his cell. He was taken to the clinic for treatment. He contends he suffered a head injury which caused him to experience headaches. The MANCI medical department's records indicate Plaintiff had no physical injuries, and his vital signs were normal. Plaintiff received a conduct report for giving false information and for misuse of medication. He was found not guilty of the charges. Plaintiff asserts the Defendants were negligent.

Standard of Review

Although *pro se* pleadings are liberally construed, *Boag v. MacDougall*, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is required to dismiss an *in forma pauperis* action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); *Lawler v. Marshall*, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); *Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville*, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). An action has no arguable basis in law when a defendant is immune from suit or when a plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. *Neitzke*, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or "wholly incredible." *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992); *Lawler*, 898 F.2d at 1199.

When determining whether the Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must construe the Complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, accept all factual allegations as true, and determine whether the Complaint contains “enough fact to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The Plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds for relief “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” *Id.* Although a Complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, its “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint are true.” *Id.* The Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” *Papasan v. Allain*, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).

The Supreme Court in *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009), further explains the “plausibility” requirement, stating that “a claim has facial plausibility when the Plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678. Furthermore, “the plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully.” *Id.* This determination is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” *Id.*

Analysis

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and, unlike state trial courts, they do not have general jurisdiction to review all questions of law. *See Ohio ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner*, 549 F.3d 468, 474 (6th Cir. 2008). Instead, they have only the authority to decide cases that the Constitution and Congress have empowered them to resolve. *Id.* Consequently, “[i]t is to be presumed that a

cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” *Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 511 U.S. 375, 377(1994) (internal citation omitted).

Generally speaking, the Constitution and Congress have given federal courts authority to hear a case only when diversity of citizenship exists between the parties, or when the case raises a federal question. *Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams*, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). The first type of federal jurisdiction, diversity of citizenship, is applicable to cases of sufficient value between “citizens of different states.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). To establish diversity of citizenship, the Plaintiff must establish that he is a citizen of one state and all of the Defendants are citizens of other states. The citizenship of a natural person equates to his domicile. *Von Dunser v. Aronoff*, 915 F.2d 1071, 1072 (6th Cir.1990). The second type of federal jurisdiction relies on the presence of a federal question. This type of jurisdiction arises where a “well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the Plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” *Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust*, 463 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1983).

Diversity of citizenship does not exist in this case. Plaintiff is incarcerated in the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility serving a ten year sentence which expires in August 2019.¹ He does not list any other address for himself. All of the Defendants are listed as employees of MANCI, with addresses at the Ohio prison. A plaintiff in federal court has the burden of pleading sufficient facts to support the existence of the court’s jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. In a diversity action, the plaintiff

¹ Information concerning Ohio inmates can be found at <http://www.drc.state.oh.us/OffenderSearch/Search.aspx>

must state the citizenship of all parties so that the existence of complete diversity can be confirmed. *Washington v. Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc.*, No. 03-3350, 2003 WL 22146143, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 16, 2003). The Complaint, as written, suggests that the Plaintiff and Defendants are all citizens of Ohio. Federal subject matter jurisdiction cannot be based on diversity of citizenship.

If federal jurisdiction exists in this case, it must be based on a claimed violation of federal law. In determining whether a claim arises under federal law, the Court looks only to the “well-pleaded allegations of the Complaint and ignores potential defenses” Defendant may raise. *Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp.*, 501 F.3d 555, 560 (6th Cir. 2007). Although the well-pleaded-complaint rule focuses on what Plaintiff alleges, it allows the Court to look past the words of the Complaint to determine whether the allegations ultimately involve a federal question. *Ohio ex rel. Skaggs*, 549 F.3d at 475. In addition to causes of action expressly created by federal law, federal-question jurisdiction also reaches ostensible state-law claims that: (1) necessarily depend on a substantial and disputed federal issue, (2) are completely preempted by federal law or (3) are truly federal-law claims in disguise. *See Mikulski*, 501 F.3d at 560; *City of Warren v. City of Detroit*, 495 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 2007).

Here, Plaintiff is proceeding *pro se* and *pro se* plaintiffs enjoy the benefit of a liberal construction of their pleadings and filings. *Boswell v. Mayer*, 169 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1999). Indeed, this standard of liberal construction “requires active interpretation ... to construe a *pro se* petition ‘to encompass any allegation stating federal relief.’” *Haines*, 404 U.S. at 520. Even with that liberal construction, however, Plaintiff failed to properly identify a federal question in this case.

The only claim Plaintiff asserts in this case is one of negligence. Negligence is a cause of action which arises under state tort law. It does not support the existence of federal question

jurisdiction. *Veljkovic v. First Energy Co.*, No. 1:07 CV 1991, 2007 WL 2409716, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2007).

Even if this Court reads Plaintiff's Compliant generously as attempting to assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Eighth Amendment, it would fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Supreme Court in *Wilson v. Seiter*, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991), set forth a framework for courts to use when deciding whether certain conditions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. A plaintiff must first plead facts which, if true, establish that a sufficiently serious deprivation has occurred. *Id.* Seriousness is measured in response to "contemporary standards of decency." *Hudson v. McMillian*, 503 U.S. 1,8 (1992). Routine discomforts of prison life do not suffice. *Id.* Only deliberate indifference to serious medical needs or extreme deprivations regarding the conditions of confinement will implicate the protections of the Eighth Amendment. *Id.* at 9. Plaintiff must also establish a subjective element showing the prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. *Id.* Deliberate indifference is characterized by obduracy or wantonness, not inadvertence or good faith error. *Whitley v. Albers*, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when both the objective and subjective requirements are met. *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).

Although Plaintiff arguably satisfied the objective component of his claim, his allegations fail to satisfy the subjective element of an Eighth Amendment claim. The subjective component requires Plaintiff to show that the Defendants knew of, and acted with deliberate indifference to his health or safety. *Wilson*, 501 U.S. at 302-03. Deliberate indifference "entails something more than mere negligence." *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 835. This standard is met if "the official knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” *Brown v. Bargery*, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 837). Plaintiff alleges that Nurse Thompson dispensed medication to him believing she was dispensing it to his cellmate. He alleges the light was off in his cell and he took the pills believing them to be aspirin. Even liberally construed, the Complaint contains no allegations indicating the Defendants acted with a degree of culpability greater than mere negligence. Negligence does not support an Eighth Amendment claim.

Conclusion

Accordingly, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) without prejudice to any claims Plaintiff may have under state law. The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.²

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ SOLOMON OLIVER, JR.
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

² 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides:

An appeal may not be taken *in forma pauperis* if the trial court certifies that it is not taken in good faith.