



in which a prisoner seeks redress from governmental entities and employees, and to dismiss before service any such complaint that the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from defendant who is immune from such relief. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; *Hill v. Lappin*, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2010). In order to survive a dismissal under § 1915A, a *pro se* complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state claim to relief that is plausible on its face. *Hill*, 630 F.3d at 471 (holding that the dismissal standard articulated in *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) and *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) governs dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. at 1940.

Upon review, the Court finds that the plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. Even liberally construed, it does not allege a plausible federal civil rights claim upon which he may be granted relief.

In order to state a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States by a person acting under color of state law. *Flagg Bros. v. Brooks*, 436 U.S. 149, 155–57 (1978). A state prison and prison “staff,” as the plaintiff sues here, are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. *See Anderson v. Morgan County Correctional Complex*, No. 15-6344, 2016 WL 9402910, at \*1 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. Sept. 21, 2016), citing *Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police*, 491 U.S. 58, 65–71 (1989) and *Hix v. Tenn. Dept. of Corr.*, 196 F. App’x 350, 355 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006).

Additionally, even assuming a proper defendant, the plaintiff’s allegations are

insufficient to demonstrate a plausible constitutional claim. A prison official's negligent interference with a prisoner's religious diet, as the plaintiff's allegations at the most suggest here, does not violate the First Amendment. *See Colvin v. Caruso*, 605 F.3d 282, 293-94 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that isolated incidents of negligence by prison officials in implementing kosher food requirements is not actionable under the First Amendment); *Gallagher v. Shelton*, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009) (isolated acts of negligence in providing kosher diet do not support a free-exercise claim). Nor are the plaintiff's allegations regarding his food sufficient to demonstrate a plausible claim under the Eighth Amendment. *See Balcar v. Smith*, No. 17-5159, 2017 WL 3613479, at \*2 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. July 17, 2017) (holding that a plaintiff's allegations showing "some negligence regarding the defendant's attention to his diet requests and allergies" were insufficient to demonstrate a claim under the Eighth Amendment).

### Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. In light of the § 1915A dismissal, the plaintiff's motion to proceed *in forma pauperis* (Doc. No. 2) is denied as moot. The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.



9/8/2020

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DAN AARON POLSTER  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE