UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO		
	:	
TAG R. KECKLER,	:	
	:	CASE NO. 3:08-CV-170
Petitioner,	:	
	:	
V.	:	OPINION & ORDER
	:	[Resolving Doc. Nos. 1, 12, & 13.]
MARC DANN, et al.	:	
Respondents.	:	
	:	
	:	

JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

On January 18, 2008, *pro se* Petitioner Tag R. Keckler filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to <u>28 U.S.C. § 2254</u>. [Doc. <u>1</u>.] With his petition, Keckler seeks relief from the five-year sentence that an Ohio state court imposed following his guilty plea to one count of endangering children. [*Id.*]

Keckler advances two arguments to support his petition. [<u>Id.</u> at 5, 7.] First, he says that the Ohio state court's sentence was illegal. [<u>Id.</u>] Second, he contends that his trial counsel was ineffective. [<u>Id.</u>]

The State of Ohio opposes Keckler's motion. [Doc. <u>12</u>.] First, the State argues that Keckler's petition is time-barred because he failed to file his petition within <u>28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)</u>'s one-year statute of limitations. [<u>*Id.* at 4-11</u>.] Second, the State argues that Keckler failed to exhaust his claims in state court. [<u>*Id.* at 11-13</u>.] Finally, the State argues that Keckler's claims are meritless. [<u>*Id.* at 13-15</u>.]

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On August 6, 2009, Magistrate Judge William H. Baughman, Jr. filed a Report and Recommendation that recommended the Court deny Keckler's § 2254 petition as time-barred. [Doc. <u>13</u>.] The Magistrate Judge found that Keckler's sentence became final as a matter of Ohio law on September 17, 2006 because he failed to appeal within 30 days of his sentencing on August 18, 2006. [<u>Id. at 7</u>.] As a result, under <u>28 U.S.C. § 2244</u>'s one-year limitations period, Keckler had until September 17, 2007 to file his federal habeas petition. [<u>Id.</u>] Keckler did not, however, file this petition until January 18, 2008. [Doc. <u>1</u> at 1.]

Moreover, the Magistrate Judge found that Keckler could not avail himself of statutory or equitable tolling of § 2244's limitations period. [Doc. <u>13</u> at 7-9.] The Magistrate Judge held that statutory tolling was unavailable because Keckler did not file his motion for leave to file a delayed appeal until September 26, 2007, after § 2244's limitations period had run.¹ [<u>Id. at 7-8</u>.] The Magistrate Judge also found that Keckler failed to show any factual basis for equitable tolling. [<u>Id. at 8-9</u>.]

The Federal Magistrates Act requires a district court to conduct a *de novo* review only of those portions of a Report and Recommendation to which a party has objected. <u>28 U.S.C.</u> § <u>636(b)(1)(C)</u>. A party must file any objections to a Report and Recommendation within ten days of service. <u>Id.</u> Failure to object within this time waives the party's right to appeal the magistrate judge's recommendation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); *see also Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140, 145

^{1/}Although Petitioner dated his motion August 31, 2007, the Ohio appellate court did not receive it until September 26, 2007. [Doc. 12, <u>Ex. 6</u>.] Ohio law deems the date of a motion's receipt–not mailing–to be the date of filing. See <u>State ex rel. Tyler v. Alexander</u>, 555 N.E.2d 966, 967-68 (Ohio 1990); see also <u>Vroman v. Brigano</u>, 346 F.3d 598, 603-04 (6th Cir. 2003). Thus, Petitioner filed his motion too late to toll § 2244's limitations period. Moreover, a motion for state post-conviction relief cannot resurrect § 2244's limitations period once it has expired. See, e.g., <u>Searcy</u> v. Carter, 246 F.3d 515, 519 (6th Cir. 2001).

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(1985); *Souter v. Jones*, 395 F.3d 577, 585 (6th Cir. 2005). Absent objection, a district court may adopt the magistrate's report without review. *See <u>Thomas</u>*, 474 U.S. at 149</u>. In any event, having conducted its own review of the parties' briefs on the issue, the Court agrees with the conclusions of the Magistrate Judge.

Accordingly, the Court **ADOPTS** in whole Magistrate Judge Baughman's findings of fact and conclusions of law and incorporates them fully herein by reference. The Court thus **DENIES** Petitioner Keckler's § 2254 petition. Further, the Court certifies, pursuant to <u>28</u> <u>U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)</u>, that Petitioner could not take an appeal from this decision in good faith, and no basis exists on which to issue a certificate of appealability. <u>28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)</u>; Fed. R. App. <u>P. 22(b)</u>.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 25, 2009

James S. Gwin

JAMES S. GWIN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE