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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

| MICHAEL MILLER, |) CASE NO. 4:09 CV 2067 | |
|---------------------|-----------------------------|---|
| Plaintiff, |)) JUDGE SARA LIOI) | |
| v. |) | |
| |) MEMORANDUM OF OPINIO | N |
| YOUNGSTOWN BOARD OF |) AND ORDER | |
| EDUCATION, |) | |
| |) | |
| Defendant. |) | |

On September 4, 2009, plaintiff *pro se* Michael Miller filed this *in forma* pauperis action against the Youngstown Board of Education. For the reasons stated below, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

The complaint states in its entirety as follows:

504 plan clearly say, I have a right to a education. I did not receive.

Although *pro se* pleadings are liberally construed, *Boag v. MacDougall*, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is required to dismiss an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. ¹ *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); *Lawler v. Marshall*, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); *Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville*, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996).

¹A claim may be dismissed *sua sponte*, without prior notice to the plaintiff and without service of process on the defendant, if the court explicitly states that it is invoking section 1915(e) [formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)] and is dismissing the claim for one of the reasons set forth in the statute. *McGore v. Wrigglesworth*, 114 F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 1997); *Spruytte v. Walters*, 753 F.2d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 1985), *cert. denied*, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986); *Harris v. Johnson*, 784 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1986); *Brooks v. Seiter*, 779 F.2d 1177, 1179 (6th Cir. 1985).

Principles requiring generous construction of pro se pleadings are not without

limits. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985). A complaint must

contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements of some

viable legal theory to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements. See Schied v. Fanny

Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). District courts are not required

to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them or to construct full blown claims

from sentence fragments. Beaudette, 775 F.2d at 1278. To do so would "require ...[the courts]

to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, ... [and] would ... transform

the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking

out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party." Id. Even liberally

construed, the complaint does not contain allegations reasonably suggesting plaintiff might

have a valid federal claim. See Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ,, 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir.

1996) (court not required to accept summary allegations or unwarranted legal conclusions in

determining whether complaint states a claim for relief).

For the foregoing reasons, the request to proceed *in forma pauperis* is granted

and this action is dismissed under section 1915(e). Further, the court certifies, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 13, 2009

HONORABLE SARA LIOI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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