

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

SHIRLEY A. CARLETTI, et al.,)	CASE NO. 5:09 CV 2501
)	
Plaintiff,)	JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS
)	
v.)	
)	<u>MEMORANDUM OF OPINION</u>
MARK CROOKSTON, et al.,)	<u>AND ORDER</u>
)	
Defendants.)	

This *pro se* action was filed by Randall A. Carletti on October 23, 2009, on behalf of himself and purportedly on behalf of Shirley A. Carletti and Shir Leasing. The complaint consists almost entirely of legal rhetoric, and no intelligible allegations are set forth.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

As the Court held in *Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929, the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require “detailed factual allegations,” but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.”

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citations omitted).

Even liberally construed, the complaint does not contain allegations reasonably suggesting plaintiff might have a valid claim. *See, Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ.*, 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 1996)(court not required to accept summary allegations or unwarranted legal conclusions in determining whether complaint states a claim for relief). This action is therefore appropriately subject to summary dismissal. *Apple v. Glenn*, 183 F.3d 477 (6th Cir. 1999); *see Hagans v. Lavine*, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974)(citing numerous Supreme Court cases for the proposition that attenuated or unsubstantial claims divest the district court of jurisdiction); *In re Bendectin Litig.*, 857 F.2d 290, 300 (6th Cir.1988)(recognizing that federal question jurisdiction is divested by unsubstantial claims).

Accordingly, this action is dismissed under section 1915(e). Further, the court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 25, 2009

/s/ John R. Adams
JOHN R. ADAMS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE